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Editors' Comments

The Editors are pleased to announce that with this issue, the *UCLA Historical Journal* increases its circulation beyond California, to over one hundred colleges and universities nationwide. A highly favorable response to the *Journal*'s first issue (1980) and the large number of fine manuscripts submitted in the past year have persuaded the Editors that with a national base, the *Journal* can meet its objective of publishing high-quality graduate student work and acquainting readers with findings and methodologies which may later become relevant to their own work. Furthermore, the Editors hope that the *Journal*, through its "Special Features" section, will serve as a forum for communicating information and issues of particular concern to graduate students. We intend that subsequent issues of the *Journal* will continue to draw upon the large, untapped reservoir of graduate talent, and we invite graduate students everywhere to submit their work for consideration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In addition to the invaluable criticism of manuscripts provided by faculty referees, the Editors thank the following individuals and UCLA organizations for their advice and support: the faculty and staff of the Department of History, Vice-Chancellor Victoria Fromkin, Dean Antony Orme, the Graduate Students Association, the Social Sciences Council, and the History Graduate Students Association. We also thank Professor Elizabeth Perry for permission to use her advice on course proposals and dissertation-publishing as the basis for part of this year's "Special Features."

On a personal note, as the outgoing Editor-in-Chief, I would like to thank the outgoing Managing Editor, Elliot Kanter, for his firm hand on the *Journal*'s finances and technical production, and for his friendly advice on more general matters. It would be impossible to specify the numerous chores willingly assumed by other Editorial Board members; for their perceptive reviews of submitted articles and continuing help and hard work, I sincerely thank them. In addition Marilyn Turner deserves special recognition for her long hours and good humor in typing both this and the 1980 issue. Finally, I congratulate Bradford Newfield and Nancy Yamane, respectively the incoming Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor, and wish them the best of luck with future issues.

Douglas R. Littlefield
Editor-in-Chief

"They Never Stopped Watching Us": FBI Political Surveillance, 1924-1936

David Williams

> We never knew . . . about the way that Hoover's FBI kept track of us after the 1924 reform announcements. They never stopped watching us.
>
> --Roger Baldwin to Alan Westin, 1977[1]

Since 1976, when the "Church Committee" uncovered a pattern of FBI abuses dating back to the 1930s, considerable attention has focused on how the federal government can effectively control the FBI's domestic intelligence activities and prevent a resumption of widespread surveillance of lawful political activities. Legislation currently before Congress proposes to charter the FBI and spells out in considerable detail the Bureau's criminal and intelligence responsibilities. While the Justice De-

David Williams received his B.A. in History from Marquette University and completed his Ph.D. in modern American constitutional/legal history at the University of New Hampshire. He is currently a student at Cornell University's School of Law.

partment and representatives of civil liberties and professional organizations are still debating the particulars, both sides share a common goal: an effective law enforcement agency which will not violate the law in pursuit of its mission.[2]

This is the second major attempt in the Bureau's seventy-three year history to restrict FBI political surveillance. In May 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, armed with a mandate from President Calvin Coolidge to clean up the scandal-ridden Justice Department, ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to limit its investigations to violations of federal statutes. Stone's public statement, issued on May 15, marked a watershed in the history of civil liberties. For the first time, a high-ranking government official recognized that illegal surveillance constituted a serious threat to the democratic process:

> There is always the possibility that a secret police system may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly comprehended or understood. . . . It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those functions for which it was created and that its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach. . . . The [Federal] Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is only concerned with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which should be our first concern to cherish.[3]

With few exceptions, historians and contemporary policy makers have believed that the FBI did not engage in political surveillance activities until President Franklin Roosevelt formally rescinded Attorney General Stone's executive order in August 1936. Even the "Church Committee," which conducted the most thorough congressional investigation of FBI intelligence activities to date, did not question this assumption. As a result, the committee's reports provide little new insight into FBI political surveillance prior to 1936. However, FBI files obtained recently through the Freedom of Information Act confirm suspicions that FBI Director Hoover misled Attorney General Stone in 1924, and for the next twelve years used the FBI to gather information on activities of the Bureau's critics, and on labor and radical political organizations. The extent of this illegal surveillance has never been fully appreciated. These investigations allowed FBI Director Hoover to help set the Roosevelt Admin-

istration's internal security agenda.[4]

This essay will examine FBI surveillance of the following groups and activities: the American Civil Liberties Union, an early critic of political espionage; the Trade Union Educational League, a leftist labor organization; and mass political demonstrations. The essay will also consider the Bureau's cooperation with State Department intelligence officers who monitored the activities of United States citizens overseas, and show how such investigations were kept secret. FBI political surveillance during the first Roosevelt administration will also be examined. To fully understand the context, it is necessary to review the Bureau's initial reaction to Stone's 1924 directive.

On the surface, Hoover seemed eager to implement Stone's policy. On May 20, 1924, appearing before the Brookhart Committee investigating former Attorney General Harry Daugherty, Hoover testified that the FBI was no longer interested in political opinions. He told the committee: "[i]nstructions have been sent to officers in the field to limit their investigations in the field to violations of [federal] statutes." He announced that in the two weeks since he had assumed office, he had fired all of the notorious "dollar-a-year men" (political cronies hired by Daugherty and Hoover's predecessor, William J. Burns) and would continue to "eliminate from the forces such deadwood as has been in the [FBI]." New emphasis, Hoover stated, would be placed on future applicants' educational qualifications, rather than their political connections. Reassuring the committee of his sincerity and commitment to Stone's reforms, Hoover repeated his earlier pledge in his closing remarks. He reassured Senator Wesley Jones (Rep., Wash.) that Bureau investigations would be limited "absolutely to violations of Federal statutes, and that will be the policy followed by this bureau."[5]

These assurances aside, Hoover fought vigorously to maintain the scope of FBI authority. Five weeks after the Brookhart hearings, Hoover sent a long memorandum to Attorney General Stone responding to charges made by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Earlier that year, in a pamphlet entitled "The Nationwide Spy System Centering in the Department of Justice," the ACLU asserted that the FBI had "created a nation-wide system of espionage on radical and labor organizations, and on individuals connected with these movements . . . [and t]heir activities . . . constitute in affect a secret police system of a political character." In a bitter reply, Hoover advised Stone that during the past five years the Bureau had investigated only those persons and organizations that could be considered "ultra-radical," and only if "there [was] indication of a probable violation of a federal statute." Still smarting from the widespread criticism of the FBI's role in the 1920 deportation raids, Hoover defended FBI

intervention in the deportation process. "In many cases," he explained, "the aliens are charged with activities inimical to our institutions and government." "This activity of the [FBI] is perfectly proper and legal as such work has always been performed upon the request of the Secretary of Labor." Hoover denied that the FBI had ever wiretapped or used listening devices to eavesdrop on private conversations. The FBI had not, Hoover continued, as the ACLU had charged, seized evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, nor employed spies or undercover agents to "incite members to unlawful acts nor to get information calculated to help break strikes or to prevent labor union organization." The FBI Director concluded that "the Bureau has very rigid rules on matters of this kind," and that the ACLU's charges "cannot be proved."[6]

While Hoover's memo was primarily a detailed defense of the FBI's record, Hoover assured the Attorney General that the Bureau would conform to the new guidelines and that he had strictly prohibited surveillance of lawful political activities. "The agents of the [FBI] have been specifically instructed within the last month to confine their activities to investigations of matters in which there appear to have been or may probably arise a violation of a federal statute." The FBI also required all new special agents to attend a training session "at which time careful attention is given to defining the limitations of the duties of a Special Agent insofar as they apply to the rights of the public citizens at large." Consequently, "no innocent or loyal American" should have "any fear or objection to" the FBI.[7]

Hoover's open-ended criticism of the ACLU in this memorandum raises the possibility that Stone and his immediate successors may have been more ambivalent toward FBI political surveillance than is usually presumed. If this indeed was the case, Hoover and his superiors left no evidence that they amended Stone's order to accommodate limited political surveillance. Perhaps there was an unofficial, or verbal, understanding between Hoover, Stone, and his immediate successors that, under certain conditions, allowed the FBI to conduct internal security investigations even though no specific violation of the law was involved. While historians cannot dismiss this possibility, the available evidence militates against it.[8]

The heart of the issue concerned the Justice Department's position regarding American communists and the American Communist Party. The issue was particularly complex because the Party's platform called for the overthrow of the existing government and economic order. Shortly after Stone issued his order prohibiting FBI political surveillance, he asked Assistant Attorney General Earl J. Davis to review the "applicability of federal criminal statutes to Communist activities." On June 10, 1924, Davis reported that Communist Party activities did not

appear to violate any federal law. Because the FBI had been unable to prove that Party members had reached a "specific and definite agreement . . . to overthrow the government," the Justice Department could not indict Party members under section 6 of the Criminal Code (seditious conspiracy). The courts, Davis noted, had consistently ruled that section 6 required the government to "prove a conspiracy to use force against the federal government of its officers in their execution of the law." Successful prosecution of Party members was also unlikely under the Logan Act (1790), which prohibited "communication between American citizens and foreign governments when that correspondence was contrary to the best interests of the United States." While the FBI had proof that Party leaders in the United States were in close contact with the Communist International in Moscow, such communication did not violate the law because department lawyers had determined that the Soviet Union did not qualify as a *de jure* government. FBI Director Hoover ostensibly agreed with the findings in the Davis memorandum. On October 10, 1924, Hoover told Assistant Attorney General William Donovan that: "[i]t is, of course, to be remembered that the activities of the Communists and other ultra-radicals have not up to the present time constituted a violation of the federal statutes, and consequently, the Department of Justice, theoretically, has no right to investigate such activities as there has been no violation of the Federal laws."[9]

For the next sixteen years, Hoover publically maintained this position. For example, on May 14, 1925, FBI Director Hoover informed Stone that "from time to time information concerning communist activities in the U.S. is *voluntarily* furnished to . . . the Bureau. However, the Bureau is making no investigations of such activities inasmuch as *there is no violation of a Federal Penal Statute involved* [emphasis added]." Attorneys General John Sargent (1925-1929) and William Mitchell (1929-1933) demonstrated no desire to resurrect the Bureau's anti-radical division, nor was it likely that Hoover tried to persuade his superiors to initiate investigations of activities he thought to be subversive, given the failure of past efforts of this sort. In fact, as will be seen, Hoover went to considerable trouble to convince department officials that the Bureau was strictly following Stone's policy.[10]

Beneath the facade of cooperation and obedience, the FBI persisted in old ways. Even as Acting Director Hoover announced the dramatic break from past policies and publically pledged FBI cooperation and support for the Stone directive, the FBI field office in Los Angeles forwarded to Washington headquarters hundreds of pages of reports on the activities of the local ACLU chapter. Captioned "Attention Mr. Hoover," these investigative reports carefully summarized the minutes of the organization's weekly meetings, executive board meetings, the ACLU's plans for fu-

ture demonstrations and litigation, the group's financial resources and the names of important contributors. On May 23, 1924, special agent Arthur Hopkins informed the Bureau that "[t]here were about four hundred people at the [weekly] meeting of the ACLU. . . . Dr. [Clinton] Taft asked that the collection be larger than usual as there was rent to pay and the cost of the programs [sic]."[11]

Official infiltration also continued. An FBI informer was a member of the group's executive board and provided the Bureau with inside information about the ACLU's policy and administrative and financial decisions. On September 26, 1924, special agent Hopkins outlined the executive board's plans to challenge compulsory military training at the University of California, labor injunctions, and California's criminal syndicalist laws. Hopkins reported that the ACLU, in cooperation with the IWW, decided to "start a fight for civil liberties in Los Angeles harbor [sic]," and to sue former L.A. Police Chief August Volmer for arresting and jailing peaceful picketers. "Upton Sinclair . . . promised to get for Mr. [Robert] Whitaker his list of prominent people in all the nearby towns," Hopkins concluded, "so that he could visit them to solicit their aid in his work. Informant will also get a copy of this list."[12]

At the same executive board meeting, Reverend Taft announced that he had invited Federal District Court Judge Benjamin Bledsoe to address an open forum meeting scheduled for October 26, 1924. On October 3, Hopkins informed FBI chief Hoover that Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) L.C. Wheeler had "confidentially informed Judge Bledsoe [that the ACLU sponsored the open forum] and also to the character of the organization which had issued the invitation." The briefing achieved satisfactory results, and on October 9, Bledsoe decided not to address the meeting. The ACLU, the judge told Reverend Taft, is "an institution with whose plans, purposes and methods I have no sympathy at all. . . . I must withdraw the acceptance I made to speak." At the judge's request, the FBI agreed "to furnish [Bledsoe] with a confidential summary of the history, activities and personnel of the ACLU."[13]

Although Hoover assured Attorney General Stone that the Bureau would no longer cooperate with local "red squads," the FBI actively solicited information from police intelligence units about radical activities. On March 28, 1925, special agent Hopkins forwarded to Washington headquarters "confidential reports covering the activities [of the ACLU and the IWW]" compiled by the Los Angeles police department. "This office and this agent work in very close cooperation [with the LAPD's radical section]. . . . [T]his agent knows, and assists in directing, all the operatives furnishing the data upon which these reports are based." The field office's contact with the L.A. "red squad" presumably continued well into the

1930s even though Hopkins closed the office's investigation of the ACLU in November 1925.[14]

Hoover ordered two ad hoc investigations of the New York ACLU after regular coverage ended in late 1925. On February 27, 1929, responding to a personal request from the Director, New York SAC C.D. McKean conducted "a confidential undercover inquiry . . . at the main office of the ACLU." Apparently, Hoover had heard that the New York chapter had described "white slave traffic," once the mainstay of FBI investigative work and still an important part of the annual budget request, as a "minor offense." The investigation, reflecting Hoover's prurient interests, uncovered nothing. "A search of the ACLU's files from January 5, 1928 to February 21, 1929," McKean noted, "failed to develop any such circular as the one described by you."[15]

In March 1931, Hoover requested FBI clerks to compile a history of the ACLU and a list of the organization's leaders. On March 19, C.G. Schenken completed the report. Following a concise summary of the ACLU's positions on such issues as free speech, conscientious objection to military service, and civil rights, the memo provided biographical information, gleaned from more comprehensive dossiers, on many prominent jurists, educators, and community leaders. The list included Jane Addams, Clarence Darrow, John Dewey, Ernst Fruend, Charles Amidon, and Felix Frankfurter. Schenken's portrait of Frankfurter demonstrates the Bureau's ideological biases, its extremely narrow focus, and its inability to distinguish between a reformer and a radical. Schenken referred to a letter in which Theodore Roosevelt accused Frankfurter of excusing anarchists who "threaten democracy and civilization." In 1917, as counsel to the President's Mediation Commission, Frankfurter had found that Tom Mooney and Warren Billings had not received a fair trial. In his report, Schenken maintained that Frankfurter "accepted [Roosevelt's] characterizations as more complimentary than defamatory." Frankfurter, Schenken continued, had enthusiastically engaged in "Communistic and Workers Party movements" and had also "supported and cooperated with the Socialist Party, Socialist Labor Party Workmen's Defense Conference, Labor Defense League and Communist Party." While it could be argued that this exercise did not overtly violate the Stone directive (no field investigations were conducted), it certainly demonstrates that the Bureau considered itself a political police.[16]

The monthly reports on radical activities filed by FBI field offices further support this conclusion. The summaries provided the FBI with a useful overview and improved the accessibility of information in its possession. Using these summaries, FBI clerks could compile dossiers, organizational histories, and special reports in a fraction of the time it would have taken to page through case

files and other records.[17]

The report submitted by special agent John Haas on radical activities in the New York area during May 1925 reflected these priorities. General categories included "Radical Activities," "Individuals," "Radical Meetings," "Negro Activities," "Japanese Activities," "Russian Affairs Abroad," and "General." The "Radical Activities" section described a May Day rally sponsored by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and a celebration honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Workman's Circle held at Madison Square Garden. "The Public Speaker was Eugene V. Debs," Haas reported, "declaring that he spoke for all classes . . . when he called on the people to agitate for the release of Sacco and Vanzetti . . . and that when the working men throughout the world clasped hands they would be able to 'put an end to capitalism [sic] system, wipe it from the face of the earth and establish a working class republic throughout the world.'"[18]

FBI intimidation and harassment of the American labor movement also continued despite Attorney General Stone's opposition. Unlike his predecessors, Stone believed that the rights of workers to organize, demonstrate peacefully, picket, and strike were constitutionally protected. Hence, a primary goal of his 1924 directive was to insure strict government neutrality in industrial relations. FBI Director Hoover, however, shared none of Stone's predilections. In 1919, as head of the Bureau's General Intelligence Division (GID), Hoover claimed that communists had inspired seventy-five percent of the strikes in the United States. Unable to separate political rhetoric from basic issues such as wages, working conditions, and job security, Hoover equated labor militancy and strikes with treason. As a consequence, between 1924 and 1936, the FBI collected and analyzed information about the activities of radical labor organizations.[19]

William Z. Foster's Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) was a primary target of FBI surveillance during this period. Founded in 1921, the TUEL supported the formation of a labor party, recognition of the Soviet Union, and full equality for women, minority, and younger workers. While many of its leaders were avowed Marxists, the TUEL initially represented a broad coalition of communist and non-communist trade union members. Not a union itself, the TUEL required members to belong to an established union, and advocated labor organization along industrial rather than trade lines. To finance its work, the TUEL relied primarily on initiation fees, membership dues, and assistance from the Workers Party, but also received some support from the Red International Labor Unions (Profintern). Assistance from Profintern led the FBI to believe that TUEL was a "subversive" organization which served the interests of a foreign master and, therefore,

precluded it from "indulging or participating sincerely in any American movement."[20]

In early 1922 the FBI opened an offensive against the TUEL in an effort to smash the organization before it gained any influence in the labor movement. During the campaign, the FBI hired informers, regularly disrupted TUEL meetings, and compiled lengthy synopses on League activities, intentions, and strategy. In August 1922 FBI agents in cooperation with local officials raided a TUEL/Communist Party strategy meeting in Bridgman, Michigan and arrested Foster and fifteen other League officers under the Michigan syndicalist law. A September 1922 report attested to the effect of the FBI's tenacious efforts. The FBI agent concluded that constant surveillance had demoralized League members, "badly shaken up" League Secretary Foster, and because of "talk about there being a 'traitor' high up in the [TUEL], . . . [a]ll the reds are in favor of cleaning house."[21]

Following the Stone reform, the FBI found it necessary to cover TUEL affairs more discreetly. Emphasis shifted from crude, overt intimidation to an exclusive reliance on the work of paid informers. Whether for ideological or financial reasons, several TUEL officials regularly furnished the FBI with confidential information. In February 1927 an FBI informer attended a secret Communist Party/TUEL meeting in Chicago. Disturbed by a recent decline in active Party membership, from eleven thousand to seven thousand active members, fifty Party and TUEL leaders decided to emphasize the recruitment of minority and younger workers. "[I]t was decided," the informer advised the FBI, "that the Communist Party [and TUEL] from now on must devote at least seventy-five percent of its activities to trade union work." In January 1928 a confidential informer attended a TUEL conference in New York and reported that it was "most revolutionary." The delegates discussed "plans for breaking into the ranks of the American Federation of Labor," the basic strategy of the TUEL since its founding seven years earlier. Strikes led by TUEL in 1927, the informer learned, cost the League approximately $250,000, $100,000 of which was paid by Profintern. In a conversation with the informer, Foster optimistically claimed that "he expected real work on a bigger scale to result from the conference."[22]

FBI surveillance extended well beyond the TUEL to include the monitoring of political meetings and public rallies sponsored by liberal and radical organizations. Prior to Stone's 1924 order, some Bureau agents, assisted by local police, disrupted these meetings. But generally, FBI agents (or their hired informers) went only to jot down the names of the speakers and the main points of their addresses, and to estimate the size of the audience and its reaction to speeches. While Justice Department policy prohibited surveillance of this kind after Stone

took office, the FBI collected information about various protest meetings after 1924. The Bureau's investigations of the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee is a case in point.[23]

In the spring of 1927, the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee hoped to mobilize public opinion to persuade responsible government officials to stay the execution of the two convicted anarchists. Mass demonstrations, the committee thought, might succeed where legal appeals had not. On April 16 and July 7, the committee sponsored rallies in New York's Union Square which drew approximately twenty thousand persons. At the July 7 demonstration, Fiorello LaGuardia, Scott Nearing, Sidney Hillman, and Carlo Tresca addressed the crowd before New York City police broke it up with clubs and gas. FBI agent John Haas attended both events, noted the speakers' names, and summarized their speeches.[24]

FBI coverage of the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee's activities intensified as the scheduled date of execution drew near. On August 6, FBI Director Hoover instructed all agents-in-charge to "make every effort to keep fully informed as to the [activities of the defense committee] in your district, . . . see that every secrecy is maintained [and] keep me advised by wire of developments." Although Hoover later explained to Attorney General Sargent that these investigations were conducted to protect federal property and the lives of federal officers, several field offices indulged in general intelligence investigations wholly unrelated to potential violence or disorder.[25]

In the San Francisco Bay area, FBI agents contacted local "red squads" and assigned agents to work "under cover" to gather information concerning "radical activities." The St. Louis field office transmitted the names of individuals who participated in a peaceful protest a month earlier. On August 16, special agent E.J. Connelly submitted summaries of several meetings held at the Italian Fraternal Hall and clippings from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* which called for a stay of execution until new evidence could be thoroughly reviewed. From Butte, Montana, special agent D.H. Dickerson reported that a "confidential informant" planned to attend a meeting protesting the execution. The Atlanta SAC suspected that communists had infiltrated the defense committee and informed the Director he was "making a discreet and confidential investigation" of the matter.[26]

The Depression intensified Hoover's antipathy toward communism. As the United States slid slowly into its greatest economic crisis, and despair and public dissatisfaction with President Herbert Hoover's policies increased, many Americans took to the streets to protest unemployment and increasing poverty. The demonstrations

became known as "Hunger Marches." FBI Director Hoover wildly overexaggerated the Communist Party's appeal to the unemployed, fearing that it would exploit the Hunger Marches in an effort to drive a wedge between the American people and their government. Hence, the FBI closely monitored attempts to organize protests against the Hoover administration's economic policies.[27]

Veterans' marches were a prime investigative target. In May 1930 word reached FBI Director Hoover that the Communist Party had shown considerable interest in organizing ex-servicemen who had not received government pensions. I. Weiss, secretary of the Workers Ex-Servicemen League (WESL), contacted Charles Gwynne of the New York Chamber of Commerce and offered to sell Gwynne information concerning communist activities in the WESL. Gwynne, a former army intelligence officer, informed the FBI of Weiss's offer. On May 28 special agent C.D. McKean advised Hoover that, having conferred with "our own confidential informant [in the Communist Party]" and other intelligence officers in the New York area, Weiss "is a fraud and merely seeking a position," and should not be hired as an FBI informer.[28]

While the New York office chose not to employ Weiss, other paid informants in the Communist Party kept the FBI up to date on the WESL's plans. On January 20, 1931, in a letter to the State Department, Hoover concluded that the WESL was an "active Communist unit . . . and is at present trying to organize an impressive number of ex-servicemen for the purpose of a 'Hunger March' to Washington. The campaign is conducted by the league under the direction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party."[29]

In the spring of 1932, when the Bonus Army started to assemble on Anascotia Flats in Washington, D.C., FBI Director Hoover joined the chorus of officials who advised the President that the demonstration was a communist-inspired plot. By mid-summer over twenty thousand unemployed veterans had set up a make-shift camp which swiftly became a major political liability to the administration, symbolizing its inability to address social and economic problems effectively. In late July, exasperated by the refusal of the Bonus Army to leave the capital peacefully and convinced that "subversive influence obtained control" of the demonstration, President Hoover instructed the army "to restore order." On July 28, regular army units, using cavalry, tanks, and tear gas, routed the veterans, burned their temporary shelters, and, in the process, killed four and wounded hundreds.[30]

Following the riot, the press roundly criticized the President for failing to deal with the veterans more compassionately. On August 1, in an effort to allay this criticism, the President called the heads of several investigative agencies, including FBI chief Hoover, to the

White House and asked them to initiate investigations of communist infiltration of the Bonus Army. FBI field agents attended meetings protesting the administration's brutal treatment of the Bonus marchers and, assisted by railroad police, carefully monitored the movement of Bonus marchers through important rail yards. Chicago SAC W.A. McSwain assigned several agents to attend rallies and contacted H.A. Kline of the Hargrave Detective Agency and Lieutenant M. Mills of Chicago's "red squad" to solicit information about communist influence in veterans' organizations. New York SAC C.A. Appel informed the Bureau that at a rally held in Union Square the "WESL and the Communist Party openly accepted responsibility for the bonus march." "I instructed [special agent] Quinn to have his agents prepare affidavits of what took place last night" and to make general inquiries at banks used by the WESL "in order to prove that the source of [their] money was the Communist Party, or other Communist organizations or individuals." The FBI investigation, however, did not turn up any evidence, admissible in court, to prove that the Bonus march was "a red plot" and the federal grand jury investigating the riot indicted only three men, none of whom were communists.[31]

For the next two years, the spectre of a second Bonus Army haunted FBI Director Hoover. Field offices remained on constant alert and were instructed to report any attempt to organize a similar demonstration. On November 23, 1932, St. Louis SAC D.M. Ladd summarized informers' reports on Communist Party involvement in the proposed National Hunger March on Washington. Scheduled for December 5, the march drew about 3500 demonstrators who camped in a secluded park in the Northwest section of the city. On December 6, the marchers presented Congress a petition urging it to adopt a comprehensive unemployment insurance act, and then peacefully disbanded. On May 2, 1934, Hoover ordered FBI field offices to survey "all of the principle [sic] cities of the U.S. to determine the number of Bonus Marchers reported to be en route to Washington." In Salt Lake City, special agent Louis Wine conducted "an under-cover investigation of the WESL" and concluded that the "organization was engaged in communistic activities and probably the dissemination of communistic propaganda." On May 8 the New York office reported that fifteen hundred "Bonus advocates," who were "affiliated with [the] Communist Party of America" had left the city for Washington. On May 18, 650 "roughly clad men, a handful of women, a small boy and a dog," marched past the White House and the Capitol building, stopping only to pay their respects to those who had died in the 1932 riot.[32]

During the early postwar years federal officials had been quick to blame the Soviet Union for inspiring widespread domestic unrest. Believing that radical organizations were controlled and financed by the Bolsheviks, the FBI shared general intelligence information with the State

Department. At the Bureau's request the State Department monitored the activities of American citizens travelling abroad. Subjects of State Department surveillance included labor leaders, academics, and such prominent critics of the Justice Department as Felix Frankfurter and Swinburne Hale. An amendment to the 1916 Appropriations Act allowed the Secretary of State to request FBI investigations in special instances, such as the dynamiting of a consulate or the suspicious movements of a diplomatic attaché. But the informal exchange of intelligence information could not be justified under this law. Thus, FBI cooperation with the State Department was predicated upon the assumption that an individual "who advocates Marxism-Leninism might just as well be working as an agent of a foreign power because he is aiding his cause." The problem, of course, was that Hoover lumped together all advocates of change.[33]

Though it was not explicitly stated, the intent of Stone's 1924 directive was to preclude the FBI from sharing information about lawful political activities with the State Department or other federal agencies. Hoover addressed this subject in his July 21, 1924, memorandum to Stone, assuring the Attorney General that investigations conducted for the State Department were limited to violations of the passport laws. "The system, in fact, was based upon the apprehension of fugitives applying for passports to leave the country," Hoover explained, "and is still operated for that purpose." In December 1924 the Attorney General asked Hoover "whether the Bureau would have the authority to investigate Soviet and Communist activities within the United States for the State Department in connection with the question of the recognition of the Soviet Government." Hoover informed the Attorney General of the provisions of the 1916 Appropriations law, adding that the FBI could conduct such investigations only "upon formal request by *the Secretary of State and approval of the Attorney General* [emphasis added]."[34]

Despite these assurances, Hoover independently solicited information from, and provided data to, the State Department from 1924 through 1936. On October 5, 1927, Hoover informed Robert F. Kelley, chief of the State Department's Division of Eastern European Affairs, that the executive board of the TUEL would meet in December 1927 to discuss "the organization of Industrial Unions, a Labor Party," and a strategy to affiliate with "workers of other countries for the joint defense of common interests and establishing World Trade Union Unity." A month later, Hoover reported to Kelley that the "TUEL now controls the entire membership of all New York unions." The TUEL was about to implement plans, Hoover concluded, "to take over the executive power of the unions in this country."[35]

Through his confidential informants in the British labor movement, Kelley occasionally obtained TUEL docu-

ments which the FBI had been unable to secure. On October 4, 1929, Kelley sent Hoover a copy of the minutes of the TUEL's executive board meeting held in Cleveland in September. Prepared for exclusive use by the executive board, the minutes detailed TUEL finances and expenditures and its strategy for organizing workers in large American industries. Through these same channels, Kelley was able to obtain information concerning other labor union activities. In October 1929 Kelley sent Hoover a copy of a letter from the southern organizer of the National Textile Workers appealing for money to assist in the defense of workers charged with offenses stemming from the Gastonia, North Carolina, strike. Two and a half years later, in January 1932, Kelley forwarded Hoover a copy of the National Miners Union constitution, noting that the organization "is the most active of all communist unions in the United States at the present time."[36]

Hoover, then, had the best of both worlds: a clean public image based upon efficient conduct of the FBI's legitimate business, and the advantages of surreptitiously continuing illegal practices. But it was a delicately maintained world. While the FBI engaged in political surveillance in violation of Department policy, Director Hoover actively opposed legislation which would have required the Bureau to investigate subversive activities if Congress did not first make these activities illegal. In 1930 Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., chairman of the special committee investigating communist activities in the United States, sponsored a bill requiring the FBI "to investigate 'communist and revolutionary activity.'" In his appearance before the committee, Director Hoover argued that while communist doctrine posed a serious threat to the nation's security, the Bureau should not be required to investigate communists until Congress adopted a peacetime sedition law which clearly prohibited communist activities. "If the Bureau is given the power to investigate [subversive activities]" in the absence of such a law, Hoover insisted, "it would be in a position of having a mass of material with which nothing could be done." In January 1932 Hoover explained to Attorney General Sargent that Congressional authorization of political surveillance would jeopardize the Bureau's effectiveness because the legislation would lead to allegations that the FBI was a political police whose very existence threatened Constitutional rights: "The Department and the Bureau would undoubtedly be subject to charges in the matter of alleged secret and undesirable methods in connection with investigative activities, as well as to allegations involving charges of the use of 'Agents Provocateurs.'"[37]

Hoover's fervently anti-communist convictions best explain why he took risks to collect ostensibly useless information. His political views had been forged in the heat of the postwar Red Scare. He believed that communist conspirators had infiltrated every important government,

educational, and religious institution and "threaten the happiness of the community, the safety of every individual, and the continuance of every home and fireside. They would destroy the peace of the country and thrust it into a condition of anarchy and lawlessness and immorality beyond imagination." From 1919 through 1924, under GID chief Hoover's direction, the FBI had successfully disrupted the activities of radical political and labor organizations. Although Stone's order stayed similar aggressive intelligence activities after 1924, Hoover believed that it would be irresponsible for the Bureau to ignore the activities of individuals and organizations "antagonistic to the conception of American principles." Despite his testimony before the Fish Committee, Hoover presumed that any information gathered clandestinely was "intrinsically valuable" and would be useful in some future emergency. Thus, when the FBI drew up a 1943 custodial detention list, Bureau employees relied, in part, on information about an individual's participation in a 1932 hunger march to justify placing that person on the detention index.[38]

In view of the high stakes, the Bureau had to keep its political intelligence operations absolutely secret. To achieve this goal, FBI Director Hoover consciously sacrificed volume for confidentiality. The Bureau assigned only a limited number of agents to full-time internal security work and took the additional precaution of replacing these agents on a regular basis. Hoover realized that a disgruntled agent who knew too much could undermine the entire program by leaking important documents to a powerful congressman or a respected journalist. If unauthorized agents requested permission to initiate an investigation of political activities, the Director would personally quash the request and explain the "misunderstanding." On September 18, 1926, Detroit SAC H.W. Kage informed Hoover that he anticipated the TUEL to "spread propaganda" at an American Federation of Labor convention to be held the following week in that city. Kage, noting that special agent Haas of the New York field office "is expecting an investigation and report by this office," asked the Director if the Bureau "desired that this matter be covered." On September 25, Hoover notified Kage that "[n]o investigation of so-called radical activities should be undertaken by your office unless there is a violation of a Federal statute involved," adding that Haas's report had been "transmitted to you merely as information, not for any investigative attention by your office." Two years later, in an effort to tighten security, Hoover relieved the New York field office of its internal security responsibilities and ordered that informers in the TUEL and other communist organizations report directly to Washington headquarters.[39]

Hoover's fears that one of his agents might blow the whistle and expose illegal FBI surveillance were not en-

tirely groundless. On January 21, 1927, Franklin Dodge, a former FBI agent from Grand Rapids, Michigan, met with Senator Thomas Walsh, for years one of the Justice Department's harshest critics. Dodge privately told Walsh that the Bureau had continued to investigate radical activities after 1924 and had shared that information with the State Department's Eastern European Division. Dodge also informed Walsh that since at least 1920 the FBI had supplied "friendly" journalists with information from its extensive files in return for favorable publicity. He later sent Walsh a photostatic copy of a letter to prove this allegation. Dodge further alleged that Hoover had misused Bureau funds, spending them for private vacation and travel expenses. Nothing came of the meeting, except a promise from Walsh that when the Democrats took power once again he would see to it that Bureau policies would be fully reviewed and Hoover fired.[40]

Consistent with his public statements, Hoover refused private requests to investigate political activities. On January 10, 1927, Earl Hauck, a former FBI agent and attorney to the United Mine Workers, informed the Bureau's Indianapolis office that he expected "many of the active and most resourceful Communists" to attend the upcoming UMW convention. Hauck invited the Bureau to assign undercover agents "to watch the movements of the Communists at the convention." If the Bureau cooperated, he offered to exchange information gathered by his own undercover operatives. If necessary, Hauck offered to travel to Washington personally to brief FBI chief Hoover and finalize arrangements with him. On January 18, Hoover told Indianapolis SAC T.E. Bayliss to "advise Mr. Hauck that this Bureau is unable to take any investigative action except in cases where there is reason to believe that the existing Federal laws . . . have been violated." On January 15, 1935, Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana phoned the Bureau to find out if the TUEL was a "communist organization." After consulting Assistant Director E.C. Tamm, special agent R.L. Fagan returned Ludlow's call and informed him that the FBI "had made no investigation of the TUEL." It was his personal opinion, Fagan continued, that the TUEL "was generally thought of as a Communistic organization," but that the FBI "could make no official statement regarding this organization inasmuch as we had not conducted any investigation in connection therewith."[41]

In an imaginative strategy, FBI chief Hoover used unsolicited requests to demonstrate to his superiors that the Bureau strictly followed Department regulations. Upon receiving a request for an FBI investigation of political activities, Hoover would forward the letter to the Attorney General, reminding him that the Bureau lacked jurisdiction. On August 21, 1929, Curtis Bush, a businessman from the midwest, informed the Justice Department that the TUEL was "very busy in trying to get recruits and organize some industries" in the area. "If it is at all possible,"

Bush declared, "I think the Government should send in a trained investigator to keep track of the activities of these Communists." In an August 26 memorandum, FBI Director Hoover advised Assistant Attorney General Oscar Luhring that the FBI could not investigate Bush's charges. "This Bureau, as you know, does not investigate any matters unless [a federal law has been violated]." "Communist activities, including the activities of the TUEL, are not matters which have received . . . the investigative attention of this Bureau."[42]

Although Stone's order was not officially revised until August 1936, FBI surveillance policy changed substantively during the second year of the Roosevelt administration. With the exception of the investigation of the Bonus Army, Presidents Coolidge and Hoover did not find it necessary to use the FBI to collect general intelligence information. It would be a mistake to conclude that this stemmed from a genuine commitment to free expression and association. Coolidge and Hoover, for example, had no fundamental objection to state suppression of radicals, the use of labor injunctions to break strikes, blacklisting, and other corporate union-busting activities. Rather, Stone's reforms fit the Republican model of federalism which emphasized decentralization of power. Franklin Roosevelt brought to the Presidency a more spacious view of federal and executive authority than either of his two predecessors. On May 18, 1934, with great fanfare, Roosevelt signed into law a series of bills which greatly increased the scope of FBI jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Ten days earlier, Roosevelt had quietly and unilaterally extended the FBI's authority to investigate political activity, and by the end of the year, Stone's order had been reduced to a dead letter. FBI chief Hoover relished his new role as the President's intelligence valet and oversaw these investigations with great enthusiasm.[43]

A little less than two months before Roosevelt's inauguration, Adolph Hitler took power in Germany. Almost immediately the spread of fascism threatened the future of European and world peace. Ultra-rightists in the United States, many of whom openly sympathized with the Nazis, complained that President Roosevelt and his administration were, among other things, tools of the international communist conspiracy. While much of the right-wing rhetoric was innocuous, ties between the German government and several rightist splinter groups, including the German-American Bund, led to suspicions that Bundists were "Fifth Columnists," ready to undermine American faith in democratic institutions. Many important federal officials, including the President himself, shared these suspicions and on May 8, 1934, Roosevelt convened a conference at the White House to discuss the problem. At the meeting, attended by Attorney General Homer Cummings, Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morganthau, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins,

Secret Service chief W.H. Moran, and FBI chief Hoover, Roosevelt instructed the FBI to gather general intelligence information on the activities of the Nazi movement in the United States and determine if the German embassy or consulate "may have any connection with the [group]." In their search for a jurisdictional basis for the investigation, the conferees decided that the FBI should cooperate with the Immigration Bureau, then still a part of the Labor Department, "since the only federal law that might be applicable to [the investigation] at the present time would be the Immigration law." Two days later, Hoover ordered the Bureau's field offices "to initiate an intensive investigation of activities of the Nazi group . . . [and this] should be considered as a so-called intelligence investigation."[44]

In a further extension of the Bureau's authority, Roosevelt asked Hoover to investigate a domestic labor crisis. Unlike the investigation of American Nazis, the President made no attempt to justify the jurisdictional basis of the inquiry. On September 1, 1934, Francis J. Gorman, vice-president of the United Textile Workers (UTW) called for a general strike against mills from Maine to Georgia. Throughout the summer mill owners had failed to bargain in good faith, refusing to raise wages, improve working conditions, or comply with section 7(a) of the National Recovery Act. By September 4, over 175,000 workers had joined the picket lines and within several days, another 200,000 persons walked off their jobs. "The general strike in the textile industry," Robert R. Brooks writes, "was unquestionably the greatest single industrial conflict in the history of American organized labor."[45]

In Rhode Island, where the industry employed fifty thousand workers, members of the UTW picketed every mill. Governor T.H. Green, claiming that the Communist Party had inspired the walkout, called out the National Guard to suppress the strike. The display of force "triggered violence." Rioting spread from Saylesville to Woonsocket and threatened several nearby towns. The state legislature refused Governor Green's request to ask for federal assistance to suppress the strike and, even though federal law required the legislature's approval, Green appealed to the President to dispatch federal troops.[46]

Upon receiving a telegram from Governor Green which maintained that the "'Communist party and the lawless element' were 'destroying cities and towns,'" Roosevelt asked the FBI to investigate the "actual conditions existing in the strike area." On September 14 Hoover reported that following initial confrontations, conditions had stabilized and that his agents had "observed nothing which could possibly justify the use of Federal troops." Although the memo accurately reported important information concerning a potentially serious crisis, Hoover inferred that the violence was politically motivated. "Numerous

Communists from New York and Connecticut have been arrested throughout the state," Hoover claimed, adding that "[c]onsiderable Communistic literature has been found in the Communist headquarters in Providence."[47]

The Roosevelt White House also used the FBI to screen organizations that had criticized administration policies. On December 5, 1934, Wilma Meredith, secretary to White House aide Stephen Early, phoned Hoover to solicit information about the ACLU. The ACLU's executive board had requested a meeting with the President and invited him to prepare a message outlining the administration's positions on such politically sensitive issues as the rights of labor to organize, and the proposed federal anti-lynching law, for an upcoming conference on the New Deal and civil liberties. FBI Director Hoover agreed to "prepare" a background memorandum for Early's use, but advised Meredith that "this organization does not bear a particularly good reputation . . . [and] that a message from the President might dignify an organization which should not be dignified." In the recent past, Hoover continued, the ACLU had sponsored "vigorous and vicious campaigns for what they call 'civil liberties'" and, for that reason, a statement by the President "might offend many who hold to conservatism and law enforcement." The White House apparently agreed with Hoover that Presidential recognition of the ACLU would have serious political consequences, and Roosevelt neither met with ACLU representatives to discuss civil liberties issues nor sent a message to the conference.[48]

By 1936, then, Roosevelt and Hoover had developed an "understanding" unique in the relationship between the President and agency heads, who normally are responsible to the relevant cabinet officers. Roosevelt knew that Hoover was not overly concerned with formality and would ignore jurisdictional problems that would have otherwise barred FBI intelligence investigations. Hoover, in turn, understood that the President, like himself, was given to "a natural affinity for the intelligence process, a gossipy and voyeuristic delight in the insider's role, and a callousness to the claims alike of privacy and free expression." Thus, as his fears of "subversive activities" mounted, Roosevelt consulted with Hoover, and not his superior, Attorney General Cummings, nor Congress. During his August 1936 meeting with Roosevelt, Hoover was able to persuade him that labor militancy and domestic radicalism, not simply Nazism, constituted a serious threat to the nation's security. Following this discussion, Roosevelt officially (if secretly) rescinded the Department ban on non-criminal investigations, issuing the FBI an open-ended mandate to scrutinize political and labor activities.[49]

One of the most striking and disturbing characteristics of FBI political surveillance between 1924 and 1936 is the lackadaisical attitude of Congress and the Execu-

tive. In 1924, when Stone announced his reform, he took no positive steps to prevent the FBI from simply continuing political investigations under a new guise. He did not, for example, force the FBI to turn over to him documents which would have proven the political nature of many FBI investigations and that Hoover, despite his disclaimers, directed many of these illegal investigations. Congress did little better. Following its investigation of former Attorney General Daugherty and the politicization of the FBI under William Burns, Congress allowed the executive to clean its own house and did not seriously consider legislation to prevent illegal FBI surveillance. This abdication of authority would have serious consequences when, on the eve of the second World War, the FBI intensified its surveillance of lawful political activities and, on its own initiative, developed a custodial detention plan to hold "subversives" in case of an emergency.[50]

FBI abuses during the Cold War such as the Bureau's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), it should be noted, were more of a variation on a familiar theme than an original composition. While FBI harassment of dissidents following the second World War was much broader and more intensive than in the early 1920s, the methods employed by the Bureau (e.g., physical surveillance, the use of informers and agents provocateurs, planted stories, and cooperation with state and local "red squads") to intimidate left-wingers were essentially the same. Yet the eerie similarities between the FBI's campaign against the TUEL and other organizations in the 1920s and latter-day COINTELPRO's are not simply evidence of the Bureau's unyielding hostility to dissent; they are also dramatic manifestations of a cultural and political chauvinism deeply rooted in American history. It is unlikely that the FBI could have indulged in intensive political espionage and waged war on radicalism without public assent and official acquiescence. In this sense, Attorney General Stone's declaration was out of step with a public opinion lacking genuine tolerance of minority rights, opinion more adequately reflected by FBI Director Hoover's hysterical incantations.[51]

Nevertheless, Hoover felt obliged to give at least lip service to Stone's reforms. The fact that he had to repudiate the Bureau's anti-radical policies in 1924 in order to win Stone's confidence, his awareness that FBI surveillance had to be conducted secretly, and the cessation of aggressive intelligence activities all indicate that Hoover believed that many conscientious Americans were less than willing to sacrifice "due process" at the altar of national security. Even Franklin Roosevelt, at the height of his power and popularity, was reluctant to announce a unilateral resumption of FBI political surveillance. Only after Germany had shattered the fragile world peace in September 1939 did the President publicly author-

ize a limited FBI role in the investigation of "subversive activities."[52]

This respect for law, however transparent, does suggest how individual rights might be protected from official interference. Federal legislation alone cannot change the popular prejudices and myths nor prevent the national emergencies that give sanction to official vigilantism. Congress can, however, adopt an FBI charter which strictly prohibits political surveillance and aggressive intelligence and insures accountability through independent inspection of FBI files and its intelligence activities. Given this mandate, it is less likely that the President or his subordinates would violate the law in security's name.[53]

NOTES

1. "'They Never Stopped Watching Us': A Conversation Between Roger Baldwin and Alan F. Westin," *Civil Liberties Review* 4 (Nov./Dec. 1977): 25.

2. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Committee on Federal Legislation. *A Charter for the FBI* (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1980); John Elliff, *Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

3. American Civil Liberties Union, *The Nationwide Spy System Centering in the United States Department of Justice* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1924), p. 3.

4. A partial list of historians reaching this conclusion includes Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York: Knopf: distrib. by Random House, 1980); Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans: From Hoover to the Huston Plan* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976); Morton Halperin, et al., *The Lawless State* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976); Sanford Ungar, *FBI* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Fred J. Cook, *The FBI Nobody Knows* (London: Macmillan, 1964); William Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Donald Johnson, *The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1963); Paul L. Murphy, *The Meaning of Freedom of Speech: First Amendment Freedoms From Wilson to FDR* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972); Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the American People* (New York: Random House, 1956); Max Lowenthal, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (New York: Sloane, 1950). Several authors have noted in their footnotes that the FBI investigated political activities between 1924 and 1936, but none offers a sustained analysis of these investigations. See especially, Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, pp. 255-256; Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 336; Jerold Auerbach, *Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), p. 30. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (1976), and Final Report, *Supplementary and Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (1976). Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. Because of the processing fees involved in my more extensive FOIA request, this essay wilbe based on FBI files released by the Bureau prior to May 1981. A fee waiver request and appeals are pending, and if granted, files compiled on more than twenty organizations and thirty-six individuals will be forthcoming. Files on the following organizations have been released as a result of my own and others' FOIA requests: Workers' Ex-Servicemens League, Trade Union Educational League (re-named the Trade Union Unity League in the late 1920s), United Mine Workers, United Textile Workers, Unemployed Citizens Council, American Civil Liberties Union, and the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee. FBI files on the ACLU are located at the ACLU's New York offices and can be seen upon request. The files on the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee are in the possession of the Boston Public Library and also can be seen upon request. The remainder are in the author's possession.

5. Senate Select Committee on the Investigation of the Attorney General,

Hearings, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924), pp. 3251-3263.

6. Hoover to Stone, 7/31/24, FBI files, ACLU. The ACLU, Hoover claimed, was "consistently and continually advocating . . . the attempt on the part of the communistic element to paralyze labor unions." The ACLU's existence, Hoover continued, "depends largely upon its continued agitation and the fostering of the confusion in a defense of the terms 'liberty' and 'license.'" Hoover to Stone, 7/31/24, FBI files, ACLU. Recent research demonstrates that contrary to Hoover's denials in the 7/31/24 memorandum, the FBI regularly eavesdropped, wiretapped, broke into houses, meeting halls, and offices to gather evidence, hired informers who became agents provocateurs, and spied on a wide variety of lawful political activities. See especially, David Williams, "'Sowing the Wind': The Deportation Raids of 1920 in New Hampshire," *Historical New Hampshire* 34 (Spring 1979): 13-18; "'They Never Stopped Watching Us': A Conversation Between Roger Baldwin and Alan Westin," *Civil Liberties Review*, p. 20; Donald Johnson, *Challenge to American Freedoms*, pp. 75-78. Also see, National Popular Government League, *To the American People: Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Justice Department* (Washington, D.C.: National Popular Government League, 1920), pp. 29-30.

7. Hoover to Stone, 7/31/24, FBI files, ACLU.

8. Athan Theoharis, in *Spying on Americans*, raises the possibility that Cold War Presidents might have given similar verbal authorization to the FBI to initiate custodial detention programs; see pp. 40-64. There is at least one example, however, of Hoover attempting to persuade an Attorney General that there was something insidious about an organization like the ACLU. On September 9, 1924, Hoover sent Stone a copy of a letter written by ACLU Director Roger Baldwin to Clinton Taft of the California ACLU which outlined the organization's official policy on defending the right of communists to free speech and association. The letter was stolen sometime in August 1924 by one of the Bureau's undercover agents still operating within the group. Hoover told Stone that the letter indicates "very clearly what the views of the American Civil Liberties Union are with regard to the right of freedom of speech and freedom of press." There is no indication in the departmental records that Stone ever read the memo, or if he did, what he replied. Hoover to Stone, 9/9/24, Justice Department file 202600-823, Record Group 60, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

9. William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 241-243; Senate Select Committee, *Supplementary and Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, p. 389.

10. Senate Select Committee, *Hearings*, p. 553. Little is known about Hoover's relationship with Attorneys General Sargent and Mitchell. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that Hoover ever broached the subject of political surveillance with either man.

11. Hopkins to Hoover, 8/23/24, FBI files, ACLU.

12. Hopkins to Hoover, 9/26/24, FBI files, ACLU.

13. Hopkins to Hoover, 9/26/24; Hopkins to Hoover, 10/3/24; Bledsoe to Taft, 10/9/24; FBI files, ACLU.

14. Hopkins to Hoover, 3/28/25; "American Civil Liberties Union. Southern California Branch. Activities. L.A., California. Jan'Feb'March 1925"; FBI files, ACLU. "This case," Hopkins reported, "is being closed for the reason that no special investigations of the activities in questions are being made . . . . Case will be re-opened in the event anything of importance develops." The San Francisco, Chicago, New York, New Haven, and Pittsburgh field offices also maintained close ties with local "red squads" throughout the period. See Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, FBI files, Boston Public Library; WESL FBI files, author's possession.

15. McKean to Hoover, 2/27/29, FBI files, ACLU.

16. Schenken to Hoover, 3/19/31, FBI files, ACLU.

17. United States Department of Justice, *Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1920* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 172-179 and *Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1921* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 128-131; Skully to Hoover, 8/15/21, FBI file BS 202600-33-302, FBI Investigative Files, 1908-1922, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Dodge to Walsh, 2/2/27; GID Bulletin, 6/25/21, Box 278, Thomas Walsh Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

18. Haas Report, 5/31/25, FBI files, ACLU.

19. See Alpheus Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law* (New York: Viking, 1956), pp. 255-260, 550-555. Irving Bernstein, *The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1941* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1970), pp. 635-681; Williams, "'Sowing the Wind,'" p. 17. Under the direction of GID chief Hoover, the FBI infiltrated every major labor organization from 1919-1924. See General Index, FBI Investigative Files, 1908-1922, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also, J. Edgar Hoover, *Masters of Deceit* (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 67-71. In 1927 FBI agent John Haas labeled an investigation of the TUEL under the caption "Treason."

20. William Z. Foster, *History of the Communist Party of the United States* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), pp. 196-210; Daniel Bell, *Marxian Socialism in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967),

pp. 341-345; Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 236-239; "Attorney General Palmer on Charges Made against the Justice Department by Louis F. Post and Others," House Rules Committee, *Hearings*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (1920), p. 154.

21. Michael Belknap, "The Mechanics of Repression: J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation and the Radicals, 1917-1925," *Crime and Social Justice* 7 (Spring/Summer 1977): 52-53; Morton to Hoover, 9/5/22, FBI files, TUEL, author's possession.

22. Peyronnin to Hoover, 2/18/27; Haas to Hoover, 1/30/28; FBI files, TUEL.

23. Paul Murphy, *World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties in the United States* (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 71-132; Thomas Lawrence, "Eclipse of Liberty: Civil Liberties in the U.S. During the First World War," *Wayne Law Review* 21 (1974): 33-112; H.C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite, *Opponents of the War: The Story of the Persecution of Anti-War Groups* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957); FBI Investigative Files, 1908-1922, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

24. G. Louis Joughin and Edmund M. Morgan, *The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 254-255; Haas Report, 4/20/27, 7/11/27, FBI files, Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee.

25. Hoover to SAC's, 8/6/27; Hoover to Sargent, 10/10/27, FBI files, Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee.

26. Wine to Hoover, 8/15/27; Connelly to Hoover, 8/11/27; DeNett to Hoover, 8/23/27; Dickerson to Hoover, 8/15/27; FBI files, Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee.

27. Irving Bernstein, *The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1970), pp. 415-455; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1957), pp. 166-176, 248-269.

28. McKean to Hoover, 5/28/30; Weiss to Gwynne, undated; FBI files, WESL, author's possession.

29. Hoover to Kelley, 1/20/31, FBI files, WESL.

30. Sanford Ungar, *FBI*, p. 59; Donald J. Lisio, *The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy and the Bonus Riot* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1974), pp. 229-230, 245-247.

31. Fay to Hoover, 7/2/33; Appell to Hoover, 7/31/33; McSwain to Hoover, 8/1/32; Nalls to Hoover, 8/8/32; Quinn to Hoover, 8/1/32, 11/23/32; Dunn to Hoover, 8/8/32, 8/31/32; Connelly to Hoover, 8/1/32, FBI files, WESL.

32. Ladd to Hoover, 11/23/32; *New York Times*, 12/7/32, p. 3; 12/5/32, p. 1; Hoover to Howe, 8/2/34; Reinecke to Hoover, 5/3/33; Dowd to Hoover, 5/9/34; Little to Nathan, 5/9/34; Fay to Hoover, 5/9/34, FBI files, WESL; *New York Times*, 5/4/34, p. 10; 5/12/34, p. 2; 5/19/34, p. 14.

33. United States Department of Justice, *Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1920* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 178-179, and *Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1921* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 130-131; Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 17-20. See also, David Caute, *The Great Fear* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 115; Joan Jensen, *Price of Vigilance* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 14-16.

34. Hoover to Stone, 7/21/24, ACLU files; Senate Select Committee, *Supplementary and Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, pp. 389-390.

35. Hoover to Kelley, 10/5/27, 11/22/27, FBI files, TUEL, author's possession.

36. Kelley to Hoover, 10/4/29, 1/12/32, FBI files, TUEL.

37. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings*, FBI, VI, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (1976), pp. 555-557; Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 47-51.

38. "Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made against the Justice Department by Louis F. Post and Others," House Rules Committee, *Hearings*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (1920), p. 154; Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, p. 154. "[P]olitical surveillance," Donner writes, "is a continuous process of people-watching conducted in many cases for years, in order to develop information for use at some time in the future . . . [and i]nformation derived from clandestine sources is assumed to be intrinsically valuable--else why go after it." Ibid., pp. 24-25. The FBI's custodial detention plan is discussed in considerable detail by Athan Theoharis in *Spying on Americans*, pp. 40-64; Athan Theoharis, "The Truman Administration and the Decline of Civil Liberties: The FBI's Success in Securing Authorization for a Preventive Detention Program," *Journal of American History* 64 (Spring 1978): 1010-1030; Robert Goldstein, "The FBI's Forty-Year Plot," *The Nation* 227 (July 1, 1978): 10-15. Seattle field office to Washington, 7/8/43, FBI files, UCC, author's possession. The name of the individual was withheld by the FBI under section b(7)c, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.

39. Kage to Hoover, 9/18/26; Hoover to McKean, 2/25/26, FBI files, TUEL.

40. Dodge to Walsh, 2/2/27; Brennan to Dodge, 11/22/20; Walsh to Baker, 2/9/26; Walsh to Messervy, 3/5/26; Walsh to Durborow, 3/25/26, box 278, Walsh

MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. In early 1933 President-elect Roosevelt nominated Walsh to head the Justice Department. Since Walsh's contempt for Hoover and the FBI was no secret, it appeared that Hoover's days at the Bureau were numbered. On March 2, 1933, however, Walsh died en route to the inauguration and Hoover survived the scare. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 3/3/33; FBI file 62-28331, author's possession.

41. Bayliss to Hoover, 9/5/28; FBI files, UMW, author's possession; Haas to Hoover, 9/5/28; Fagan to Tamm, 1/15/35, FBI files, TUEL, author's possession.

42. Bush to Attorney General, 8/21/29; Luhring to Hoover, 8/26/29; Hoover to Luhring, 8/26/29, FBI files, TUEL, author's possession; Hoover to Dodds, 12/19/31, FBI files, WESL, author's possession. In an October 1975 analysis of FBI jurisdiction over domestic security investigations, the Bureau cited one of Hoover's denials as evidence that the FBI "followed [Stone's] policy from its inception." On October 7, 1925, Hoover told Colonel James H. Reeves, General Staff, War Department, that "general investigations into radical activities by our various field offices were discontinued some time ago by reason of certain changes in policy, program procedure, etc." Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations, *Hearings*, FBI, VI, p. 554.

43. Samuel Walker, *Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 184-185; Ungar, *FBI*, pp. 76-77; Arthur Millspaugh, *Crime Control by the National Government* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1937), pp. 48-53. See generally Irving Bernstein, *The Lean Years*. Roosevelt, it should be noted, had never been a supporter of the rights of dissidents. In 1920, while campaigning for the Vice-Presidency, he claimed that the 1919 takeover of the IWW headquarters by a mob led by members of the American Legion was "a form of red-blooded patriotism." Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, p. 54.

44. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations, *Hearings*, FBI, VI, pp. 559-560. Richard W. Steele, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Spring 1979): 15-32.

45. Quoted in Bernstein, *Turbulent Years*, p. 309.

46. Bernstein, *Turbulent Years*, pp. 310-312.

47. Hoover to Stephens, 9/14/34; Hoover to Cummings, 9/14/34; McKean to Hoover, 9/14/34, FBI files, UTW, author's possession. In *Turbulent Years*, Bernstein concludes that "the Communists had nothing to do with the strike. Communist headquarters in nearby New Bedford was shut down and the party's 'flame,' Ann Burlak, was driven out of Fall River." *Turbulent Years*, p. 312.

48. Hoover to Tamm, 12/5/34; Hoover to Early, 12/5/34. The report the FBI provided the White House was prepared by special agent C.G. Schenken in March 1931. See note 15, above. Wilma Meredith memorandum, 12/5/34, quoted in Auerbach, *Labor and Liberty*, p. 30; ACLU, *Liberty under the New Deal: The Record for 1933-1934* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1934), p. 3; Jonathan Mitchell, "Civil Liberties Under Roosevelt," *The New Republic* 83 (Dec. 26, 1934): 188-189.

49. Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 54, 56-59; Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, pp. 73-77.

50. See David Williams, "The Bureau of Investigation and Its Critics, 1919-1921: The Origins of Federal Political Surveillance," *Journal of American History*, forthcoming, December 1981. Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, pp. 40-64.

51. See Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, pp. 229-244, for an explanation of the effects of the Cold War on FBI internal security policies. Also see, William Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); and John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955).

52. Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, pp. 73-77; Donner, *Age of Surveillance*, pp. 56-59.

53. See generally, Elliff, *Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations*, and Association of the Bar of the City of New York, *A Charter for the FBI*.

The Artisans' Battle Against Political Subordination in Colonial New York City

Charles Frederick Collins

For New York City's artisanry, the period 1765-1770 was one of unprecedented political activity. During this period the artisans developed organizational methods which differed significantly from the traditional politics of colonial New York. Their activities ranged from organizing mass street demonstrations and large public meetings to participating actively in New York's electoral politics.[1]

This phenomenal rise in the political activity of the artisanry has sparked a continuing debate among colonial historians. Carl Becker began this debate in *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776*, by arguing that New York's politics in the 1760s were characterized not only by a struggle for independence from Britain, but also by a conflict between the lower and upper classes over who would benefit from independence.

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Becker's critics have attacked his thesis of class struggle. Some historians, such as Roger Champagne and Milton Klein, do not so much contest Becker's claim that colonial society was divided into an upper and lower class as much as they maintain that these class differences had no political meaning. They suggest that the lower class, like the upper class, actually supported either the DeLanceys or the Livingstons, New York's two ruling political families. Other historians, such as Patricia Bonomi, deny that New York was a class society and instead assert that New York's colonial society was pluralistic and consisted of myriad opposing interest groups based on religious, economic, regional, and ethnic differences. These historians' arguments largely discredit Becker's thesis regarding New York's colonial politics. Yet the success of Becker's critics should be attributed more to his weaknesses than to their strengths. Becker views New York's class conflict as a struggle between an unfranchised lower class and an upper class of merchant-landlords who held a monopoly on the politics of the colony. He characterizes the struggle as a battle for democracy. But as Becker's critics correctly observe, New York's lower class enjoyed one of the most liberal franchises among the colonies and had used it for many years before the revolutionary period.[2]

In spite of Becker's emphasis on the control of political power, the conflict between New York's lower class artisanry and the upper class merchant-landlords was just as much a struggle over differing economic perspectives. The merchant-landlords were part of an Atlantic economy, and their interests were best served by maintaining that economy. Artisans were linked to the Atlantic economy by their dependence on the merchants who both employed their services and acted as middlemen facilitating a smooth flow of raw materials and services between the various artisanal crafts. Yet artisans had fewer direct ties overseas because their production was largely for local and regional markets.

These differing economic interests were reflected in political conceptions. The merchant-landlords favored a government by the upper class. They supported democracy only as a method of deciding differences among themselves. To realize their conception of democracy, however, the merchant-landlords did not need to limit the franchise or discourage the artisans from voting. Instead, they used their transoceanic economic position to control the voting behavior of the artisanry.

Where the merchant-landlords preferred an oligarchy, the artisans' ideal was a community-based democracy of small producers, none of whom would be economically powerful enough to control other artisans' votes. This conception reflected the artisans' stronger local and regional connections. The destruction of the traditional system of

patronage and clientage, which bound the artisanry to the political desires of the merchant-landlords, was the prerequisite for the political freedom the artisans sought.

The struggle between the artisans and the merchant-landlords grew out of specific events in New York City during the period 1761-1770. The period was one of economic decline both in New York and in the Atlantic economy in general. Depression initially strengthened the client-patron relationship. Prolonged depression, however, such as that experienced in New York in the 1760s, forced many artisans living close to the margin of survival to reevaluate their position vis-à-vis the ruling class. This was compounded by the fact that the artisanry was not only under economic pressure, it was also involved in the colonies' struggle with Great Britain. Through this struggle the artisans not only developed organizational skills, they also adapted the ideology of the colonial struggle to their own economic conflict with the merchant-landlords. This ideology was based on two major concepts. The first was that decision-making should involve the entire community and not just the elite. The second was the belief that individual artisans had inalienable democratic rights as "Free Born Englishmen" as much as did the merchant-landlords.

As a result of the economy and the struggle with England, the period witnessed a constant process of polarization between the two classes, especially during the Stamp Act crisis, the 1768 and 1769 assembly elections, and the struggles over non-importation and the secret ballot in late 1769 and early 1770. It was during this period that New York City's artisanry awoke to their own interests and caused the burst of political activity which has interested so many historians.[3]

The system of political subordination, or deference, in colonial New York City enabled the merchant-landlords to control the political behavior of the artisanry. This system worked through a combination of patronage, or sponsorship, and economic clientage, or coercion. The potential success of the system was limited by both the economic position of individual artisans and the general economic situation of New York society. The greater economic independence of the more prosperous and skilled craftsmen probably enabled them to avoid clientage, although they could have opted to accept patronage, which was more condoned by colonial society. Less skilled and more dependent artisans would have been the most likely victims of coercion. Economic conditions within the colony limited the system, however. Although an expanding economy increased the system's potential for patronage, it also presented more options to artisans. Simultaneously, expansion increased employment and protected the lower artisans from economic coercion. Likewise, a declining economy increased the potential for coercion since

artisans were in a more marginal position, and it also decreased the availability of patronage positions. Although depression reinforced the power of economic coercion, a prolonged depression limited this effect because individual artisans, when threatened with unemployment or even starvation, broke the long-term chains of economic clientage in the interests of immediate survival.

Virtually all historians who have studied New York's colonial politics have commented on the bribery and intimidation which characterized the colony's general electoral practices. They have attributed this corruption to the primitive nature of colonial democracy.[4] But few have noted that the system of political subordination was more developed in the urban areas. In New York City the foundation of this political subordination was clientage, and it functioned through the most sophisticated methods of information gathering and dissemination known during the period. Not only was voting by voice (*viva voce*), and closely monitored, but the results were published and sold. Thus, the merchant-landlords had easy access to the voting records of the entire artisanry.[5] This coercive side of political subordination, although little publicized, was a mass phenomenon because patronage was limited in scope by the availability of official positions and party funds. There were, however, a multiplicity of economic connections between the merchant-landlords and the artisanry and it was these connections which facilitated the economic coercion of the artisans.

The system of control was relatively simple. During elections, "Candidates, their Friends, Agents, Attornies, Solicitors or Acquaintances" canvassed the artisans. Once the artisan-clients were informed of their patrons' interests, they were monitored to insure that they voted in the prescribed manner. This monitoring was done by the candidates or their agents who stood near the polling area to insure that artisan-clients realized they were being watched.[6] Naturally, the monitoring process was made easier after the election of 1761 when the poll lists began to be published.

The system of political subordination was strained throughout the period 1761-1770, however, by the colony's steadily deteriorating economic conditions which began with the decline of Britain's military presence near the end of the Seven Years' War. With the British withdrawal, New York's economy slid into a declining cycle of recession and recovery from which it did not escape until the early 1770s. This economic decline was caused by a constant process of monetary shrinkage and the end of the economic expansion New York had experienced as a result of its strategic position as Britain's major supply depot in North America during the war and by changes in European food production.[7] It was these years of economic crisis that weakened the system of political deference.

The effects of the British withdrawal and the economic crisis were felt most by the artisans. Rising food prices caused by increasing European demand for flour drove many artisans into debt. The more marginal artisans faced starvation or poor relief. Simultaneously, as business declined, unemployment increased and wages for cartmen, laborers, mariners, and other unskilled artisans plummeted. To make matters worse, the artisans also faced competition for jobs from those British soldiers who remained stationed in New York. These soldiers were willing to work for wages which were far lower than those normally received by artisans. These problems became severe after 1763 and led to a partial breakdown in the traditional system of political deference.[8]

When the Seven Years' War ended in 1763, Britain was faced with the massive costs of garrisoning its new emppire in North America. Led by Prime Minister George Grenville, the British government planned to defray some of the costs of this enterprise by increasing taxation in the colonies. To carry out this plan, Grenville's administration imposed three new colonial taxes: the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Quartering Act of 1765. Although the acts were to help British finances, the combined effect of these acts on the colonies was the further depression of trade and drainage of specie.[9]

These new taxes, like the depression, were felt the most by the artisans. Unemployment increased in distilling and shipping industries due to the effects of the Sugar Act. The Stamp Act's tax on legal documents also injured the artisanry by placing heavy duties on indenturing and apprenticing agreements. The Quartering Act was the worst of the three taxes from the standpoint of the artisans. First, it taxed the artisans to billet the King's troops; and second, these same soldiers, who were willing to accept sub-standard wages, competed with the artisans for jobs.[10]

All classes of New York society united to oppose these taxes. Initially, they focused their efforts on the Stamp Act because the Stamp Act was an internal tax--one levied on goods and materials already in the colonies and not one, such as the Sugar tax, collected on products as they entered the colonies. The levying of an internal tax was viewed as a more severe threat to colonial rights. The unity of classes in their opposition to the Stamp Act was built around the commonly-held concepts of community, private property, and the inalienable rights of Englishmen. Colonial solidarity, however, was short-lived.

The artisans, who were the most threatened by the new taxes, were responsible for the break in unity. Having the most to lose from the Stamp Act, they responded to it so violently that they frightened the moderate section of the ruling class, the Livingston party, which controlled

the General Assembly at this time. The Livingston party believed that by petitioning Parliament they could obtain the repeal of the Stamp Act, and, to back this up, they hoped to lead a peaceful boycott of those transactions requiring stamps. The artisans, in contrast, supported tactics such as crowd actions and mass meetings which they thought would bring faster results. These tactics characterized their activities for the remainder of the decade, and forged strong links between the artisan community and the militant Sons of Liberty, an organization which had sprung to life in opposition to the Stamp Act.

It is unclear exactly how the Sons of Liberty were organized or led. Some of the emerging leaders of the new organization were ships' captains or merchants. One prominent leader was Captain James DeLancey, the head of the DeLancey party. Despite these upper class leaders of the Sons of Liberty, the majority of the rank and file members were artisans. Many of these artisans who were active in street demonstrations participated partly in deference to the Sons' non-artisan leaders. This was the case, for example, with the seamen Sons of Liberty who followed Alexander McDougall and Isaac Sears, both of whom were ships' captains.[11] Regardless of class distinctions within the Sons, their opposition to the Stamp Act was more active than the tactics of the Livingston party, and as such the group attracted the support of the artisanry as well as the attention of Parliament. As a result, the Stamp Act was repealed in March 1766.

The success of the anti-Stamp Act agitation demonstrated to the artisans the benefits of mass action and community organization. During the crisis the artisanry went beyond its traditional methods of agitation and crowd action based on occupational groupings responding to problems specific to their trades. Instead they began to organize their community as a whole. This organization was carried out by a small but militant minority, most of whom were enlisted in the Sons of Liberty, and it conflicted with the desires of the moderate Livingston party. Yet artisan actions were not completely class-based. The activity of the artisans was carried out both in the interests of some elements of the ruling class, such as James DeLancey's party, as well as for the artisan community itself. Even after the repeal of the Stamp Act, however, the artisans remained politically subordinate to the ruling class and its needs and ideology. New York City's artisans were political novices in 1765-1766, but the Stamp Act crisis taught them the value of organization. By 1769 the artisans were well-schooled in politics. They received this education during the bitter electoral contests of 1768 and 1769.

In the twelve months between February 1768 and January 1769, there were two Assembly elections in New York. These elections occurred in the lull between the Stamp Act

crisis and the coming battles over the Townshend Acts. Although these elections saw the further politicization of New York's artisans, they did not pit the artisans directly against the ruling class. As the Stamp Act crisis had presaged, the elections were contested between the parties of the DeLanceys and the Livingstons. For the artisanry, the choice was between these parties, for there were no candidates who reflected the class interests of the artisans.[12] The first of these elections took place in March 1768.

The politics of the 1768 election are elusive because, despite the Stamp Act crisis, there was not a complete polarization between the DeLanceys and the Livingstons. There were four Assembly seats available from New York City and seven candidates competing for these positions. Captain James DeLancey, Jacob Walton, and James Jauncey were nominated together by a large meeting of New York's freemen and freeholders. They ran on a ticket which claimed to have the interest of the mercantile community at heart. The Livingston party ran Phillip Livingston and John Morin Scott. The other candidates were William Bayard, a merchant, and Amos Dodge, a carpenter. Neither of these last two candidates was popular.[13]

The election's elusiveness flows from the decision of the DeLanceys to run only three candidates. This tactic had two results. First, it virtually assured the popular Phillip Livingston of a seat by placing Livingston in a position where his success was not linked to John Morin Scott. Second, the strategy also allowed the DeLancey supporters to concentrate their attacks on Scott who was a more vulnerable candidate than Livingston.

Isolating Scott was an important strategy, and it reveals the deference the artisans accorded the upper classes. The attacks of DeLancey's supporters on Scott struck a responsive chord in the artisan community. The artisans had two grievances against Scott: he was a lawyer, and he had betrayed the community by opposing the artisans' tactics during the Stamp Act crisis. The hostility toward Scott for his betrayal during the Stamp Act crisis needs no explanation, but the reasons behind the artisans' hatred for lawyers are not immediately clear.[14]

Many artisans thought that lawyers were parasitic non-producers and generally unscrupulous individuals. The artisans' broadsides regarding lawyers show the beginnings of class consciousness in that they often compared lawyers' qualities to those of the merchants:

> Jack Bowline and Tom Hatchway send their services (damn compliments) to the Freeholders and Freemen of the City of New York and beg they would in order to try how the land lies, take an Observation and they will find, 1st, That the good people of

> this City are supported by trade and the Merchants. 2nd, That the Lawyers are supported by the people.[15]

Bowline and Hatchway were answered by Mr. Axe and Mr. Hammer, two cordwainers, who affirmed "that the Leather-Aprons (a very respectable Body) are clearly of their Opinion, That it is Trade and not Law supports our Families . . . ." Coupled to the artisans' belief that lawyers were parasites was the popular feeling "that our happy constitution has found more betrayers in that practice [law] than in any other profession whatsoever."[16]

The artisans' distrust of lawyers, nonetheless, was based on more than general impressions of unscrupulousness. They believed that Scott in particular, and lawyers in general, opposed a bill which would set up a small claims court where claimants could litigate before a justice of the peace without the aid of lawyers. This law clearly would benefit the lower classes at the expense of the legal profession. The artisans believed that:

> The Reformation of the Proceedings in the Recovery of Debts, and lessening their fees is absolutely necessary, but if you choose Lawyers to represent you, they will never suffer any effectual Law to pass for this Purpose . . . .[17]

Since this bill would hinder lawyers in one important aspect of their work, the recovery of debts, it also would have had an effect on the system of economic clientage. Thus, the bill was class-biased, and Scott's opposition to it gained him few friends among the artisans and strengthened the potential for class issues to influence the election.

Scott and his supporters in the Livingston party attempted to defuse the class issue and to downplay Scott's role during the Stamp Act crisis. They did this by introducing religious issues into the election debates (the DeLanceys were Anglicans, and the Livingstons were Presbyterians). In earlier days, this tactic might have been successful, but it was such an obvious device that many artisans realized it was merely a smokescreen behind which lay the real class-related issues of Scott's professional and political loyalties. Artisans were advised in "The Voters New Catechism" that "He [Scott] here literally uses Religion as a cloak to hide his Faults."[18]

The strategy of making religion an issue failed, and Scott was decisively rejected by the voters. Over 47% (1924 voters) of the possible electorate of 4023 white males participated in the election of 1768.[19] Phillip Livingston commanded the most votes (1320), but the DeLancey slate swept into office behind him. James DeLancey received 1204 votes, Walton 1175, and Jauncey 1052. Scott, perhaps due to his lukewarm Livingston support,

received only 870 votes. Bayard and Dodge together could not equal even Scott's total.[20]

By analyzing data provided by the poll lists, kept so carefully in the interests of the merchant-landlords, it is possible to distinguish the outlines of economic clientage in this election. To do this, all the voters identifiable by occupation (1151 out of 1924 or 60% of the total voters) were compiled into a sample. The voters were classified by separate trades and then grouped under larger occupational headings. Of the 1151 occupationally identified voters, 996 were identified as artisans, 83 were merchants, and the remaining 72 were gentlemen, attorneys, and farmers.

Table I shows the outcome of the election. The results are organized first by candidate and then by slate voting, where a voter either chose all three DeLancey candidates or voted for both of the two Livingston candidates. Since voters had four possible candidates, they could not vote both slates.

The outcome of the election indicates that slate voting among artisans was linked to economic clientage.[21] The artisans' voting patterns mirrored those of their merchant-landlord patrons. The merchants' vote was split between the DeLanceys and the Livingstons, and, similarly, this division was reflected in the artisanry's voting patterns.

Despite the DeLanceys' claim to represent the mercantile community, they won only because of the combined total of split ballots. Slate voters among the merchants favored the Livingstons. Of the 60 merchants (72% of the total) who voted by slate, 37 (62% of the slate voters) cast their ballots for the Livingston ticket. Only 23 (38% of the slate voters) voted for the DeLancey candidates in a block.

The artisans' voting patterns closely parallelled those of the merchants. The total number of artisan slate voters was 712 or 71% of the total artisan sample. Of the artisan slate voters, 388 (54% of the slate voters) voted for the Livingston ticket; 324 (46% of the slate voters) voted DeLancey. Most of the individual artisanal trades were split as to their affiliation. Many trades, which largely supported one or the other of the two contesting parties, were too small to be meaningful, and their voting probably was influenced by family affiliation. In the larger trades, kinship was not statistically important. The Livingston party benefitted most from the few instances of craft-specific slate voting, but even the most militant artisans, members of the Sons of Liberty, were divided in their political affiliation. The division shows the split over political tactics seen during the Stamp Act crisis. The majority of the Sons, led by Isaac

TABLE I

ARTISAN VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1768 ELECTION

LEGEND:

A - DELANCEY
B - WALTON
C - LIVINGSTON
D - JAUNCEY
E - SCOTT
F - BAYARD
G - DODGE
H - DELANCEY SLATE VOTERS
I - LIVINGSTON SLATE VOTERS

	TOTAL	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
MERCHANTS	83	57	56	72	31	43	31	0	23	37
ARTISANS										
GENERAL SERVICES:										
Laborer	142	85	80	85	90	64	41	31	43	47
Shopkeeper	35	20	26	32	13	19	11	0	8	18
Cartman	21	14	10	16	14	15	6	4	6	13
Butcher	16	12	10	9	11	6	1	5	7	4
Innkeeper	9	9	7	7	6	2	3	1	4	2
TOTAL	223	140	133	149	134	106	62	41	68	84
LEATHER GOODS:										
Cordwainer	121	64	60	89	63	75	36	17	29	62
Sadler	12	8	5	10	5	8	4	1	3	8
Currier	5	5	5	3	4	0	1	2	4	0
Tanner	6	4	5	4	4	3	3	1	3	2
Leather Dresser	3	1	2	2	3	1	1	0	1	1
TOTAL	147	82	77	108	79	87	45	21	40	73
BUILDING TRADES:										
Carpenter	75	48	49	53	49	35	25	25	28	29
Bricklayer	31	17	15	16	14	12	9	3	9	11
Painter	7	5	5	5	4	1	4	1	1	0
Mason	6	6	6	4	2	2	3	0	2	1
Plasterer	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	120	76	76	78	70	50	42	29	40	42
METAL WORKING:										
Blacksmith	26	20	22	15	19	13	8	4	13	9
Gunsmith	13	9	11	8	8	8	8	2	7	7
Brass Founder	3	3	1	2	0	3	1	0	0	2
Tinman	6	3	3	5	2	4	2	0	2	3
Brazier	5	2	4	3	5	3	0	0	2	1
Wheelwright	4	3	3	4	1	3	1	1	1	3
TOTAL	57	40	44	37	35	34	20	7	25	25

TABLE I - CONTINUED

	TOTAL	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
WOODWORKING:										
Cooper	51	27	26	36	37	23	13	8	22	18
Joiner	26	18	17	17	10	13	13	6	6	8
Blockmaker	12	9	7	8	5	6	2	2	3	4
Turner	10	7	9	5	7	2	4	1	6	1
Cabinetmaker	4	2	4	3	1	2	1	0	0	1
Chairmaker	5	2	2	4	2	3	2	0	2	3
Upholster	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
Coachmaker	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
TOTAL	113	68	69	76	65	51	37	18	42	36
WEARING APPAREL:										
Tailor	35	25	27	20	23	12	13	3	16	10
Wigmaker	22	14	14	13	12	13	7	3	6	9
Feltmaker	7	4	4	6	1	5	1	1	1	4
Hatter	9	6	6	8	6	4	1	1	4	4
Staymaker	2	1	2	2	0	2	1	0	0	2
Pantsmaker	4	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	2	2
Weaver	23	16	16	18	15	10	6	3	9	9
Hosier	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
TOTAL	104	70	74	71	60	49	31	12	38	40
SHIPPING:										
Mariner	42	27	29	32	22	18	10	51	16	16
Shipwright	28	19	18	17	13	91	8	11	9	8
Sailmaker	6	3	4	6	3	2	4	0	0	2
Ropemaker	6	5	5	4	5	1	1	0	5	1
Instrument Maker	3	2	2	2	3	1	1	0	2	1
Boatman	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Rigger	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	0
TOTAL	88	59	61	64	47	32	25	16	34	28
BAKERS:										
Baker	64	49	37	49	21	40	25	8	12	37
Boalter	2	2	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	1
Measurer	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Miller	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	69	53	40	53	22	43	26	8	13	39
SPECIAL SERVICES*	75	57	57	57	38	23	25	7	24	21
ARTISAN TOTAL	996	645	631	693	550	475	313	159	324	388

*Special Services include trades which had so few artisans in their ranks that figures showing their voting patterns as a trade are meaningless. The majority of these artisans produced luxury goods.

Sears and John Lamb, supported the DeLanceys. The minority, under Alexander McDougall, supported the more moderate Livingstons.

Thus, patronage and clientage seem likely to have played a role in the outcome of the 1768 Assembly election. Merchants and artisans voted by slate in similar proportions (72% and 71% respectively). Likewise, the breakdown of slate voters is comparable between merchants and artisans. The Livingston ticket received 62% of the merchant slate voters and 54% of the artisan slate voters. The DeLanceys attracted only 38% of the merchant slate voters and 46% of the artisan slate voters. The stronger showing of the DeLancey ticket among artisan slate voters probably reflects a bias among independent artisans in favor of the more radical policies of the Sons of Liberty and their DeLancey supporters.

Although the outcome of the 1768 election certainly suggests that clientage played a role, the results of the 1769 election are more compelling, if only because non-slate voters played such an important role in determining the 1768 outcome. This was less the case in 1769.

On January 2, 1769, Governor Moore again dissolved the General Assembly and called for new elections. Moore's action was caused by the Assembly's discussion of the Massachusetts Circular Letter protesting the Townshend Acts. The Assembly discussed and answered the letter due to the promptings of the DeLancey party and the Sons of Liberty. Both the contending parties realized that by discussing the Circular Letter they were assuring the Assembly's dissolution because they knew that Governor Moore had instructions to this effect. Yet both sides believed that they would profit by a new election.[22]

The election differed significantly from the 1768 election in that there was a complete polarization between the parties. After some initial attempts to compromise, each party nominated four candidates for the four seats. The Livingston party put forward Phillip Livingston, John Morin Scott, Peter Brugh Livingston, and Theodore Van Wyck. Against these four, the DeLanceys matched their three incumbents and a former Assemblyman: Captain James DeLancey, Jacob Walton, James Jauncey, and John Cruger.

The DeLancey party won a stunning victory. All of the DeLancey candidates out-polled all the Livingston candidates, even Phillip Livingston. The total vote for Phillip Livingston dropped from 1320 in 1768 to 666 in 1769.[23] At first glance, the decline in the Livingston party's support is difficult to explain. The issues in the 1769 election were largely the same as in 1768. Once again, the Livingstons attempted to polarize New York society over a religious question. They accused James DeLancey of bringing an Anglican bishop from England to

implement a religious tyranny. The DeLanceys, on the other hand, again attacked lawyers and the Livingstons' more moderate stand on the Stamp Act. Regardless of their best efforts, however, the issues raised by the DeLanceys and the Livingstons were unimportant.

The decisive issue of the 1769 election had been raised in London in 1767 when Parliament passed the Townshend Acts. These acts increased import duties on many items and provided for stricter enforcement of anti-smuggling laws. They cut into the profits of merchants and set precedents for further import taxes. They also adversely affected the artisanry by decreasing employment. The Townshend Acts further increased the artisans' fear of employment competition from British soldiers because they contained provisions which threatened New York's Assembly with dissolution unless it passed the allocation bills necessary to support the Quartering Act. Thus, although the Townshend Acts were originally conceived by British policy-makers as uncontroversial to Americans, they were bitterly opposed by both New York City's merchants and artisanry and became the major focal point for the 1769 election.[24]

The manner in which the merchants and artisans had initially dealt with the Townshend Acts helped determine the outcome of the election. On August 27, 1768, while the Massachusetts Circular Letter was being discussed in the Assembly, the merchants organized against the Townshend Acts and agreed to cease importing British goods. The merchants immediately formed a committee to monitor the waterfront and to organize boycotts against those importers who defied the non-importation agreement. Similarly, on September 5, the artisans' signed a tradesmen's non-importation agreement, yet the tactics by which they proposed to enforce the agreement were quite different than those of the merchants.[25] While the merchants planned to enforce non-importation by peaceful boycotts, the artisans revived the mass action tactics they had used to oppose the Stamp Act. They circulated threatening handbills, burned effigies, and gathered signatures on petitions demanding that New York's Assembly respond favorably to the Circular Letter. The DeLancey party, aware of the Livingstons' more moderate approach and in an attempt to court artisan support, championed the struggle against the Townshend Acts, even though they did not endorse the artisans' tactics. As a result, the artisans' swing to the support of the DeLanceys in the 1769 election reflected the DeLanceys' opportunistic and temporary acceptance of the artisans' politics, if not their methods.[26]

Table II measures the change in slate voting patterns between the two elections. The data reveals the artisans' shift to the support of the DeLanceys. It also shows the strength of slate voting and again suggests clientage.[27]

TABLE II

ARTISAN VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1769 ELECTION
COMPARED TO 1768 TOTALS

LEGEND:

D--DELANCEY SLATE D-68--1769 VOTING RECORD OF 1768 DELANCEY SLATE VOTERS
L--LIVINGSTON SLATE L-68--1769 VOTING RECORD OF 1768 LIVINGSTON SLATE VOTERS
S--SPLIT-BALLOT VOTERS S-68--1769 VOTING RECORD OF 1768 SPLIT-BALLOT VOTERS

	1769 TOTAL	1769 SUBTOTALS			L-68			D-68			S-68		
		D	S	L	L	D	S	D	L	S	D	L	S
MERCHANTS	66	33	12	21	20	3	4	19	0	2	11	1	6
ARTISANS													
GENERAL SERVICES:													
Laborer	98	53	13	32	24	5	4	30	2	1	18	7	7
Shopkeeper	27	11	4	12	11	1	3	5	0	0	5	1	1
Cartmen	15	5	4	6	5	1	2	2	0	1	2	1	1
Butcher	12	7	4	1	1	0	2	4	0	1	3	0	1
Innkeeper	6	1	1	4	2	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0
TOTAL	158	77	26	55	43	7	11	42	4	4	28	9	10
LEATHER GOODS:													
Cordwainer	97	36	9	52	43	4	4	17	2	2	15	7	3
Sadler	8	3	2	3	3	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0
Currier	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	0
Tanner	5	3	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0
Leather Dresser	3	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	117	47	13	57	48	5	7	23	2	3	19	7	3
BUILDING TRADES:													
Carpenter	53	33	5	15	14	3	3	19	0	1	11	1	1
Bricklayer	21	13	0	8	6	2	0	7	1	0	4	1	0
Painter	6	4	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0
Mason	4	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Plasterer	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	85	50	9	26	23	5	3	26	1	3	19	2	3
METAL WORKING:													
Blacksmith	26	15	3	8	5	1	0	11	2	1	3	1	2
Gunsmith	13	5	2	6	5	0	2	4	1	0	1	0	0
Brass Founder	3	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Tinman	4	1	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Brazier	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Wheelwright	3	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	52	27	7	18	13	3	3	16	3	2	8	1	3

TABLE II - CONTINUED

	1769 TOTAL	1769 SUBTOTALS D	S	L	L-68 L	D	S	D-68 D	L	S	S-68 D	L	S
WOODWORKING:													
Cooper	35	22	5	8	6	1	2	6	2	0	15	1	2
Joiner	20	9	4	7	3	1	1	3	1	9	5	3	1
Blockmaker	10	5	3	2	2	1	0	2	0	1	2	0	2
Turner	10	8	1	1	1	0	0	5	0	1	3	0	0
Cabinetmaker	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Chairmaker	5	2	0	3	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Upholster	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Coachmaker	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	86	49	14	23	15	3	6	20	4	2	26	5	5
WEARING APPAREL:													
Tailor	28	16	6	6	4	1	3	11	1	1	4	1	2
Wigmaker	13	6	4	3	3	0	0	4	0	2	2	1	1
Feltmaker	6	2	1	3	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Hatter	7	4	0	3	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Staymaker	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pantsmaker	3	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Weaver	17	10	5	2	2	0	3	7	0	0	3	0	2
Hosier	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	78	41	18	19	16	2	8	28	1	3	11	3	6
SHIPPING:													
Mariner	28	14	3	11	9	0	2	13	0	1	1	2	0
Shipwright	21	12	4	5	4	3	0	4	0	3	5	1	1
Sailmaker	4	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
Ropemaker	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
Instrument Maker	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Boatman	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Rigger	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	63	38	9	16	13	4	3	25	0	4	9	3	2
BAKERS:													
Baker	41	11	11	19	18	0	10	4	0	1	7	0	1
Boalter	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Measurer	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Miller	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	45	13	12	20	19	0	10	4	0	1	9	0	1
SPECIAL SERVICES*	61	34	7	20	14	3	2	20	3	1	11	3	3
ARTISAN TOTAL	745	376	115	254	204	32	53	205	18	23	139	33	38

*Special Services include trades which had so few artisans in their ranks that figures showing their voting patterns as a trade are meaningless. The majority of these artisans produced luxury goods.

As in the 1768 election, the artisans' voting patterns closely parallelled those of the merchants. Out of 66 total merchants, 54 or 82% voted by slate. Of these, 33 (61% of the slate voters) opted for the DeLancey slate, while only 21 (39% of the slate voters) chose the Livingston ticket. This is almost an exact reversal of the 1768 election. The DeLancey candidates gathered part of their new support from merchants who had split their vote in 1768. Eighteen merchants had split their votes in 1768. Of these, 12 voted by slate in 1769, with 11 or 61% going for the DeLanceys in 1769. Only one merchant, or 6%, voted Livingston. The relative decline of the Livingstons' strength among slate voters can be explained by an increase in those who did not vote.

The 1769 data from the artisanry is similar to that of the merchants. Of 745 total artisan voters, 630 (85%) voted by slate. Of these, 376 (60% of the slate voters) voted the DeLancey ticket while 254 (40% of the slate voters) favored the Livingston slate. Of the 210 artisan voters in the sample who had split their votes in 1768, like the merchants, a large proportion (139 or 66%) voted the DeLancey ticket in 1769. In contrast, only 33 or 16% supported the Livingston ticket. The shift of the former split-ballot artisan voters to the DeLanceys gave that party a large majority among most of the more numerous crafts.

Although both the merchant and artisan split-ballot voters from 1768 swung to the support of the DeLanceys, for the most part, the slate voters from 1768 maintained their party affiliation. The 1769 sample contains 535 voters who were slate voters in 1768. Of these, 409 or 76% remained consistent to the party they had previously supported. The DeLanceys kept 80% of their 1768 slate voters while the Livingstons held on to 59% of their 1768 slate voters.

The 1769 election offers stronger evidence of patronage and clientage than does the 1768 election. Merchants and artisans both voted in nearly identical proportions for the DeLancey slate (61% and 60% respectively). They also had like showings in slate voting patterns for the Livingston ticket (39% and 40%). Furthermore, of those 1768 split ballot voters who shifted to slate voting in 1769, there are additional similarities between the merchants and artisans. Sixty-one percent of the 1768 split ballot merchants chose the DeLancey ticket in 1769. Sixty-six percent of the 1768 split ballot artisans went for the DeLancey ticket. The slate votes for the Livingstons among 1768 split ballot merchants and artisans again show a similar trend with 6% and 16% respectively voting Livingston in 1769.[28]

From the results of the 1768 and 1769 elections, it is possible to discern some general outlines of the

clientage system in colonial New York City. With few exceptions, clientage cut across occupational groups. It reflected the relation between individual merchants and their artisan clients. Although the evidence is circumstantial, slate voting strongly suggests that the majority of New York artisans stood in a client relation to merchant patrons. Also, the consistency of slate voters through both elections indicates that clientage survived the divisive election of 1769. The elections had posed the vital issues of economic and political rights to the artisanry but only in an indirect fashion. When these issues were posed more concretely after the elections, during the last half of 1769 and early 1770, the artisans broke with their former merchant allies, the DeLanceys, and struggled against clientage.

Political deference was able to withstand the pressure of the heated electoral campaigns of 1768 and 1769 because it was based on strong patron-client relations rooted in economics and political tradition. This structure, however, was weakening in the late 1760s, and by 1769 it was no longer able to provide the conditions under which New York's ruling class effectively could maintain its hold on the artisanry. Ironically, it was the struggle with Britain over the Townshend Acts, in which the merchants and artisans had originally found a common cause, that led to the final break between these two groups.

The DeLancey party may have exploited the Townshend Acts crisis to gain artisan political support in the 1769 election, but the DeLanceys did not completely endorse artisan tactics. Rather, the DeLanceys preferred the more conservative, traditional methods of opposition to the British law: non-importation and a boycott of violators of the non-importation agreement. In fact, the merchants' committee organized to monitor the non-importation agreement was not only composed of DeLancey supporters, it was chaired by Isaac Low, a politically active merchant and strong supporter of James DeLancey. The DeLanceys thus sided with the prevailing merchant desire to keep the artisans from developing the clout they had wielded in the Stamp Act crisis.[29]

The DeLanceys, like other merchants, truly may have believed their method of opposing the Townshend Acts to be the best. Many artisans, however, held a more cynical view of the concerns motivating New York's merchants. One satire of the merchants' motives, written in 1770, recalled the early days of non-importation:

> Posterity will scarcely believe that their predecessors embarked in a scheme to defeat the machinations of their political enemies, when they are told that this scheme though evidently calculated to attain the desired end, would, if persevered

> in, be highly injurious to their private concerns. To lessen their surprise it will be necessary to inform them that the parties engaged in it were merchants, that for a considerable time it proved highly advantageous to them, by enabling them to collect their debts, to vend their moth eaten fragments, and to clear at least fifteen percent by the course of exchange.[30]

Artisans, then, did not fail to note that non-importation was not only patriotic, it was a profitable method of clearing merchants' inventories.

Non-importation did not help just the merchants, however. It also contained potential economic benefits for the artisanry because non-importation gave impetus to plans to improve the general domestic economy. Soon after the adoption of the Townshend Acts, colonial New York began to prepare itself for the inevitable shortages by taking steps toward self-sufficiency. A committee was appointed by the city government "to consider the Expediency of entering into Measures to encourage Industry and Frugality, and employ the Poor." This committee recommended establishing new manufactures, such as a linen works, as well as the comprehensive boycott of British goods. The program appealed to the artisanry because it provided more business for colonial craftsmen and jobs for their unemployed brethren. Ideologically, the committee's recommendations were compatible with most artisans' views of their situation. The recommendations explained the colony's "Poverty and Distress" in terms of the importation of luxury goods from Britain. This not only put the blame for New York's economic problems on the luxury-buying merchants, it also appealed to the artisans' desires for an economy insulated from the fluctuations of the British mercantile system.[31]

Regardless of who would benefit most by opposing the Townshend Acts, neither the merchants' strategy of boycotting nor the artisans' plans for mass actions could be implemented immediately. The battle to enforce non-importation did not begin until March 1769 when goods ordered the previous summer arrived from Britain. It was during the interim prior to the arrival of British goods that the two Assembly elections of 1768 and 1769 took place. This lull in the battle allowed the DeLancey party and its merchant supporters to parade as patriots sharing a mutuality of interests with the artisanry. This mutuality proved to be a myth, and was exposed after the merchants had received the first benefits from non-importation and had begun to reconsider their relationship with the artisans.

Throughout the last half of 1769 and well into 1770, a struggle took place over the tactics to be used to enforce non-importation. The merchants favored boycotting violators. The artisans, who had revived the Sons of

Liberty, supported mass public meetings at which violators would be publicly humiliated and forced to apologize to the community.[32] It was difficult to reconcile the two points of view. The merchants did not want the artisans disciplining merchants who violated the non-importation agreement, and this was at least partly because the public disciplining of merchants by the artisan community strained the traditional system of political deference. But the artisans felt the system needed straining to protect their interests. When the artisans discovered violators, they not only held public meetings, they also published the results of these meetings and the issues involved so that the whole community could condemn the violator. This had the indirect effect of weakening the deference system. For example, when Simeon Cooley, "a Haberdasher, Jeweller and Silversmith" violated the agreement, the artisans advertised their opinions of this merchant:

> Shall then so contemptible a Reptile and Miscreant as the said Simeon Cooley, be suffered to baffle or defeat the united virtuous Efforts, in the Support of so righteous a cause, not only of this City, but of the whole Continent? --God Forbid!-- "Better that all such miserable depraved Wretches were crushed to Atoms, than the Safety of the most inconsiderable Town endangered."[33]

Such community action as the publication of this broadside unified the artisanry under the leadership of the Sons of Liberty and widened the growing breach between the artisans and merchants.

It was not just merchants in general that the artisans came to oppose. Even the DeLanceys, who previously had enjoyed greater artisanal support than the Livingstons, now fell from grace. As early as October 1769, the DeLancey-controlled merchants' committee to enforce non-importation came under attack from the artisan community. One broadside, entitled "A Pill for the Committee of Non-Importation," went so far as to accuse the committee of camouflaging continuing trade with Britain:

> If you really never entertained a single Idea of doing any Thing more than endeavoring to make the Public believe, that you were willing to sacrifice your private Interests to the Good of Society: It is now quite Time to change the scene, as they are become to flimsy to screen your Actions from the Eyes of the Community.[34]

The DeLanceys' support declined even more when the DeLancey-controlled Assembly passed a special tax to raise funds to implement the Quartering Act. The DeLanceys were aware that by passing the tax they would probably lose their earlier artisan support, but trade had declined to an alarming point and there was little available cur-

rency.[35] The currency problem was further complicated by the need to obtain British consent for any new colonial emission of paper. Thus, the DeLanceys and Lieutenant-Governor Cadwallader Colden reached an agreement satisfying both the British government and the economic needs of New York's mercantile community. The agreement stipulated that the Assembly would pass an allocation bill providing funds for the Quartering Act and in return Colden would sign the emission bill. Implicit within the agreement was the merchants' consent to end non-importation as the price of British approval of the paper emission.[36]

The agreement satisfied everyone but the artisanry. Alexander McDougall, the early leader of the Sons of Liberty who had supported the Livingstons, led the attack on the DeLanceys. With the support of the Sons, he issued his famous broadside, "To the Betrayed Inhabitants of New York." In this attack, McDougall censured the Assembly for voting the allocation for billeting British troops. He pointed out that this meant that New York was breaking ranks with Massachusetts and South Carolina in the struggle with Britain.[37]

Another broadside, issued by "A Son of Liberty," firmed up McDougall's more rhetorical statement by describing the effect that the allocation would have on New York's economy. This writer claimed that billeting would increase taxes because the British headquarters and its staff would be in the city. At the same time, billeted troops would increase the prices of necessities because the demand for essentials would rise but the supply would remain the same. Lastly, the inclination of officers and soldiers to buy luxury goods would bring more British imports, and colonial money would be shipped to Britain to pay for these, causing less currency. In addition to all the above, the broadside confirmed the artisanry's resentment of job competition from off-duty soldiers.

Most important were the closing remarks of this broadside, which called for a meeting and recorded the artisans' need to make community decisions without the interference of deference:

> As the design of this meeting is to get the free and unbiased Sentiments of the People, on this important head, all such who are contending for power, are desired to stay at Home, that the People be uninfluenced in their Deliberations: therefore the DeLanceys, Livingstons and Waltons, are hereby requested not to give the People any uneasiness by their appearance, lest they should be insulted.[38]

The meeting took place on December 18, 1769. Although over fourteen hundred people came and listened to speakers denouncing the bill providing billeting funds,

few merchants attended. The sense of the audience was taken, and it was decided that a committee should be appointed to convey the crowd's sentiments to the Assembly. In reply to this uncharacteristic artisan assertion of power, the Assembly retaliated and ordered McDougall's immediate arrest for seditious libel.[39]

The jailing of McDougall intensified the artisans' anger, and it also pointed out the major weakness in the artisans' position: they lacked any concrete method of binding the Assembly to accept their point of view. Both in elections and community meetings, the artisans were powerless as long as the system of clientage existed. Thus, in answer to the arrest of McDougall, the Sons of Liberty began a petition campaign in late December to place a bill mandating the secret ballot before the Assembly.

The concept of the secret ballot had received widespread publicity during the two previous elections. The idea was popular and made sense within the ideological context of the rights of the free-born Englishman. It had also been used for years in neighboring colonies. Yet the artisanry was not interested in just an abstract democracy. They were fighting against quartering British soldiers, for non-importation, and, by necessity, against those who opposed these goals. The Sons of Liberty justified the campaign for the secret ballot on the grounds that it would end corruption and free the poor from the political bonds of clientage:

> The method of taking the Sufferages of the People, for Places of Truth, by Ballot is so manifestly condusive to the Preservation of Liberty, that its Opposer must necessarily be eyed with Jealousy: unless it be excusable on the Score of his Folly and then his Opinion deserves only our contempt . . . . It is not in Human Power to devise a more effectual Antidote to Corruption than a Law of Elections by Ballot; by which, no man of Opulence will be able to procure a Seat in the Assembly, by an undue Influence upon the Fears of the Electors . . . . Every Patriotic Heart, must therefore exult on hearing of the late motion on a Balloting-Law. A Law which may be properly titled "An Act for the Redemption of the Poor, and the Establishment of the Liberties of the Colony."[40]

Although to modern ears the artisans' arguments may seem obvious, they were controversial at the time. Voice voting was traditional in New York society, and the DeLancey party hoped to capitalize on this by emphasizing that secret balloting was undemocratic because voters were unable to come forward and openly state their preference. This view was published in a broadside under the signa-

tures of many of the DeLanceys' supporters:

> It having been industriously propagated that Numbers of the Voters of this City and County, have been long intimidated at Elections, and are therefore desirous of voting for the future in a secret manner, by way of Ballot; which report being by many surmised to be void of a Proper Foundation, and only intended to answer the particular private purposes of certain Persons; it is therefore requested that the independent Freeholders and Freemen of the City, will meet at the Merchant's Coffee House Tommorrow, at Eleven o'Clock in the Forenoon, to convey their Sentiments respecting this matter to their Representatives and to convince them that they are not to be diverted by any Motives whatever, from daring and chusing to speak their Minds freely and openly, to do which at all times, is their birthright as Englishmen and their glory as Americans.[41]

It was not coincidental that almost half of those who signed this broadside were members of the merchants' non-importation committee. This reflected the close interconnection between the issues of non-importation and secret balloting.[42]

The meeting called for by the DeLancey broadside was an attempt to reverse the decision of the artisans' public meeting of December 18, 1769, which, in addition to protesting the approval of funds for the Quartering Act, had voted to support secret balloting. The artisans graphically described the DeLancey meeting as one "to try how far commercial Influence would induce the common artificers to acquiesce in the present Deprivation of this most inestimable Privilege."[43] With tensions high, violence erupted at the meeting when Isaac Low attacked one of the Sons of Liberty. After the tumult quieted, a sense of the meeting was taken by literally dividing the house and, much to the dismay of the DeLanceys, the secret ballot won handily.[44]

Undaunted by their defeat at the Coffee House meeting, the merchants' committee conducted a house-to-house poll of the city's inhabitants to ask their opinion of secret balloting. The merchants' committee planned this poll to offset the petitions, sponsored by the Sons of Liberty, in favor of secret balloting. The Sons of Liberty opposed this house-to-house polling because it was more easily manipulable by patron-client relations. Not surprisingly, when the poll was completed, over a thousand voters had expressed their disapproval of the secret ballot.[45] The artisanry had yielded to the power of deference. They were willing to vote in their own interest when gathered in large public meetings, but individual artisans by themselves were unable to stand up to the ruling

class economic pressure.

Soon after the Coffee House debate, a bill for secret balloting was placed before the Assembly. The bill had the support of the Livingston party which had realized this was an opportunity to gain artisan support at the expense of the DeLanceys, particularly after McDougall's arrest. Three of New York City's representatives initially supported the bill. Only James DeLancey opposed it. Much of the bill's early support can be attributed to the unfavorable response to the billeting allocations the DeLancey-controlled Assembly had received from the artisan community. Another factor generating support was New York's uproar over the many street battles between the artisanry and British soldiers.[46]

Nonetheless, on January 9, 1770, the secret balloting bill was defeated in the Assembly by a vote of thirteen to twelve. The vote was initially tied but the Speaker of the Assembly, John Cruger of New York City, voted against the bill. Despite earlier support, all the representatives from New York City, like Cruger, also voted against the bill. Perhaps the DeLancey supporters voted against the bill to oppose the Livingstons, or perhaps they were refusing to bow to artisan pressure.[47] The agitation for the secret ballot did not immediately end, but its thrust had been blunted in the Assembly. The defeat of the bill reinforced the political power of the merchants, and it also foreshadowed the outcome of the artisans' struggle for non-importation.

The final battle for non-importation took place during May, June, and July of 1770. Following on the heels of the defeat of the secret ballot bill, this struggle further intensified the antagonism between the artisans and the merchant-landlords. Yet the result of this struggle, like that for the secret ballot, left no tangible advantages to the artisans save an awareness that their interests differed from those of the merchant-landlords.

The sequence of events during the struggle for non-importation was basically the same as during the secret ballot agitation. The Sons of Liberty held large public meetings in support of non-importation, and the DeLanceys took house-to-house polls countering the results of the public meetings. Without the pressure secret balloting would have put on the Assembly representatives, the artisans were trapped within the system of clientage. The DeLanceys' polling campaigns isolated the Sons of Liberty from the artisan community. Finally, the Sons were driven to use force to stop the polling efforts, and, on July 7, 1770, they were defeated in a street battle by DeLancey supporters. The artisans' battle for non-importation was lost.

Although the artisans lost the battles over the

secret ballot and non-importation, these struggles both heightened awareness of their own interests and increased hostility toward the merchant-landlords. The artisanry had united in support of these political objectives and, in the process, they had overcome many of the craft divisions imposed by clientage. They also had learned political skills. Most importantly, the artisans had come firmly to identify their interests with the revolutionary tendencies in colonial society.

The artisanry did not play an independent role in the elections of 1768 and 1769. However, they gained valuable political insights through their experience in these elections. In the process of canvassing votes, the merchant-landlords tutored the artisanry in the ideology of independence emerging in the colonies. The elections also must have convinced many artisans of the need for a secret ballot if their independence were to be actual. The artisanry then adapted its growing experience in politics and the new ideology to its own purposes during the struggles over the secret ballot and non-importation. After 1770, the clientage system still dominated New York's politics but the artisans' automatic acceptance of political subordination was a thing of the past.

NOTES

The author thanks Professor Gary Nash, whose thoughts provided the foundation of this article. The author also thanks Jacquelyn S. Collins, without whose help New York's poll lists would have remained an insurmountable obstacle.

1. In this paper, the term "artisan" is defined in a similar manner to Staughton Lynd's and Alfred F. Young's definition of "mechanics." They define "mechanics" as those who work with their hands "below the rank of merchants or lawyers." According to their estimate about two-thirds of New York City's population were in the mechanic class. See: Staughton Lynd and Alfred F. Young, "After Carl Becker: The Mechanics and New York City Politics, 1774-1801," *Labor History* 5 (Fall 1964): 217-218.

2. The term "merchant-landlords" in this article denotes the ruling elite in New York society. Although there were probably economic differences among the ruling parties, these differences were not the classic landowner-merchant dichotomy pictured by some historians. See Patricia Bonomi, *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 96-97, 100-102, 279-288. As demonstrated later in this paper, New York City's merchants were divided as to political affiliation. Carl Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1909), pp. 11, 22; Roger Champagne, "Family Politics versus Constitutional Principles: The New York Assembly Elections of 1768 and 1769," *William And Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 20 (January 1963): 57-79; Roger Champagne, "Liberty Boys and Mechanics of New York City, 1764-1774," *Labor History* 8 (Spring 1967): 115-135; Milton M. Klein, "Democracy and Politics in Colonial New York," *New York History* 40 (July 1959): 221-246, and "Politics and Personalities in Colonial New York," *New York History* 47 (January 1966): 2-15. For an instructive critique of Champagne see: Bernard Friedman, "The New York Assembly Elections of 1768 and 1769: The Disruption of Family Politics," *New York History* 46 (January 1965): 3-24.

3. Class consciousness often has been a very ephemeral phenomenon. Once a class is conscious of its own interests, it may not always remain that way. Yet a class which is unaware of itself at one point in time remains a class and retains the potentiality of struggling in its own interests at another time.

4. Of these historians, only Carl Becker realized the systematic nature of the corruption. Becker argued that there was a system of economic intimidation in effect in the countryside which forced tenants to vote in their landlords' interests. Unfortunately, Becker did not extend this analysis to the

urban artisanry. Becker, *History of Political Parties*, p. 12.

5. There is little information available to explain why the New York Assembly chose to publish poll lists, but, nonetheless, publication clearly benefitted the merchant-landlords and the political deference system.

6. For an example of this behavior see: Nicholas Vargas, "Election Procedures and Practices in Colonial New York," *New York History* 41 (1969): 267; also see Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 89.

7. For a good description of New York's economic woes, see: Joseph Albert Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755-1775* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 89, 90-91, 108.

8. For data on the cost per capita for food consumption see Ernst, *Money and Politics*, p. 108, and David Klingaman, "Food Surpluses and Deficits in the American Colonies, 1768-1772," *Journal of Economic History* 31 (Sept. 1971): 566-569; Nash, *Urban Crucible*, p. 371.

9. For a discussion of the impact of these taxes on the colonies, see Phillip S. Foner, *Labor and the American Revolution* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 46-47

10. Foner, *Labor and the American Revolution*, p. 83.

11. The largely artisanal composition of the Sons of Liberty is accepted by most historians. For example see: ibid., pp. 36-37.

12. In the 1768 election, Amos Dodge, a carpenter, ran but he received the lowest total vote and little support from the artisanry. This lack of artisan candidates mirrored New York's class structure. Artisans were believed to "have too confined an education and sphere of action to qualify them for such a trust. Nor have they their minds enlarged by the science of general commerce." *The Occasionalist* (New York, 1768), p. 3, available, as are all subsequently cited broadsides and colonial newspapers, in the Readex Microprint edition of *Early American Imprints* published by the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.

13. Robert J. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies, 1689-1776* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 153.

14. *To the Freeholders and Freemen of the City and County of New York . . . New Jersey . . .* (New York, 1768).

15. *A Card. Jack Bowline and Tom Hatchway . . .* (New York, 1768).

16. *The Occasionalist* (New York, 1768), p. 2.

17. *To the Freeholders and Freemen of the City and County of New York . . . New Jersey . . .* (New York, 1768).

18. *The Voters' New Catechism* (New York, 1768).

19. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, p. 156.

20. Ibid., p. 153.

21. Table I was constructed from data provided in *A Copy of the Poll List of the Elections for Representatives for the City and County of New York; which election began on Monday the 7th day of March, and ended on Friday the 11th, of the same Month, in the Year of our Lord MDCCLXVII* (New York, n.p., 1880); *The Burghers of New Amsterdam and the Freemen of New York, 1675-1866*, in New York Historical Society, *Collections* (New York, 1885); *Muster Rolls of New York's Provincial Troups, 1755-1764* in ibid. (New York, 1936); and *Abstracts of Wills, 1766-1783* (New York, n.p., 1898-1900), vols. 7-9, passim. For occupational headings, see Champagne, "Liberty Boys and Mechanics of New York," pp. 126-128.

22. Bonomi, *A Factious People*, p. 248.

23. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, p. 153.

24. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 93-95.

25. Ibid., pp. 124-125.

26. Friedman, "New York Assembly Elections," pp. 13-15; Nash, *Urban Crucible*, pp. 362-374.

27. Table II was constructed by matching occupationally identified voters from the 1768 election (compiled in Table I) with their voting records in the 1769 election as listed in *A Copy of the Poll List of the Election for Representatives for the City and County of New York; which election began on Monday the 23rd day of January, and ended on Friday the 27th, of the same month, in the year of our Lord, MDCCLXIX* (New York, 1769), available in the Reader Microprint edition of the *Early American Imprints* published by the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.

28. The smaller voter turnout in the 1769 election raises some important historical questions for this study. For instance, did artisans abstain to escape the compulsion of economic clientage? Patricia Bonomi has suggested that the polarization of the 1769 election put voters in an untenable position in which they could not split their vote without alienating one party or the other. In other words, if Bonomi were correct, abstainees would be mainly those who had split their ballot in 1768. This seems unlikely because the number of those 1768 slate voters who did not vote in 1769 is within seven percent of slate voters in the 1768 sample. (See Table III below.) The almost equal percentages of 1768 Livingston and DeLancey slate voters among the 1769 ab-

stentions also makes it unlikely that the mass of these abstainees were avoiding compulsory voting. Furthermore, we can assume that abstaining could have been identified by individual artisans' patrons and this would have placed the artisan in a poor position vis-à-vis the patron nearly as much as an incorrect vote.

TABLE III

1768 VOTERS ABSTAINING IN 1769

LEGEND:
D - DELANCEY SLATE VOTERS IN 1768
L - LIVINGSTON SLATE VOTERS IN 1768
S - SPLIT-BALLOT VOTERS IN 1768

	TOTAL	D	L	S
CARPENTERS	31	9	10	12
LABORERS	52	11	14	27
CORDWAINERS	32	8	13	11
BAKERS	26	10	10	6
COOPERS	16	4	7	5
MARINERS	15	3	5	7
TAILORS	8	4	2	2
CARTMEN	10	4	5	1
JOINERS	6	1	1	4
WEAVERS	8	2	4	2
WIGMAKERS	9	0	5	4
SHIPWRIGHTS	7	2	1	4
SHOPKEEPERS	8	3	3	2
BUTCHERS	5	3	1	1
BLACKSMITHS	5	0	3	2
BRICKLAYERS	4	1	2	1
INNKEEPERS	3	0	0	3
SADLERS	3	2	1	0
MASONS	3	1	1	1
MISCELLANEOUS	47	12	19	16
TOTAL	298	80	107	111

Table III was constructed by matching the poll list from the 1768 election with that of the 1769 election and extracting those occupationally identified voters who failed to vote in 1769. For further information see Bonomi, *A Factious People*, passim; and Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, passim.

29. It is possible to ascertain the pro-DeLancey composition of the merchants' non-importation committee by comparing the similarities between the list of the committee's members found on the signed *Broadside . . .* (New York, 1770), which called for a meeting to choose a new committee, and the list of the signatories to the broadside, *To the Independent Freeholders and Freemen, of this City and County. It having been industriously Propagated . . .* (New York, 1770), which launched the DeLancey party's campaign against the secret ballot.

30. *Proposals for Erecting and Encouraging a New Manufactory . . .* (New York, 1770).

31. *Report of the Committee appointed the 29th of December last . . .* (New York, 1768).

32. The Sons abandoned earlier political differences and reunited under the title of the United Sons of Liberty. See *Original Founding Resolutions of the United Sons of Liberty* (New York, 1769).

33. The artisans' success at enforcing non-importation is reflected in these broadsides: *Simon Cooley . . .* (New York, 1769) and *Thomas Richardson . . .* (New York, 1769).

34. *A Pill for the Committee of Non-importation . . .* (New York, 1769).

35. Schlesinger, *Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 224.

36. Ernst, *Money and Politics in America*, pp. 266-267.

37. *To the Betrayed Inhabitants of the City and Colony of New York . . .* (New York, 1769).

38. *Union, Activity, Freedom . . .* (New York, 1769).

39. Bonomi, *A Factious People*, p. 269.

40. *To the Freeholders and Freemen of the City and Province of New York, Gentlemen . . .* (New York, 1769).

41. *To the Independent Freeholders and Freemen, of this City and Country. It having been industriously propagated . . .* (New York, 1770).

42. For the similarity of the composition of these two committees see: *Broadside . . .* (New York, 1770), and *To the Independent Freeholders and Freemen, of this City and County. It having been industriously Propagated . . .*

(New York, 1770).

43. *All the real Friends of Liberty* . . . (New York, 1770).

44. Ibid. On the same day, January 5, 1770, at the meeting at the Coffee House, the Sons of Liberty circulated a petition calling for a secret balloting bill. In an advertisement, the Sons advised the artisanry to sign their petition which could be found at the houses of James McCartney, mariner; David Phillips, wigmaker; Jasper Drakes, boatmen, and Henry Becker. That the Sons' support lay among the artisanry is clear from the locations of the petitions. See *Advertisement* . . . (New York, 1770).

45. Bonomi, *A Factious People*, p. 275.

46. For the DeLanceys' initial opposition see: *All the real Friends of Liberty* . . . (New York, 1770).

47. *New York Assembly Journal*, January 9, 1770.

The Janus Legacy: Ancient Theorists of the Roman Mixed Regime

Ronald J. Lettiere

Jean-Jacques Rousseau for once falls into the mainstream of traditional Western republican thought in claiming the Roman mixed regime as "*the* model for all free peoples."[1] Indeed, the notion that classical Rome constituted the most outstanding historical example from antiquity of the well-ordered republic pervaded republican thinking from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century.[2] Although they deliberately sought to improve upon the Roman mixture in their teachings, Italian Renaissance and Anglo-American theorists nonetheless deeply wedded a veneration for the ancient Republic to modern republicanism. By often portraying their efforts at founding new republics as the resurrection of an expired classical ethos, modern republicanists envisioned Rome as the "eternal city" for their followers as well as those of Christianity.

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The location of an idealized political order in the Roman Republic did not, however, originate in modern republican historiography. The genesis of this fusion between the historically real and theoretically ideal regime actually is to be found in the political and historical writings of classical Greek and Roman theorists. For students of political thought, this development has taken on immense significance, particularly in regard to the birth of modern political analysis. According to such notable scholars as the Carlyles, George Sabine, Charles McIlwain, F.W. Walbank, and Robert Cumming, the attempt by ancient theorists to identify the Roman Republic as the actualized ideal regime constituted a radical departure from the Socratic approach to the study of political life, and in fact provided the theoretical foundations for modern political thought. Pointing toward the Roman assumption that politics in general, and regime forms in particular, can be investigated only in terms of their historical development and not absolutist philosophical categories, this body of scholarship has depicted the classical republican thinkers as the theoretical predecessors of Machiavelli's "new method" of political analysis.[3]

Although these scholars have shed much light on this development in terms of its broad methodological significance to the study of political life, little attention has been directed toward the impact of the new Roman school of political inquiry on the classical theory of the mixed regime.[4] This paper will explore the theory of the mixed regime contained in the works of Polybius, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch, not only as a subject matter deserving of its own separate study, but also in terms of its relationship to the theories advanced by earlier Greek proponents of this constitutional model. It will first locate each ancient theorist as a follower of the Roman historical approach to the study of political life and then proceed to examine their individual views on the mixed regime, focusing constant attention on the relationship of their separate teachings to those of Plato and Aristotle, as well as to each other. The paper will conclude with a brief appraisal of the significance of the Roman theory to the subsequent history of Western republican thought until the nineteenth century.

The Romanized Greek historian, Polybius, first transferred the notion of the mixed regime from classical Greek philosophy to Roman historical analysis.[5] In his multivolumed *Histories*, Polybius advanced not only a new model of the properly mixed regime, but also, a radically novel approach to the study of political life in general which provided the model's theoretical foundation.[6] According to Robert Cumming, Polybius offered his new approach to politics as a grandiose attempt to reconcile the ambiguities on the vision of the ideal regime contained in Plato's *Republic* and *Timaeus*. In these dialogues, Socrates advanced two seemingly disparate views on the

nature of the ideal political construct. In the *Republic*, Socrates intended his political ideal to exist purely in the theoretical realm of speech; while in the *Timaeus*, he yearned to transfer the ideal from its ideational and moral context to an actual historical existence so as to better judge its excellence.[7]

Polybius' solution to the Platonic dilemma of the value of history for political inquiry did not take on the guise of an attempted synthesis between philosophy and history. Instead, the *Histories* stands as a manifesto for the superiority of historical analysis over abstract philosophy as the means of determining what is best in political life. Rejecting Plato's "Republic" from consideration as the best regime because it had not actually existed in time and space, Polybius restricted his search for the ideal regime to the annals of history.[8] As such, he replaced the Socratic emphasis upon philosophical inquiry with historical analysis as the true acid test for all political forms. Polybius' championing of history over philosophy constituted an act of intellectual tyrannicide: no longer would man engage in the politically futile quest for the philosopher-king. The realm of the philosopher was the imaginary, and political life consisted exclusively of historical reality.

Because of these novel precepts, Polybius, unlike either Plato or Aristotle, presented his teachings on the ideal mixed regime in the form of an historical analysis of an actual regime. For Polybius, the Roman Republic offered the highest mixture that history had spawned. Although he agreed with his predecessors that a mixed regime alone could escape from the dreaded naturally induced anacyclosis (a perpetual cycle of constitutional revolutions) and thus provide stability in a world of flux, Polybius radically departed from the mixtures advanced by Plato and Aristotle in his treatment of Rome. The Republic owed its excellence not to the philosophical wisdom of a single lawgiver like Lycurgus, but to the fact that it had evolved naturally over centuries. Apparently in concord with Cato's maxim that the cumulative wisdom of centuries was vastly superior to the wisdom of any one man, Polybius judged the Roman mixture superior to any Greek mixture (either theoretical or historical) believed to be the conscious creation of a single lawgiver.[9] In addition, Rome deserved the title to the actualized ideal form of the mixed regime because it perfectly blended the three just regimes of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. So perfect was the equilibrium achieved in the Roman mixture that "it was impossible for a native [Roman] to pronounce with certainty whether the whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical."[10] In claiming the Consuls as the regime's monarchical ingredient, the Senate the aristocratic, and the Tribunes the democratic, Polybius thus associated the properly mixed regime as a blending of three regime forms. As a result, he agreed

with Aristotle that a proper mixture required three ingredients rather than the Platonic two. Unlike Aristotle, however, Polybius championed a mixture which allowed no one ingredient to dominate and blended the three regime forms equally.

Not only was each element of the Roman mixture associated with a specific regime form, but each also wielded an equal portion of the power in the regime. In his explanation of the manner in which he actually distributed political power among the three elements of the Republic, Polybius presented his novel idea of the checks and balance system upon which all modern mixtures would rest. The key to the Roman distribution of power, according to Polybius, was "how each of the three parts is enabled, if they wish, to counteract or cooperate with the others." Thus, the Senate and Tribunes held the Consuls in check, while also restraining each other. Because he believed that a well-ordered regime required a perfect balance of its separate elements, Polybius championed the rigid Roman system of checks and balances and presented the most structurally oriented teachings on the mixed regime in antiquity.[11]

Polybius continued his praise of the structural excellence of the Roman mixture with an elaborate discussion of its stability. In times of common danger to the Republic, the three elements combined to act in unity and thus enhance the powers of the regime to defeat its common enemy. Thus, under the condition of foreign threats, the Roman mixed regime became unified, acting essentially as if it were a single element. Although Polybius obviously intended this passage as a rebuttal to the Aristotelian contention that a mixed regime could easily be destroyed by forces outside the regime because of its internal divisions, the champion of Rome depicted the cardinal advantages of the Republic in terms of its institutional safeguards during peace. In the absence of foreign enemies, the Roman mixture was able to maintain its stability through a principle of institutional dynamism contained within the structure of the mixture. According to Polybius, the Roman regime was capable of rendering internal conflict harmless in times of peace because of its elaborate system of checks and balances. As a result, Polybius discovered the stability sought by the ancients not through their prescription for institutional rigidity and stasis, but through an internal dynamic of constant motion and flexibility contained within Rome's institutional apparatus.[12]

Polybius concluded his teachings on the mixed regime with a comparison of the Roman and Spartan mixtures and a prophesying on the future of the Roman mixture. In his discussion of Rome and Sparta, he once again departed from his Socratic predecessors on a vital element for the ideal mixture. Polybius lauded the Spartan mixture (prior to

Rome, universally acclaimed as the best historical mixture) because of its capacity to thwart the vices of cowardice and ambition.[13] Yet, by praising Sparta's ability to produce brave and temperate citizens, Polybius conspicuously omitted the remaining Socratic virtues of wisdom and justice from his appraisal, and consequently dismissed the Platonic critique that the Spartan mixture was faulty because it was capable of promoting only the lowest form of the four virtues.

Because of his nearly wholesale rejection of the role of philosophy in political life, Polybius also offered a new teaching on the ends of political life. For Plato and Aristotle, the purpose of the ideal regime was to promote the virtuous man. Yet, because he had discovered his ideal regime existing in actual time and space, Polybius transformed the four Socratic virtues (wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage) into one cardinal element: the preservation of the actualized ideal Roman mixture. Thus, because the ideal regime had been achieved, the four virtues were no longer needed as philosophical guidelines to judge the merits of the regime. Instead, Polybius weighed the virtues promoted by the ideal regime in terms of their abilities to control the vices that were the cardinal threat to the stability of the ideal mixture.

Sparta earned Polybius' plaudits primarily because of its capacities to control the vices of cowardice and ambition, the two elements deemed vital for the preservation of any regime. Despite this ability, however, the Spartan mixture failed to harness the regime's imperial ambition to rule over Greece due to a defect in the original Lycurgean laws. In turning toward the actualized ideal Roman mixture, Polybius first praised its ability to control ambition among its three governmental institutions. The checks and balance system harnessed the desire for absolute control by any one institution. In moving his discussion of ambition from an institutional sphere to the actual citizens in the regime, Polybius again contended that Rome, in its excellence, had the necessary constitutional provisions to withstand this internal threat. Pointing toward the mixture's sole ruling capacity over the dispersal of honor and the infliction of punishment in the regime, Polybius believed the city capable of curbing mounting ambition among the ranks of its citizens.[14]

Despite these accolades, Polybius depicted a fate for Rome no better than Sparta's. Regardless of its elaborate institutional safeguards, the Republic would fall prey to a cycle of constitutional revolutions (anacyclosis) and internal decay. Unlike Sparta, however, Rome's degeneration would be the result of external conditions.[15] Throughout the *Histories*, Polybius contended that the Roman mixed regime was at its height and nearest to perfection whenever it was under foreign threats. Only in his concluding passages in Book VI did Polybius allude to

the idea that the loss of external enemies would lead to Rome's decay.[16] Peace would bring prosperity to Rome, but prosperity would be accompanied by luxury and a decline in internal harmony due to the loss of all potential enemies. Luxury would further unleash the vice of ambition among the citizenry to such a degree that the regime could not control it. Finally, this wave of uncontrolled ambition would thrust the Republic into mob rule.

Polybius thus shrouded his analysis of Sparta and Rome in an apocalyptic tone that would greatly influence modern republicanism. The ideal mixed regime was condemned to only a limited existence in time. Yet, in contrast to Rome, the Spartan mixture, despite its faults, lasted unaltered for eight centuries. Rather than conclude that Sparta proved superior to Rome because of its greater ability to forestall degeneration, however, Polybius presented future republican theorists and statesmen with a choice. If a people desired only to remain "in secure possession of their own territory and to maintain their freedom," then they must emulate the Spartan mixture.[17] If, however, a people aspired to greatness, a quality Polybius defined strictly through the measure of imperial conquests, then Rome proved the ideal mixture. As such, Polybius bequeathed a dilemma to future republicans in the form of an Achilles syndrome of greatness or longevity.

Cicero's *Republic* and *Laws* proposed the first solution to Polybius' temporal dilemma concerning Rome as the actualized ideal mixed regime. Unlike Dionysius and later Renaissance theorists who would attempt to solve the dilemma in terms of its own categories, Cicero sought to dismantle the fundamental precepts upon which Polybius had based his historical prophecy. Cicero sought to pierce Polybius' apocalyptic strain concerning the Republic's durability by demonstrating that, as the historical embodiment of the ideal regime, Rome had the unique virtue of promoting harmony during peacetime in addition to achieving imperial greatness. In his exploration of the causes of this unique Roman capacity, Cicero injected a host of Socratic ingredients into his Polybian-styled historical analysis. Consequently, Cicero's theory of the mixed regime stood as an attempted synthesis of the Socratic and Polybian approaches. By grounding his vision of the ideal mixture in historical reality and by accepting Cato's maxim on cumulative historical wisdom, Cicero clearly fell under the general methodological prescriptions of Polybius. General similarities aside, however, Cicero tempered the Polybian approach to politics by granting a formative, albeit subservient, role to philosophy in political life. For Cicero, political wisdom, although derived primarily from actual experience, could also be gained through philosophical inquiry. Rather than depict the two entities as separate and distinct as did Polybius, Cicero collapsed the polarities by rendering political philosophy a direct

derivative from practical statesmanship. According to Cicero, the ideals presented in abstract philosophy were political ideals only because they had previously been realized in practice by political rulers.[18]

Cicero accomplished his reconciliation of philosophy and history by rendering philosophy subservient and totally dependent upon actual political experience. This view pervaded the entire teachings of the *Republic* as well as its dramatic structure. All characters in the dialogue are experienced Roman statesmen who, under the guise of a religious holiday, engage in an abstract discourse on the ideal republic. The main character, Scipio, was selected to present his vision of the ideal mixture by his interlocutors because of his wisdom and experience as a statesman, rather than a vast knowledge of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, in Book III Scipio defined the superior man as one who gains wisdom through both experience and philosophy, even though it was acknowledged that Roman statesmanship had spawned the "precepts and discoveries" of the latter.[19]

Like Polybius, Cicero rejected Plato's "shadowy commonwealth of the imagination" in favor of Rome as the actualized ideal mixed regime that served as the best of all political forms. In addition, he followed Polybius' general view that the Roman Republic owed its excellence to its natural evolution and its perfect blend of the simple forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as an escape from anacyclosis. Although the *Laws* provided ample evidence that Cicero did not follow Polybius' straightforward identification of the regime forms with governmental institutions, he adopted wholesale Polybius' view that a regime defined its character from the nature of its ruling elements. Thus, Cicero borrowed his general criteria for depicting Rome as the actualized ideal directly from Polybius.[20]

Although Cicero agreed with Polybius that the best use of wisdom was discovered in the founding and preservation of regimes, he refused to depict the preservation of the Roman regime as the highest political virtue. Instead, he markedly broke from his Roman predecessor by constantly identifying the essence of a political community as primarily "an association and partnership in justice." By constituting justice as the principal bond that united a regime and its citizens, Cicero returned the cardinal task of a mixed regime to the positive Socratic function of promoting virtue among a citizenry. Thus, the virtue of justice (such an essential ingredient in the composition of the Socratic ideal) was restored as a component of the Roman Republic. Consistent with his synthetical purposes, Cicero also justified the need for justice in the actualized ideal mixture through a practical argument extracted from Roman history. Accordingly, he heralded justice as a keynote to the Republic's

excellence, not only as the primary bond among citizens, but also because it spawned the harmony and concord so essential to the preservation of the regime. As a result, Cicero was able to justify the Republic's commitment to equal justice both from its intrinsic merits and the ends that it served.[21]

The Ciceronian notion of justice also served to resolve the Polybian dilemma concerning the temporal dimensions of the Republic. Although he agreed with Polybius that the regime's stability was in large measure indebted to its balancing of duties and functions along institutional lines, Cicero, because of his great concern for justice, upheld citizens' rights as a necessary ingredient for the Republic's delicate balance. For Cicero, this required the construction of a Romanized "even balance of rights, duties, and functions," so that "magistrates have enough power, the counsel of eminent citizens enough influence, and the people enough liberty." Such a balance was so vital for Cicero's ideal mixture that unless the regime subscribed to it, the polity would not "be safe from revolution."[22]

Cicero separated himself further from Polybius' teachings on the nature of the balance among the elements of the Republic in his treatment of the Republic's social structure. Polybius limited his notion of balance strictly to an institutional sphere with little regard for the relationship of the institutional structure to the existing orders of society. Cicero, however, grafted an Aristotelian ingredient onto the ideal Roman mixture by injecting a socio-economic analysis into his discussion of harmony. Although sometimes restricting his divisions of society into only "leading citizens" and "the many," Cicero opted for a threefold classification scheme which envisioned the Republic's harmony as a product of the blending of the social orders.[23] For Cicero,

> . . . just as in . . . music, . . . harmony is produced by the proportionate blending of unlike tones, so also is a State made harmonious by agreement among dissimilar elements, brought about by a fair and reasonable blending together of the upper, middle, and lower classes, just as if they were musical tones . . . .[24]

Cicero did not limit his reliance on Socratic categories in his historical analysis of Rome to a treatment of justice and a harmonious class system. Unlike Polybius, Cicero did not depict the Roman distribution of power among its institutions as one that was in perfect equilibrium. Instead, he interpreted the Republic as a mixture dominated by the aristocratic element of the Senate. Like Aristotle, Cicero believed this aristocratic ingredient to be the repository for wisdom in the mixture, as well as serving as the moderating force between the extremes of

monarchy and democracy. Furthermore, the Senate, composed of the leading citizens in the Republic, would serve as virtuous models for the vast majority. Although Cicero denied the Senate absolute power over the regime, he invested it with the greatest sphere of control, especially in regard to the Tribunes and the people. Thus, the internal harmony of the Republic's institutions was realized not by an internal dynamic of constant motion among three equally potent agencies, but through the domination of the moderating force of the Roman aristocracy.[25]

For Cicero then, the excellence of the Roman mixed regime was indebted to a variety of ingredients derived in part from the disparate teachings of Polybius and his Socratic predecessors. Despite his efforts to include rationally derived categories as formative elements in his historical analysis, Cicero fully recognized that reason could not act sufficiently as the sole ruling element over the Republic's affairs. Instead, the history of Rome demonstrated that irrational forces, defined fundamentally as the quest of the people for liberty, would constantly threaten the ideal. Foreshadowing Tacitus' chide that mixed regimes were easier to theorize about than put into actual practice, Cicero likened the ideal regime contained in the *Republic* to a beautiful painting whose colors were fading and whose configuration was not preserved.[26] Thus, Cicero's actualized ideal was not, as with Polybius, in current existence at Rome, but contained deep within the city's past. By advancing such a view, Cicero allowed, however slightly, an apocalyptic vision to enter into his pantheon to Roman republicanism.

The attempt to thrust Socratic-derived viewpoints into an historical narrative of the Roman Republic was a notable feature of another post-Polybian theorist of the mixed regime. By establishing the chronological boundaries of his *Roman Antiquities* from Rome's founding to the First Punic War, Dionysius of Halicarnassus clearly sought to place his historical analysis within the tradition of Roman republican historiography established by Polybius. As Zera Fink has observed, however, in Dionysius' hands "[Roman] history was moulded to prove and illustrate the theory of the superiority of mixed government." Although he attempted to complete Polybius' history of the rise of the Roman Republic, Dionysius rejected the evolutionary paradigm of Polybius and Cicero for a vision of the actualized ideal mixture that was moulded fundamentally by Socratic perspectives.[27]

In order to dismiss the view that Rome's excellence resulted from its natural evolution, Dionysius employed the exalted Socratic figure of the lawgiver.[28] As the living embodiment of philosophical wisdom, Plato and Aristotle had depicted the lawgiver as the necessary first condition for establishing a mixed regime. The lawgiver's wisdom enabled a regime to transcend the dimension of time

and enter the static realm of philosophy, and thus achieve a state of permanence and stability. The lawgiver's function stood in direct contrast to the apocalyptic and evolutionary theories advanced by Polybius and Cicero.[29] Dionysius drew upon the figure of Lycurgus who most closely approximated the lawgiver in history for the classical Greeks. Through his depiction of Romulus as a Roman Lycurgus and the unchanged political structure of the Republic from its Romulean origins, however, Dionysius transformed Rome from an historical into a timeless, philosophical entity and consequently rebuked the central evolutionary premise of Roman republican historiography.

Although Cicero considered Romulus the father of Rome, he did not cast Romulus as its sole lawgiver since the Republic had evolved into its mixed form naturally. In his treatment of Romulus, Cicero judged him capable of only mixing monarchy and aristocracy and ruling in Rome as a tyrant. Operating under the assumption that the lawgiver was vital to the establishment of a truly ideal mixture, however, Dionysius presented the Ciceronian "tyrant" as the sole cause for Rome's greatness as the actualized ideal mixture. Dionysius contended that Romulus' wisdom provided the city with a mixed form of government at its inception and that as the ideal, the Romulean provisions remained unchanged for over six centuries. It was not until the tribuneship of Gaius Gracchus, who foolishly tampered with the ideal mixture of Romulus, that the Republic degenerated into bloody civil strife and was subjected to the dictates of time.[30]

Although he depicted Rome as the actualized ideal mixture, Dionysius, through his treatment of Romulus, had transformed the Republic into a "Greek city" and brought the theory of the mixed regime almost entirely back to its Socratic origins. Consequently, additional Greek elements emerged in his historical analysis. To a much greater degree than Cicero, Dionysius restored the close relationship between a regime's form and the character of its citizens that was the core of Socratic political philosophy. Dionysius believed that the internal harmony so essential to the Republic's survival arose primarily from the prudent and moderate character of its citizens. In true Socratic fashion, Dionysius contended that the cultivation of just, moderate, and brave Romans resulted solely from "the form of government when this has been established wisely." Thus, Dionysius praised Polybius' venerated institutional balance not as an end in itself, but because of its capacity to produce the virtuous citizenry that was the keynote to the Republic's harmony and stability.[31]

Rather surprisingly, however, Dionysius spiced his historical narrative of the Republic with references to intense factional strife and the lack of harmony in the regime. He attributed the seemingly constant civil dissension in Rome for the most part to the base economic

drives of the plebs and the demagogic nature of the Tribunes. Although he acknowledged the Tribunes as a necessary institutional check upon the Consuls, Dionysius considered their democratic proclivities the gravest danger to the Republic's harmony and stability. It was in such a context that he championed a mixture in which the aristocratic element, as the sole repository of wisdom, served as a moderating force over the base democratic passions of the many. As a result, Dionysius' actualized ideal mixture distributed power unevenly among the three ruling elements and in fact provided for an aristocratic domination of the Senate. Like Cicero before him, Dionysius had broken from Polybius' evenly-balanced arrangement of power through the Aristotelian notion of a dominant and moderating middle element.[32]

Despite his profound theoretical innovations, Dionysius' discourse on the mixed regime still remained within the Roman historical tradition by recognizing the Republic as the actualized best mixture and by advancing his teachings through an historical narrative framework. In contrast, Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, while keeping within the general approach to the theory, would dismantle any claims of the Roman Republic as the historical embodiment of the ideal mixed regime. As a result, Plutarch's theory of the mixed regime serves as an apt introduction to the modern republican view of Rome as a tragically defected ideal.

Although Plutarch directed his *Lives* more toward extracting the virtues necessary for the proper statesman to emulate than toward "the abstract merits of different constitutions," the work nonetheless contained an exposition of the mixed regime. Unlike his predecessors, Plutarch presented his theory through an analysis of the Spartan, rather than Roman, mixture. Despite his familiarity with Dionysius' exalted vision of Rome and Romulus, Plutarch offered little praise for Romulus. Instead, he cast the Dionysian founder as a hateful monarch who owed his rise to power solely to good fortune rather than philosophical wisdom. Concerning Romulus and the mixed regime, Plutarch blatantly rejected Dionysius' contention that Romulus was the Roman mixture's lawgiver. Instead, Plutarch saw Romulus as a Roman tyrant who forced the Roman aristocracy to listen in silence to his commands. As a result, Romulus brought about the political emasculation of the aristocracy, the transformation of the regime from kingship to tyranny, and the establishment of a politically precarious mood of belligerency in the regime. Finally, Plutarch severed the remaining republican historical claim to Roman greatness by dismissing the results of Rome's imperial conquests as a cause of its grandeur. For Plutarch, the final fruits that were plucked from the tree of Roman imperialism were the vices of luxury and wealth, and the transformation of the Republic into the Empire.[33]

Rather than Rome or Romulus, Sparta and Lycurgus

earned Plutarch's "highest praise" regarding the mixed regime.[34] Lycurgus' wisdom in establishing a mixed regime for Sparta was produced not by his political experience, but through his study of Greek poetry. Given the Aristotelian chide that poetry by nature was more philosophical than history, Plutarch, in viewing the poetry of Homer and Thales as the source of Lycurgus' political wisdom, thus issued a rebuke to the Roman view of political life.[35] Indeed, so potent was this new source of political sagacity that Lycurgus sent the poet Thales to Sparta to promote harmony and obedience in its citizens through the "measured rhythms" and "ordered tranquility" of his lyric verses. Thus, the genesis of actualized mixed regimes was to be found in Greek poetry.

Despite these radical departures from the Roman republican tradition on the mixed regime, Plutarch could not break completely from the sway of their teachings. In his discussion of the specific measures comprising the Spartan mixture, Plutarch actually reverted to the tradition he had nearly dismantled. Thus, he considered the Lycurgean mixture superior to the Platonic because the former existed in space and time whereas the latter occupied only the theoretical sphere of speech. Furthermore, the properly mixed regime was one composed of the three cardinal regime forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy which directly correlated with the three governing institutions of the regime. Plutarch further echoed the theory of his Roman predecessors by envisioning the aristocratic Senate as the dominant element of the three, which, because of its tendency to moderate between political extremes, served as a "ballast" in the Spartan mixture. He also followed the earlier theories by attributing Sparta's degeneration to the spread of internal decay through luxury.[36]

Plutarch's combined attraction and repulsion to the Roman historical tradition can best be seen in the ambiguities inherent in his approach to the study of political life. Relying upon the genre of biography, Plutarch was able to use an historical analysis yet still define the good in society as an extension of the virtuous life of the individual citizen. Similarly, through the use of parallel lives taken from separate historical regimes, he showed that political virtues were absolute and not governed by time and space. Finally, although he recognized that philosophy was of value to political life, he defined philosophy in a Roman rather than Socratic sense. The use of philosophy did not produce "statues doomed to stand idly on their pedestals and no more." Instead, he envisioned philosophy as an active agent in political affairs, striving to transform all it contacted into activity and efficiency, and moving all objects under its dominion toward the honorable, useful, and great. By defining philosophy as "the good life in action," Plutarch had synthesized the contrasting perspectives on political life that

had existed in the classical republican tradition.[37]

The Roman theory of the mixed regime thus appears as a complex portrait whose contours were shaped unevenly by the canvas of classical republican historiography and the intricate brush strokes of Socratic political philosophy. By seeking to infuse selective Socratic elements into their historical analyses, post-Polybian theorists clearly displayed an indebtedness to their theoretical predecessors on the mixed regime. Although varying in degree in their reliance upon Plato and Aristotle, Cicero, Dionysius, and Plutarch presented their theories through the genres of historical narrative and biography and thus adhered to Polybius' revolutionary mode of political analysis. By employing the borrowed Socratic categories within an historical framework, they substantially altered the traditional meanings attached to many of these concepts. The Roman theorists, by unfailingly presenting their vision of the ideal through history, became theoretical founders, as well as preservers, within the classical tradition of the mixed regime.

Despite its chauvinistic trappings, the Roman contention that their city served as the eternal model of republicanism profoundly influenced the development of Western republican philosophy. Although rejected outright by Augustine and Aquinas as the actualized ideal republic, the classical Roman mixture enjoyed its own particular revival during the Italian Renaissance. Most clearly depicted in the writings of Machiavelli, civic humanists, although partisans of the ancient Republic, praised it in a more circumspect fashion than their intellectual forebears. By recognizing the Republic's collapse into despotism as a symptom of defects in the polity's construction, Renaissance republicans consciously advanced novel models of the properly mixed regime as historical replacements for the Roman mixture. Thus, the Renaissance's veneration of the eternal republican city actually included the recognition of a theoretical gulf between the ancient polity and the ideal mixed regime.[38]

The quest to discover the defects evident in the Roman Republic and advance new mixtures as the actualized ideal also lay at the core of Anglo-American republican thought from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries. This Roman-inspired tradition reached its apex in English and American writings during the last half of the eighteenth century. On the English side of the Atlantic, Montesquieu viewed the English constitution as the perfect embodiment of the ideal mixture. Pointing toward pervasive ministerial corruption and the seemingly omnipotent power of the monarch, however, American republicans, beginning in the 1760s, vehemently rejected the English model as the historical heir to classical Rome. Instead, they proclaimed their newly gained independent republic as the embodiment of the perfected Roman mixed regime.[39]

Despite their ability to widen the theoretical gulf between the Roman Republic and the ideal mixed regime, Renaissance and Anglo-American republican thinkers advanced their theories within the general context of the classical tradition. In their assumption that a mixed regime provided the soundest structure for a republic and their quest to posit the ideal in historical reality, these theorists belied the continuation of the Roman theory of the mixed regime as a formative element in modern political thought. Although the English and American tradition of viewing their regimes strictly through classical Roman lenses was brought to its end by the separate efforts of Bagehot and Lincoln during the 1860s, the Roman republican theories received their most telling blow from Karl Marx. Operating under a novel historical perspective, Marx sought, through one bold and masterful stroke, to sever modern political consciousness from its classical roots. Marx depicted the Roman republican tradition as "a nightmare on the brain of the living," and in his *Eighteenth Brumaire* condemned these time-honored teachings as bourgeois society's attempt to escape from the reality of the class struggle and infuse a mock heroism into its debased political existence.[40] It remains for modern republicanism to determine whether it will envision its own essence as the historical heir to a venerated classical ideal or as a cowardly self-deception as depicted by Marx.

NOTES

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1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "To the Republic of Geneva," in *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men*, trans. by Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 80.
2. See pages 68-69 above and accompanying notes.
3. R.W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Thought in the West* (London: W. Blackwood and Son, 1936), vol. 1, p. 2; George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt, 1962), p. 141; Charles McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 114; F.W. Walbank, "Polybius and the Roman Constitution," *Classical Quarterly* 37 (January 1943): 82-83; Robert Cumming, *Human Nature and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 87-333.
4. See especially Cumming, *Human Nature and History*, vol. 1, p. 179, n. 41. Students of the mixed regime have not fared much better in their treatment of the ancient theorists as a distinct school of thought on the subject. For most of these latter scholars, classical antecedents of the construct are of little significance in understanding seventeenth and eighteenth century mixtures, and, as a result, receive scant attention. For the extreme position of this school of thought, see Martin Diamond, "The Separation of Powers and the Mixed Regime," *Publius* 7 (Summer 1978): 35-43. Notable exceptions to this general observation are Paul Eidelberg, *Philosophy of the American Constitution* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), and *Discourse on Statesmanship* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974); and Gilbert Chinard, "Polybius and the American Constitution," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1 (January 1940): 38-58. For Eidelberg, Aristotle provides the key to understanding the American Constitution, while Chinard's study is too brief to do justice to his subject.
5. Polybius' place in the annals of historiography as an early practioner of the genre of universal history and as *the* historian of Republican Rome's rise to world hegemony has been well established by a host of twentieth century

historians. These same scholars, however, have been negligent in recognizing the role of Polybius' novel historiographical genre in the history of political philosophy. According to F.W. Walbank and Arnaldo Momigliano, the political teachings of Polybius relied upon Greek political theories to interpret the realities of the Roman Republic and led to significant historical inaccuracies. Those scholars who have attempted more elaborate analyses of Polybius' political thought have not fared much better, and, except for Robert Cumming, have viewed Polybius strictly as the founder of the constitutional theory of checks and balances. On Polybius and universal history, see J.B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), pp. 217-223; R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 33; T.R. Glover, "Polybius," in *Cambridge Ancient History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1930), vol. 8, p. 17; F.W. Walbank, "Polybius," in T.A. Dorey, ed., *Latin Historians* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 43, 49. For the appraisals of Walbank and Momigliano, see F.W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 155 and Arnaldo Momigliano, *Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography* (Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1977), p. 76. On the Polybian theory of checks and balances, see Kurt Von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), passim; M.J.C. Vile, *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 36; Leon Homo, *Roman Political Institutions* (New York: Knopf, 1930), pp. 113-118; T.A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), pp. 269-274; Gilbert Chinard, "Polybius and the American Constitution," pp. 38-59; William Dunning, *A History of Political Theories Ancient and Medieval* (New York: Macmillan, pp. 113-118.

6. This latter point is developed more fully in Cumming, *Human Nature and History*, vol. 1, pp. 87-161; John Kayser and Ronald Lettieri, "Aquinas' *Regimen Bene Commixtum* and the Medieval Critique of Classical Republicanism," forthcoming in *The Thomist*; and Ronald J. Lettieri, "Republican Rome in the Eyes of Polybius and Other Post-Hellenic Greeks," paper delivered at the New England Historical Association, October 1977.

7. Cumming, *Human Nature and History*, vol. 1, p. 136; Plato, *Republic*, 472E and *Timaeus*, 19B-C.

8. Polybius, *Histories*, 6, 47.7-10.

9. Ibid., 6, 9.11-14; 10.13-14.

10. Ibid., 6, 9.11-14; 10.13-14; 11.11-13. See also Harry Jaffa, "Aristotle," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., *History of Western Political Philosophy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 80-94 and 125-126.

11. Polybius, *Histories*, 6, 12-18.8; 15.1-17.9.

12. Ibid., 6, 18.2-4; 18.6-8.

13. Ibid., 6, 43-58; 46.7-9; 48.2-6.

14. Ibid., 6, 14.3-5; 46.7-9; 48.2-6; 48.6-49.10.

15. Namely, Roman dominion over the world. See ibid., 6, 50.6.

16. Ibid., 6, 18.1-8; 57.4-10.

17. On the apocalyptic strains in republican consciousness, see J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 50-56, 108-112, 213-215. Polybius, *Histories*, 6, 50.1-2. It is interesting to note that the issue of what categories constituted Roman greatness were still widely debated during the eighteenth century. In *Causes of the Greatness of the Romans*, Montesquieu accepts Polybius' notion of a territorial scale of imperial conquests when speaking of Roman grandeur. Conversely, Gibbon, in Chapter 2 of *Decline and Fall* rejects this imperial measuring stick in favor of the advance of philosophy and liberty. Charles Montesquieu, *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline*, trans. by David Lowenthal (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 23-25, 92-94; Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Modern Library, 1932), vol. 1, p. 25.

18. Dionysius attempted this solution through the myth of six centuries of Roman excellence under the mixed regime. This solution to the Polybian dilemma was revived during the sixteenth century regarding republican myths concerning the Venetian commonwealth. Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities*, 2, 11, 2-3; Gaspari Contarini, *History of Venice*, trans. by Lewis Lewekenor (London: n.p., 1599); William J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), passim; Cicero, *Republic*, 1,2,2; 2,1,1.

19. Cicero, *Republic*, 1,22,36; 3,3,5; 3,4,7. On the characters and the dramatic structure of the *Republic*, see especially Cumming, *Human Nature and History*, vol. 1, pp. 184, 207; George Sabine and Stanley Smith, "Introduction," in *Cicero's On the Commonwealth* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1929), pp. 4-6.

20. Cicero, *Republic*, 1,27,44; 1,29,45; 1,44,68; 1,46,70; 2,16,30; 2,23, 42; 2,30,52; 2,39,65-66; *Laws*, 2,10,23-34; 3,5,12-13. Even though Cicero's *Laws* contains alterations of the actual Roman mixture, the addition of the permanent office of the Censors and the curbs on the Tribunes are "modest" changes as depicted by Ronald Syme. See Cicero, *Laws*, 2,5,13: Ronald Syme, *Ten Studies in Tacitus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 119. For a general discussion of the ideal regime presented in the *Laws*, see C.W. Keynes, "Original Elements in Cicero's Ideal Constitution," *American Journal of Philol-*

ogy 42 (1921): 309-323.

21. Cicero, *Republic*, 1,7,12; 1,25,39; 1,32,49; 2,42,69.

22. Ibid., 2,34,57; 3,8,16.

23. Ibid., 1,49,69.

24. Ibid., 2,42,69.

25. Ibid., 1,34,52; 1,35,55; 2,22,39; *Laws*, 3,10,23-24; 3,12,27-28; 3,14, 31-32; 3,17,38.

26. Cumming, *Human Nature and History*, vol. 1, p. 252; Cicero, *Republic*, 5,1,2; Tacitus, *Annals*, 4,33,11.

27. Ernest Carey, "Introduction," in *Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), p. xii; Zera Fink, *The Classical Republicans* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1945), p. 8. Clearly, my analysis of Dionysius' theory of the mixed regime is at odds with K.J. Dover's view that "Dionysius does not command respect as a historian or as a critic of historiography." K.J. Dover, "Thucydides," *Greek and Roman Survey* 7 (1973): 9.

28. Aristotle, *Politics*, 2,9,11-12; 3,9; 4,1,12; 4,1,14; 5,8; 6,1,6; 7,14.

29. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, pp. 168-173; 188-193.

30. Cicero, *Republic*, 2,7,12-18; 2,13,43; 2,28,50; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, 1,4,2-3; 2,7,1-2; 2,11,2-3.

31. Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities*, 1,89,1; 2,3,4-6; 2,14,1; 2,27,1.

32. Ibid., 3,11,8-9; 6,22,1; 6,71; 7,8,1; 7,65,1-3; 7,66,4-5; 8,81,1; 9, 27,1; 10,1,1; 10,3,1; 14; Fink, *Classical Republicans*, p. 10.

33. C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 111; Plutarch, *Parallel Lives*, "Romulus," 26,1; 27,1-2; "Numa," 8,1; "Lycurgus and Numa," 4,7. Compare Plutarch's treatment of post-Romulean Rome with the inflamed state of Sparta under its kings as depicted in Plato, *Laws*, 691e. On this point, see especially Alan Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 201.

34. C.J. Gianakaris, *Plutarch* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970), p. 123.

35. Plutarch, *Parallel Lives*, "Lycurgus," 4,1-4; Aristotle, *Poetics*, 9,3, 1451b.

36. Plutarch, *Parallel Lives*, "Lycurgus," 5,2-8, esp.7; 6,1-3; 30,1; 31,2.

37. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, pp. 6, 19-20, 211-212; Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, p. 109; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 776c-d.

38. Augustine, *City of God*, 2,2; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1-2, 95,4, and 1-2, 105,1. Thomas depicted the founding of the Roman Republic merely as a transition from despotism to simple aristocracy and replaced Rome as the ideal mixture with the divinely sanctioned Hebraic mixture contained in the Old Testament. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum*, 1,4. For a discussion of the Thomistic theory of the mixed regime, see John Kayser and Ronald Lettieri, "Aquinas' *Regimen Bene Commixtum* and the Medieval Critique of Classical Republicanism," forthcoming in *The Thomist*; Thomas Gilby, *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 289-295; Alexander D'Entreves, *Medieval Contribution to Political Thought* (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), pp. 39-40; Dino Biongiari, "Introduction," in *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Hafner Press, 1953), pp. xxix-xxxi; Nicollo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, "Preface" to Books 1 and 2; 1,2-24; 3,1. On the various theories of the ideal mixed regime advanced during the Renaissance, see Fink, *Classical Republicans*, pp. 10-20; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, pp. 99-104, 299-310.

39. On the English theory of the mixed regime, see especially, John Kayser and Ronald Lettieri, "'The Last of All the Romans': Shakespeare's Commentary on Classical Republicanism," *Clio* 9 (Winter 1980): 197-227; Corrine Weston, *English Constitutional Theory and the House of Lords, 1556-1832* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 9-179; Fink, *Classical Republicans*, pp. 28-190; M.J.C. Vile, *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 1-137. For the various interpretations of the American theory of the mixed regime, see especially, Roy Lokken, "The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought," *William And Mary Quarterly* 16 (Oct. 1959): 568-580; J.R. Pole, "Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy," *American Historical Review* 67 (April 1962): 626-646; Malcolm Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine of the Separation of Powers," *University of Chicago Law Review* 2 (April 1935): 385-436; Gordon Wood, *Creation of the American Republic, 1763-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 197-222; Paul Conkin, *Self-Evident Truths* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1974), pp. 143-184; Eidelberg, *Philosophy of the American Constitution*, pp. 3-260; Martin Diamond, "The Separation of Powers and the Mixed Regime," *Publius* 7 (Summer 1978): 35-43; Ronald Lettieri, "Connecticut's 'Publius': *The Landholder Series* and the Theoretical Fabric of Confederation Republicanism," forthcoming in *Connecticut History*; Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, 11,6.

40. This is not to imply that Marx did not render the subject of political theory under the sway of historical analysis. Indeed, along with Hegel and Comte, Marx was one of the nineteenth century's dominant voices advocating the historical approach to the study of political life. On Bagehot's severing

the English constitution from the theory of the mixed regime, see Weston, *English Constitutional Theory*, pp. 217-257; on Lincoln's attempt at a new founding of the American Republic, see Harry Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 308-346; on Marx's views of the poverty of the classical republican tradition, see Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Institute of Marxism and Leninism, ed., *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works* (Moscow, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 398-399.

British Colonial Policy and the Decision to Abandon Madagascar to the French, 1882-1883

Tara Sethia

The French takeover of Madagascar in the late nineteenth century often has been viewed as the British abandonment of that island. There is a general consensus among historians that the British bartered away Madagascar at the Anglo-French convention in August 1890.[1] The convention was the logical outcome of a treaty between Germany and England signed in July 1890, whereby Germany was given Heligoland in the North Sea for recognition of an undisputed British protectorate over Zanzibar. The subsequent Anglo-French convention was an extension of this treaty. At this meeting, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, solidified the British claim to Zanzibar by recognizing the French protectorate over Madagascar in exchange for similar French recognition of Britain's claims to Zanzibar.

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The British abandonment of Madagascar has been interpreted in many ways. It has been seen by some, particularly by the members of the London Missionary Society, as a "premature" move on the part of the British. The basis of this interpretation is that the British gave up Madagascar at the Anglo-French convention which took place five years before the actual French conquest of the island in 1895. William Edward Cousins--a British missionary who served in Madagascar in the late nineteenth century--typifies this point of view. Showing his dismay over British recognition of the French protectorate over Madagascar, he explained that "[t]he English have taken but a languid interest in Madagascar affairs, or such a cool giving away of people who had always regarded us their friends would have been impossible."[2]

Subsequently, Sonia E. Howe, in *The Drama of Madagascar* (1938), suggested that when British and French interests collided over Madagascar in 1882, Britain was too preoccupied in Egypt to give serious attention to Madagascar affairs. In short, Howe believes the problem confronting the British was "one of Madagascar versus Egypt--there could be no doubt where the emphasis lay."[3] Hence, when the Malagasy ambassadors arrived in London to seek support from Her Majesty's Government against French aggression, they received a cold response. Nonetheless, according to Howe, things remained unsettled until 1890 when Britain and France "fixed the price to their mutual satisfaction" and recognized each other's respective claims to Madagascar and Zanzibar.[4]

A more recent and better-documented work by Phares M. Mutibwa presents an interpretation which differs only slightly from that of Howe. This "representative of the Malagasy viewpoint" interprets the fate of Madagascar as a part of the phenomenon of the "scramble for Africa." According to Mutibwa, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had left the French frustrated and angry. This state of affairs tied the hands of the British who could not alienate France "on such secondary issue as Madagascar," and thus they could not aid the Malagasy ambassadors. Yet no specific commitments were made by Britain until the 1890 Anglo-French convention when Britain ended this thorny problem by giving up all claims to Madagascar in exchange for French recognition of British claims to Zanzibar. Mutibwa concludes, "there was no doubt that it was Zanzibar in particular and Britain's overall interests in the Far East in general, which forced Salisbury's hand in acquiescing to French ambitions in Madagascar." The British desertion of Madagascar, to Mutibwa, was all the more striking in that Britain previously had been Madagascar's best friend and ally in Europe.[5] Similar views are presented in works by Richard Lovett, Jean Valette, Norman Goodall, and Mervyn Brown.[6]

Despite the persuasive cases presented by some of the

above authors, for all practical purposes British abandonment of Madagascar took place by 1883--well before the Anglo-French formalities of 1890. This *de facto* British repudiation of its interests in Madagascar, which facilitated the eventual establishment of the French protectorate, was as much a result of the policies pursued by the Liberal government in England from 1880 to 1885, as of the French Republic's feverish craving for colonies. This study, however, will focus on the British role because it was Britain's action (or inaction), more than the French designs on Madagascar, which proved decisive in the eventual establishment of the French protectorate over Madagascar. These actions bore, to a large extent, an imprint of the personality of Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, but they were also guided by Britain's overall international policy considerations. The most important shifts in British attitude toward Madagascar occurred between October 1882 and February 1883. It was during this period that the British attitude became increasingly ambivalent toward both France and Madagascar. And while the French were in a position to take advantage of this by establishing their control over Madagascar, the Malagasy people had no choice but to become victims of it.

Belying the ease with which the British yielded to the French in the early 1880s were long-standing British interests to promote British trade and extend the "civilizing influence" in Madagascar. Madagascar was a market for Manchester cotton goods. Even after the French conquest of the island, British cotton imports in Madagascar totaled more than that from all other countries combined. There were also vast sugar plantations owned by British subjects in Madagascar.[7] Moreover, the London Missionary Society had a very strong hold over the Hova people, who constituted about fifty percent of the total population of Madagascar. The missionaries introduced compulsory education in most of the Malagasy towns and villages by 1880, and they built a great number of churches and educational institutions.[8]

The French, on the other hand, also had long-term, if imprecise, claims to Madagascar. Occasionally the French claimed sovereignty over parts of the island, and they did secure acceptance of their sovereignty over the neighboring islands of Sainte Marie and Nossie Bé. Strengthening French claims, the Réunionese colonists regarded Madagascar as an El Dorado, a promised land. Nonetheless, under British pressure, in 1843 France renounced colonial ambitions in Madagascar "publicly and by name."[9] The French subsequently accepted the British proposal that "one government should do nothing in Madagascar without consulting the other." This understanding was reaffirmed several times prior to 1882.[10]

This policy of balance was most effective as long as the trade route to India passed by Madagascar. But with

the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Madagascar lost much of its earlier importance. Though this change was not perceived for some time, the opening of the canal, in effect, "sounded the death knell of Madagascar's independence" because a strategic balance of power in that area was no longer necessary.[11] Madagascar became one more minor pawn to be used in world-wide colonial struggles.

The opening of the Suez Canal, however, was not the only factor which disturbed the status quo of the island. The French deeply regretted losing the Indies, Canada, and Louisiana to the British, and for over a hundred years this had been a festering wound in French pride. To salve the wound, French colonial policy in the 1880s was characterized by an aggressive pursuit of influence, power, prestige, and glory.[12] As a result, it was not difficult for the French to find grounds to press for political as well as territorial gains in Madagascar. One such ground was the Malagasy preference for the British Protestant missionaries over the French Catholic missionaries--a preference viewed by the French as a political move engineered by the Malagasy government in league with the British "to elbow them [the French] out of the country altogether."[13] The French bore various such grudges, both real and imagined, and they were looking for opportunities to avenge their humiliation. The early 1880s provided France with such an opportunity in Madagascar. Aiding these desires was the nature of the British government during the 1880s.

The Liberal government of 1880-1885 in Britain was ineffective as a governing body, especially in matters concerning foreign and colonial relations.[14] Prime Minister Gladstone was a follower of Lord Aberdeen, who rejected an aggressive foreign policy and strove to acquire French friendship. Compounding Aberdeen's meek foreign policy was Gladstone's poor health and his lack of mastery of foreign affairs. Attacks of influenza left him low and weak, and internal cabinet factions became more assertive when Gladstone admitted his limited knowledge of foreign matters.[15] If anything really engrossed him, it was Ireland. In affairs such as Madagascar, his knowledge was so shallow that he was often accused of giving wrong information and making contradictory statements in the House of Commons.[16]

The Foreign Office was headed by Lord Granville, who occupied the post of Foreign Secretary with consummate uninterestedness. His diplomatic abilities were limited. His nickname was "Puss."[17] The radical Cabinet members, Sir William Harcourt and Joseph Chamberlain, had little interest in Madagascar. Lord Derby's paralyzing influence merely added to the tendency of Cabinet meetings to be typified by prolonged discussions without any decisions.[18]

The Liberal government of 1880-1885 was a match nei-

ther to the ambitious French Republic, nor to the diplomacy of Germany's Bismarck. Even though the British annexation of Egypt in 1882 had indicated that the Liberal government could be as aggressive as its Conservative counterpart, the Gladstonian government's aversion to territorial acquisitions was genuine and guided by the principle of economy in its colonial policy. In foreign policy, however, the Liberal government sought a "steady concert with France" to maintain stability on a continent faced with the increasing power of Germany under the ascending star of Bismarck.[19] This was particularly true because the British Navy was no longer invincible, and the Liberal government was well aware of this fact. Although the French smarted from earlier British colonial gains, England still looked at France as a continental friend. Furthermore, at this time a British friendship with Germany would have been almost impossible. Free trade, the English parliamentary system, and the ideas of English Liberals in general were anathemas to Bismarck.[20] Hence the Anglo-French tête-à-tête became the predominant concern of the British foreign policy. The Dual Control by Britain and France of Egypt was formed to this effect, but when the British occupied Egypt the Dual Control came to a bitter end, and a shift in the British attitude toward France took place. The British annexation of Egypt created difficulties in maintaining French friendship. Yet since close cooperation with Germany was not possible, Britain still pursued a policy of appeasement toward the French, basically to prevent formation of a Franco-German entente. It was this concern which kept the Liberal government from taking a strong stand on the Madagascar question when France pressed for greater control of the island.

In this context the Liberal government's interests in Madagascar became subordinate to its larger interest of retaining a balance of power on the Continent. The Egyptian affair was a cause of concern not because Britain had greater interests involved there than in Madagascar, but because British control in Egypt had already become a source of irritation to France. Thus, active British intervention in the affairs of Madagascar could have added fuel to the fire. This fear haunted the Liberal ministry of 1880-1885.

The British may not have desired the total alienation of France; nevertheless, the Liberal government was actively interested in maintaining Malagasy independence. This British attitude was obvious until early 1882 when the French, who were dismayed by British activities in Egypt, began to pressure the Liberal government. Indicative of French sentiments, the *Odre* charged England with the intention of acquiring a protectorate over the port of Majunga on the French-dominated northwest coast of Madagascar as a station for ships engaged in repression of the slave trade.[21] Other papers in both England and France

carried similar reports. Eventually, the uproar led to a debate in the House of Commons where Sir Charles Dilke, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, denied the validity of such statements and reaffirmed the friendly understanding between France and England regarding Madagascar.[22]

Such reports as those that brought the issue to the House of Commons contained implicit elements of a different kind of truth. This truth lay in the French thirst to recoup international prestige lost in the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and in the earlier French cessions of colonial territories to England.[23] It is in this light that the French interpretation of the visit of Rear Admiral Gore Jones, the British Commander-in-Chief of the East India Station, to Madagascar should be understood. Although this event took place in July 1881, it had lasting repercussions.

The naval visit of Rear Admiral Jones was meant to encourage the dominant Malagasy Hova dynasty to extend its rule throughout the island and thus to strengthen Madagascar's independence. Jones was not only accompanied by his staff but also by Her Britannic Majesty's consul. As no British ambassador had visited Antananarivo, the capital of Madagascar, since the coronation of Radama II in 1862, the visit of the Admiral was viewed with unusual interest and curiosity.[24] At their meeting, the admiral not only suggested that the Hova Queen establish her sovereignty over the northwest coast of Madagascar, which was ruled by the Sakalava tribe, but he also promised to help her in the endeavor.[25] The British government was eager to downplay this event so as not to alarm the French and described Jones's trip as an "official visit in response to the wish expressed by the Hova Queen" to discuss the question of establishing her authority over the Sakalava territory.[26] From Jones's advice to the Home Government, however, it became clear that this mission was to neutralize the French influence which was dominant in northwestern Madagascar. "Our placing the Hovas in force on the West coast would be an act of great political importance," Jones stated bluntly. "[I]t would at once shut up the French claims of sovereignty to any part of this island, and it should have an amazing effect in developing legitimate commerce and stopping the slave trade."[27] The British government concurred, and the Hova Queen's authority was established over the northwest coast of Madagascar.

This action was resented by French authorities for several reasons. First, the French colony of Nossie Bé lay exactly opposite the Sakalava territory. Second, the northwest coast was regarded as the "nursing mother" of Réunion.[28] The French Foreign Minister Duclerc, aware of the English role in the affair, quickly sent a dispatch to London through the British embassy to Paris stating that the area was "subject to the protectorate of France in

virtue of existing treaties."[29] The legal bases of the French "protectorate" were questionable, but the French government was determined to resist encroachments on French "rights" and to make the most of its agreements of the 1840s with the Sakalava chieftains.[30] When the British embassy in Paris, upon receiving Lord Granville's reply to the French dispatch, inquired about the nature of these treaties, the French authorities did not deign to respond.[31]

In the meantime, public opinion among the British in Madagascar became quite tense. Apprehensive of the French plans and their consequences to commerce, trade, and general safety, British subjects were alarmed. One report from Antananarivo alleged that the French were attempting to coerce the Malagasy government to accept French claims. Such coercion was seen by the British as damaging to trade and commerce, and, in turn, endangering British interests in Mauritius.[32] Eventually the Foreign Office in London established from an official source (the British consul in Madagascar) that the French designs on the island of Madagascar could no longer be taken as a "surmise of conjecture," but had to be accepted as "a matter of fact."[33]

In view of these reports and the concern of the British interests in Madagascar, Granville sent another dispatch to Paris recognizing the Queen of Madagascar as an "absolute Monarch" of the whole island except for Mayotta and Nossie Bé on the West Coast--the French territories. Granville hoped this would secure a similar recognition from the French in accordance with the mutual understanding that the two countries maintain identical attitudes toward Madagascar. The French statement accepting the British recognition of the Queen as absolute monarch of all except the French territories would reinforce Malagasy independence as well as the French and British status quo on the island. Granville further added that any advancement of territorial claims by France in Madagascar "might be calculated to disturb the understanding between the two countries."[34]

While this move by the British government was clearly directed toward perpetuating the existing understanding in Madagascar, shortly thereafter, the British suddenly shifted their stance on the matter. Within two weeks of Granville's dispatch to Paris, the British adopted a strikingly weaker policy on the issue. They did not insist on pursuing the "mutual understanding," and, remarkably, even appeared to have yielded totally to the French point of view. What *The Spectator* reported on October 21, 1882, is illustrative of the changed attitude:

> Of British interests in the matter, it would be nonsense to urge Britain to defend Madagascar; if the French got entangled in Madagascar, they would not profit from it. . . . Our interest is

> not to give France a sense of being throttled by Great Britain in all directions. The English people are not going to annex Madagascar; and it is not their business to protect the Malagasy against an invasion which will probably fail, and which if it succeeds, is certainly no worse than the French conquest of Cambodia. . . . As to the cry that the French in Madagascar will endanger our alternate route in India, we are sick of the argument. England could not clash with France for the sake of Madagascar. England cannot forfeit an alliance essential to the good order of the world. . . .[35]

As time went on, this new attitude became a part of the policies pursued from Whitehall and clearly emerged in the speeches, dispatches, and private correspondence of the British Cabinet. For example, on October 27, 1882, important members of the Cabinet representing military and foreign services met with Lord Granville. The Madagascar question was one of the purposes of the meeting. Against the strong protest of Sir Charles Dilke, now the former Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Granville, Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook decided "to put no difficulty in the way of the French."[36] Subsequently, the new policy became public in the government's response to the requests of a committee representing British interests in the area, the Madagascar Committee, and in response to the pleas of the Malagasy embassy--which was on visit to London to seek the friendly intervention of Britain in the Franco-Malagasy dispute.[37]

Approximately one month after Granville's Cabinet meeting, the Madagascar Committee visited Granville and Dilke at the Foreign Office. The Committee represented nearly all the interests likely to be affected by a French protectorate over Madagascar, and it included a large number of the members of the Parliament; members of the Society for the Suppression of the Slave Trade; the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel; the British and Foreign Bible Society; and the London Missionary Society. These groups pleaded that Her Majesty's Government should act against the French claims in Madagascar. The Committee pointed out that British subjects outnumbered the French by five to one in Madagascar, and that English trade with the island was four times that of the French. Moreover, British Mauritius received a large proportion of its food from Madagascar, and British religious and educational agencies were very active on the island.[38]

Granville's reply to the deputation clearly marked the changing British attitude toward France and Madagascar. Having sympathized with the concerns of the Madagascar Committee, he explained governmental policy in a way which amounted to a virtual British acquiescence to French domination in Madagascar:

> I may adopt as a principle generally received here, that it is not the business of this country to intervene in the affairs of other nations unless our honour and our interests are seriously concerned. It is not our business to act as police over the whole world, and what has been especially marked by those who have spoken is the desire that this country should maintain the most cordial feeling of friendship with regard to the great and near neighbour on the other side of the channel.[39]

This statement was apparently in accord with the concerns expressed at a Cabinet meeting the previous day. Regarding that meeting, Dilke had noted in his diary that "the Cabinet of Nov. 28th, 1882 had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France."[40] Granville's statement to the Madagascar Committee, then, was aimed at easing that fright.

Thus the Liberal government, which never had any inclination to formally annex Madagascar but had supported its independence for a long time, was now unwilling to accept any responsibility for the fate of the island. But even beyond this, in a dramatic switch, rather than being a mildly disinterested party, the Liberal government appeared eager not to alienate the French even at the expense of Malagasy independence.

Granville anticipated being faced by pressures similar to those caused by the Madagascar Committee in the forthcoming encounter with the Malagasy ambassadors who were seeking English support against the French. Again with the intent of avoiding French misunderstanding, Granville sent a dispatch to Paris anxiously asking the current French attitude toward Madagascar "as some guide to the language I should hold to the [Malagasy] . . . ambassadors."[41]

Newspaper reports point to the extreme delicacy of the British situation.[42] With the end of the Dual Control of Egypt by unilateral British action and the subsequent British bombardment of Alexandria in September 1882, French colonial policy was in a feverish condition. The difficulties springing out of the Egyptian-British problems compelled the British government "to steer as clearly as they can of Malagasy entanglements."[43]

By the time the Malagasy ambassadors called upon Lord Granville, British policy toward Madagascar had hardened. It was, to a large extent, based on the directives received from the French Foreign Minister, who desired that the language used by Her Majesty's Government be of "a nature to prevent the Malagasy embassy to entertain any false ideas as to the observance and proper interpretation of the [French] treaty engagements of the Hova

government."[44] Consequently, although the Malagasy embassy had received a warm welcome from Queen Victoria, the Madagascar Committee, and the London public at large, its request that Her Britannic Majesty use her "friendly offices" to insure for the Queen of Madagascar sovereign rights against French encroachments received a very cold response.[45]

During the discussions, Lord Granville, who remained in constant touch with the British ambassador in Paris, compared the views of the French government with those of the Malagasy ambassadors. Not surprisingly, Granville arrived at the conclusion that the differences between France and Madagascar were not of an unbridgeable nature and could be settled "with a little good will and moderation" on the part of France. Granville sent these recommendations on behalf of the Malagasy embassy for the consideration of the French government while at the same time he sought French directives for the British attitude toward the Malagasy embassy.[46] Britain, then, no longer had a clear policy concerning Madagascar except to know the trend of French opinion and act in accordance with that. Obviously, for Granville the concern to avoid the hostility of the French carried greater weight than the British interests involved in Madagascar.

Despite such setbacks, the Malagasy envoys remained in London, seeking public support against the French encroachments. The envoys met Lord Granville again on December 9, 1882, and submitted a written outline of their difficulties with the French.[47] This time they hoped for a more favorable response from the British government due to support from the Madagascar Committee and the backing of Sir Charles Dilke.

Regardless of its powerful composition, the Madagascar Committee proved as unsuccessful in pleading the Malagasy case as they had been in promoting their own objectives with Lord Granville. Dilke, on the other hand, who had accused the French of wantonly interfering with Madagascar--with which they had no significant trade--, claimed to have been constantly "fighting for my Malagasy friends" with Lord Granville. Granville, according to Dilke, was "frightened of the French." Nonetheless, for his stubborn insistence on British intervention in Madagascar against the French, Dilke was, as he complained, snubbed by Lord Granville and other officials, such as Undersecretary for the Colonies Leonard Henry Courtney. Courtney advised Dilke to get rid of the Malagasy envoys as soon as possible.[48]

Other British government representatives shared the desire not to create further problems with the French, especially over Madagascar. In a long address on December 14, 1882, to the Manchester Reform Club, Lord Derby, who had just joined the Cabinet as the Colonial Secretary,

spoke of the French policy in Madagascar. Derby even went so far as to virtually offer Madagascar to the French on a platter:

> Now it is always unpleasant to look on and see things done which seem to us unjust, and if friendly mediation can prevent an invasion of Madagascar we shall be quite right to try it. But it is not a question which would justify anything beyond friendly mediation; and if, as seems likely, the matters in dispute between France and Madagascar are a mere pretext and the seizure of a part of that territory is a foregone conclusion, there is nothing for us to do. So far as the English interests are concerned, it would be a great mistake for us to object to French creating for themselves a colonial empire. Even if we regard them in the right of the rivals--which I do not for I conceive no possible reason why they and we should quarrel. . . .[49]

Lord Derby's speech, which amounted to governmental policy, caused a stir among the members of the government. Lord Granville, who had held Derby in high regard,[50] objected to Derby's "giving away Madagascar."[51] Although Lord Granville did not actively support Madagascar, Derby's speech, as his colleagues put it, "spoiled his [Granville's] play by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad the cards were."[52] Similarly, Prime Minister Gladstone, who shared Derby's views, nonetheless regretted the speech. Gladstone wrote to Granville, "I do not disapprove of the opinion and an independent Peer could be open to no objection in stating it; but if it were viewed from one virtually in office, the renunciation beforehand of title or intention was a matter of regret."[53] The Queen also resented Derby's position, which favored a "free hand for France in Madagascar."[54]

This attitude coincided with the French determination to have their own way in Madagascar. Replying to the British offer of "friendly mediation" in the Franco-Malagasy dispute, French Foreign Minister Duclerc suggested "a settlement could be effected if the Malagasy embassy came back from London with the conviction that they would not be supported by Great Britain in putting forward unreasonable pretentions."[55] This amounted to French desire for total non-interference by the British in the Franco-Malagasy dispute.

Lord Granville was neither in favor of active British intervention in Madagascar, nor of French control of the island. Yet he was unsure of what to do. Confiding in his friend the American Ambassador to England, James R. Lowell, Granville expressed his frustration and laid out

the reasons for not interfering in the Franco-Malagasy dispute. The British government, Granville explained, wanted to "avoid even the appearance of any hostile combination against France," and he suggested that while England could do little to stop French designs on Madagascar, the United States stood in a favorable position to intervene and protect Malagasy independence. Granville's unhappiness with the situation was evident in his conclusion that while "the French had conducted themselves in a very high-handed, inconsistent and unjust way," nonetheless, Britain could not interfere because no sensible man entertained the idea that "whenever a foreign power occupied any port that might block the door to India, England should intervene to prevent it."[56]

Despite efforts not to alienate the French, they misunderstood the British offer of "friendly mediation." French Foreign Minister Duclerc expressed his regret for the British desire to mediate even in a friendly manner:

> Je ne sais ce que le Gouvernement Anglais entend par "to press their good offices upon the French government"; mais nous cette expression est intraduisible en Francais: car le mot que donnerait la traduction literale serait absolument inadmissible.[57]

This churlish tone of Duclerc's dispatch was matched by Gladstone's petty observation that the French had been unable to translate the phrase "to press their good offices upon the French government." On a more substantive level, however, Gladstone complained that Duclerc "need not have growled about [the British offer] when he must have seen that the intent was friendly."[58]

This dispatch, which seems to have been brought about by a complete misapprehension of an English phrase, shattered Granville's expectations of bringing about a peaceful solution to the Franco-Malagasy problem. Granville could not take a stronger position than to offer his "good offices," and these Duclerc ungraciously rejected.[59] Subsequently, Duclerc acknowledged that French and English cooperation in Madagascar had ended: "[T]he government of the [French] Republic does not believe that any useful purpose would be served by communicating a fresh statement of its views to the Malagasy embassy by the intermediary of Her Britannic Majesty's government."[60] With no alternatives left, Granville openly informed the Malagasy ambassadors that while the British government was genuinely interested in Malagasy welfare, "as the French government had not encouraged them [the British] to be a means of communicating," it was impossible "to discuss for the present details of the existing differences." Thus, Britain had abandoned Madagascar for all intents and purposes as a price of a reconciliation with France.[61]

The Anglo-French convention of 1890, then, as Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister at that time, pointed out in the House of Lords, was geared toward formally determining the British and the French spheres of influence in Africa. Even though France acquired a considerable chunk of Africa, Salisbury nonetheless considered the agreement to be a "fair one" because much of the French land was in the Sahara and of little value. The convention, however, was merely a rubber-stamp for France's position in Madagascar and Britain's position in Zanzibar. As Lord Salisbury himself explained:

> I need not say that these two acts regularizing the two Governments in Zanzibar and Madagascar will not have much practical effect one way or the other. Practically, our influence in Zanzibar would have remained the same if the Treaty of 1862 had not been modified, and practically the position of the French in Madagascar would have remained the same if the Treaty of 1886 had not been recognized by us. But the result of the mutual exchange of the declarations that have taken place is to put *the situation of both the Governments on a more regular footing.* [Emphasis added.][62]

Hence it is clear that the convention of 1890 was a mere formality, and although the conquest of Madagascar was not completed by France until 1895, the island was earmarked for her by the Liberal government of Gladstone as early as 1882-1883.

NOTES

1. Few scholars dispute this date. See, for example, Sonia E. Howe, *The Drama of Madagascar* (London: Mathuen, 1938); Phares M. Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans* (London: Longman, 1974).
2. William Edward Cousins, *Madagascar of Today* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1895), p. 154.
3. Howe, *The Drama of Madagascar*, p. 255.
4. Ibid., p. 278.
5. Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, pp. xiv, 231, 318-321.
6. Richard Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society* (London: H. Frowde, 1899); Jean Valett, *Malagasy Foreign Relations in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. by Shelby Williams (Tananarive: Imprimerie Nationale, 1964); Norman Goodall, *A History of the London Missionary Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Mervyn Brown, *Madagascar Rediscovered* (London: Damien Tunacliffe, 1978).
7. The total value of British cotton imports into Madagascar was £146,657 as compared to £133,998 from the United States, France, Germany, British India, and other countries combined. See, *The I.U.P. Series of the British Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relating to Africa, 1802-99* (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971), vol. 8, p. 99.
8. Levi P. Morton to the Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 30, 1882, *Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, 1789-1906*, vol. 91, Nov. 31, 1882-April 16, 1883, microfilm (Washington D.C.: The National Archives and Records Service, 1959), roll 94, no. 260. Hereafter cited as *DUSMF*.
9. George Nevile Sanderson, "The European Partition of Africa: Coincidence or Conjecture?" *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 3 (Oct. 1974): 19.
10. Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, pp. 30-31.
11. Brown, *Madagascar Rediscovered*, p. 222.
12. Morton to the Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 30, 1882, vol. 91, *DUSMF*, roll 94, no. 260.

13. Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, p. 185.

14. Assessing the reputation of the Liberal government, Algernon Cecil rightly observed, "The Whigs filled no place in either great school of British Foreign Policy. . . . They framed no system, embodied no principle and have left no lasting mark upon the diplomatic history of Britain." See *British Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916* (London: G. Bell, 1927), p. 230. A relatively recent article describes the Gladstonian government of 1880-1885 as "a collection of disparate elements." See John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9 (1978): 473, 478-480.

15. Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935), pp. 3-28.

16. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, March 25, 1884, vol. 286, pp. 795-798.

17. Galbraith and Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt," p. 480.

18. Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, pp. 73-76.

19. Prime Minister Lord Gladstone to Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, Sept. 13, 1881, quoted in Cedric James Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), vol. 2, p. 15.

20. Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, p. 77.

21. Reported in *The Times*, Dec. 31, 1880, p. 3a.

22. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, June 28, 1881, vol. 257, p. 1626.

23. Henri Brunschwig, "Anglophobia and French African Policy," in *France and Britain in Africa*, ed. by Prosser Gifford and WM Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 6-7.

24. *Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine*, 2:5 (1881-1884): 93.

25. *The Times*, Jan. 14, 1882, p. 10e.

26. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, March 9, 1882, vol. 267, p. 460.

27. Rear Admiral Gore Jones Report, quoted in Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, p. 200.

28. *The Times*, Jan. 14, 1882, p. 10e.

29. Viscount Lyons to Lord Granville, Paris, Aug. 16, 1882, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 75, ed. by Sir Edward Hertslet, C.B., and Edward Cecil Herblet, Esq. (London: William Ridgway, 1891), pp. 149-150.

30. In addition to Sainte Marie and Nossie Bé, the French claimed vaguely defined rights of protectorate over the Sakalava people, who lived in Cape d' Ambre in the North down to the Bay of Baly, just north of Cape St. André. These rights were based, the French claimed, on certain treaties concluded by France with the Sakalava chiefs in 1843-1845. But since the Sakalava chiefs were not independent of the central government in Antananarivo, these treaties had no meaning as they were never recognized by the Hova ruler, who was considered to be the sovereign of the whole island of Madagascar. For more details, see Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, pp. 188-200.

31. F.R. Plunket to Lord Granville, Paris, Aug. 28, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, p. 150.

32. *The Times*, Sept. 5, 1882, p. 5d.

33. Thomas Condly Pakenham to Lord Granville, Antananaviro, May 30, 1882, quoted in Mutibwa, *Malagasy and the Europeans*, p. 207.

34. Granville to Plunket, Foreign Office, Oct. 7, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, p. 151.

35. *The Spectator, A Weekly Review of Politics, Literature, Theology and Art*, vol. 55, Oct. 21, 1882.

36. Stephen Gwyn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke*, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1977), vol. 1, p. 539.

37. The Malagasy government sent an embassy to Europe in July 1882 to negotiate on the question of the Franco-Malagasy dispute. The Malagasy government thought that the French government may not have been aware of the extravagant demands made by their representatives, and it was hoped that some understanding could be reached directly with the French Republic. The visit was also meant to draw the attention of other European nations, particularly England, in the hope that their influence might favor the Malagasy cause. See the *Antananarivo Annual* 2:7 (1881-1884): 298. While the Malagasy embassy was negotiating with the French government in Paris, a rupture between the two occurred. On November 26, 1882, the envoys received an ultimatum from the French, which mandated, (1) Hova recognition of the French protectorate over the West Coast of Madagascar, and (2) the granting of a ninety-nine year lease to the French. The envoys were given six hours to sign the agreement with the threat that their refusal would have serious consequences. "Nothing but complete surrender to the French demands would be accepted" or "French cannons will teach them what it is to trifle with France." Since the envoys were not empowered to negotiate on these terms, their refusal was met with insult: the Malagasy flag from their hotel was removed, and they were informed that they were no longer welcome in Paris. See, Morton to Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 30, 1882, *DUSMF*, roll 94, no. 260.

38. The Madagascar Committee seems to have been organized by Proctor, the

Malagasy consul in London, at the advice of Sir Charles Dilke. See, Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans*, p. 227.

39. *The Times*, Nov. 29, 1882, p. 10c.

40. Quoted in Gwynn and Tuckwell, *Life of Dilke*, vol. 1, p. 539.

41. Granville to Lyons, Foreign Office, Nov. 29, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, p. 152.

42. See, for example, *The Times*, Nov. 30, 1882, p. 10f, and Dec. 1, 1882, p. 3d.

43. Norton to Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 30, 1882, *DUSMF*, roll 94, no. 260.

44. Granville to Lyons, Foreign Office, Dec. 4, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, pp. 157-164.

45. Malagasy ambassadors to Granville, London, Dec. 4, 1882, *State Papers*. vol. 75, pp. 157-164.

46. Granville to Lyons, Foreign Office, Dec. 5, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, pp. 165-166.

47. Malagasy ambassadors to Granville, London, Dec. 9, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, pp. 166-169.

48. Gwynn and Tuckwell, *Life of Dilke*, vol. 1, p. 539.

49. Quoted in *The Times*, Dec. 14, 1882, p. 10abc.

50. Lord Granville, who was not able to attend Derby's welcoming at the Manchester Reform Club, sent a written note: "Few men," the note read, "can speak with greater authority on public affairs than Lord Derby, and I am happy to believe that his views are not unfavourable to the policy which Her Majesty's Government has pursued under difficult circumstances. . . ." See *The Times*, Dec. 14, 1882, p. 10a.

51. Edmond Fritzmaurice, *The Life of Lord Granville*, 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1905), vol. 2, p. 316.

52. Quoted in Gwynn and Tuckwell, *Life of Dilke*, vol. 1, p. 540.

53. Gladstone to Granville, London, March 10, 1883, in Agatha Ramm, ed., *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-86*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), vol. 2, p. 37.

54. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 468, n. 2.

55. Lyons to Granville, Paris, Dec. 13, 1882, *State Papers*, vol. 75, p. 169.

56. James Russell Lowell to Secretary of State, London, Dec. 16, 1882, Confidential. *Despatches from the United States Ministers to Great Britain*, vol. 146, microfilm (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1954), roll 142, no. 464.

57. The French explained that there is no French equivalent for the English phrase, "to press their good offices upon the French government," and if they were to translate this literally, it would amount to something unacceptable to the French Republic. See Duclerc to Tissot, Paris, Jan. 4, 1883, and Tissot to Granville, Jan. 5, 1883, *State Papers*, vol. 75, pp. 172-173.

58. Cladstone to Granville, Jan. 13, 1883, quoted in Ramm, ed., *Correspondence of Gladstone and Granville*, vol. 2, p. 8.

59. Granville to Lyons, Foreign Office, Jan. 17, 1883, *State Papers*, vol. 75, p. 173. Also see, Lyons to Granville, Paris, Jan. 25, 1883, ibid., pp. 174-175.

60. *The Times*, Feb. 1, 1883, p. 3c.

61. Lyons to Granville, Paris, Jan. 25, 1883, *State Papers*, p. 174. Also Granville to Lyons, Feb. 9, 1883, ibid.

62. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, Aug. 11, 1890, vol. 348, pp. 456-457. Looking back in 1895 on the entire Madagascar affair of the 1880s, a British missionary in Madagascar observed that the blame for abandoning the island should be placed squarely on those in office in the 1880s rather than in the 1890s. He remarked that "if there had only been a man, as a true farseeing British statesman--not to say an Oliver Cromwell or a 'Pam'--at the British Foreign Office from 1880 to 1885, instead of kindly old gentleman Earl Granville, . . . things would have been very different from what they are today." See, Mathews to Thompson, Antananarivo, May 9, 1895, *London Missionary Society Records: Madagascar Letters*, microfilm (London: R.B. Fleming and Co., 1955), roll 215.

The Earl of Clarendon, Hamon L'Estrange, and the Riot at St. Giles on July 23, 1637: A Study in Methodology

Thomas R. Peck

Charles I, King of England and Scotland, pursued two policies during the 1630s: absolutism in government and uniformity in religion within the Church of England. Toward the latter goal, King Charles required the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, to devise a new *Book of Common Prayer* for use in all religious services in England and Scotland. On July 23, 1637, the new *Book of Common Prayer* was introduced into Scotland. The event caused a riot at St. Giles Church, Edinburgh, where the *Book* was first read. The disturbance spilled into the streets, and the rioting continued for three days. As a result, the Privy Council of Scotland suspended the use of the new *Book*. It was never used again in Scotland.

With the suspension of the new *Book of Common Prayer*, Charles I received the first substantial check to his religious policy. In an attempt to reverse this, Charles began a series of maneuvers which led to civil war in both Scotland and England, the abandonment of the policies of absolutism and religious uniformity, and ultimately to the execution of the King himself.[1]

There are nine accounts of the riot at St. Giles.[2] This article attempts to determine which is the most accurate. Each of the nine accounts relates a different tale, and it is impossible to reconcile them all. Furthermore, none of the accounts is by an eyewitness. Since the riot was a significant event, it is

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important to identify the sources used by the authors of the various accounts to help establish their validity. To do this, I searched for clues within the accounts which might reveal their sources and correlated my findings with other documentary evidence. It was impossible to positively identify the sources used by the authors of most of the accounts. There was, however, a noticeable similiarity between the accounts of the Earl of Clarendon and Hamon L'Estrange.[3]

Edward Hyde, First Earl of Clarendon, became the leader of the King's party in Parliament in 1641 and entered the King's Privy Council after the civil war began. Hyde was in exile from 1645 to 1660, during which time he was one of the King's advisors. Upon the King's restoration in 1660, Hyde was named Earl of Clarendon and made the King's principal minister, a capacity in which he served until 1667. His great histories, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* and *Life of Clarendon*, are the most valuable of all contemporary accounts of the English civil war and the Restoration. The former work contains Clarendon's account of the riot at St. Giles.

Hamon L'Estrange was a member of the gentry and a Royalist. He partook briefly in the military engagements of the civil war and then retired. L'Estrange completed *The Reign of King Charles* in 1655, which defended the King's position during the era, and it is this work which contains L'Estrange's account of the events at St. Giles.

Struck by the harmony of the accounts of Clarendon and L'Estrange, I placed their two accounts side by side. I then numbered each individual act and created separate columns for either author's account. If one of the authors failed to recount an act, the appropriate space in his column was left blank. (See the Appendix.) Out of the twenty-three separate acts identified, Clarendon and L'Estrange agreed on sixteen (seventy percent). In addition, the sequence of events was exactly the same in both accounts. Of the seven acts on which they did not agree, six (those which are labelled: 2, 13, 17, 18, 19, and 21) were events which L'Estrange simply did not record. Thus, concerning these six, L'Estrange did not contradict Clarendon. Only on act number 6 is there a true difference in the accounts. Here Clarendon has recorded that the crowd hurled stones, sticks, and cudgels at the dean's head, while L'Estrange did not recount this. This was not merely a matter of L'Estrange failing to record an event because, in act 9, L'Estrange gave the distinct impression that it was only when the Bishop of Edinburgh began to speak that the rioters threw things at *him*, and not at the dean. Despite this one contradiction, the accounts show a remarkable similarity.

Conversely, although L'Estrange and Clarendon agreed with each other in most cases, they only occasionally agreed with the authors of the other seven accounts. For example, some of the other accounts mentioned that the Bishop of Edinburgh spoke[4] and others did not.[5] Yet Clarendon and L'Estrange alone recorded the substance of his speech. Six of the other accounts noted that the crowd threw stools, with which Clarendon agreed;[6] however, only L'Estrange and Clarendon claimed that cudgels were thrown.[7] After the church had been cleared of the unruly multitude, Clarendon and L'Estrange stated that the doors were barred; only one other source recorded this event.[8] Finally, only these two authors specifically recorded that the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of St. Andrews, commanded that the provost and magistrates, who were seated in the gallery, suppress the riot. And only Clarendon and L'Estrange included in their accounts that the rioters rapped upon the church doors and pelted the windows with stones.[9]

What explanation can be given for this remarkable similarity between the accounts of Clarendon and L'Estrange and their dissimilarity with the other accounts of the riot? There are three possible answers to this question: First, L'Estrange may have copied Clarendon. Second, Clarendon could have borrowed from L'Estrange. The third possibility is that both authors used an hitherto unknown account of the riot which was not used by the authors of the other seven accounts.

It does not seem likely that either L'Estrange or Clarendon could have used the other as his source. The Earl of Clarendon fled from England on March 4, 1646, and went first to the Scilly Islands and then to Jersey where he remained until June 27, 1648. During this period, he wrote the section of *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars* which includes his account of the riot at St. Giles.[10] He remained on the continent for the rest of his exile and returned to England in 1660. Hamon L'Estrange fought briefly for the Royalist cause, withdrawing from the conflict in 1643. For the next eight years, he lived in partial retirement in England. Having reconciled himself to Parliamentary rule, he emerged from his semi-isolation in 1651. He lived at Ringstead until his death in 1660. In 1655 he published *The Reign of King Charles*, which he revised in 1656.[11]

Thus, Clarendon wrote his account of the riot at St. Giles between March 1646 and June 1648. L'Estrange composed his rendition of the riot sometime before 1655. There is no evidence that L'Estrange and Clarendon communicated with one another between 1646 and 1660, when L'Estrange died. Further, they were separated by a great distance and, for part of the time, a good deal of civil strife. Finally, there is no evidence that L'Estrange was aware of Clarendon's work, which was only in manuscript form in the 1650s, when L'Estrange wrote *The Reign of King Charles*. Similarly, there is no indication that Clarendon revised his account as a result of the work of L'Estrange.

With little possibility that L'Estrange or Clarendon aided the other, one is forced to accept the third explanation for the similarity of the accounts. This is, in fact, the best possibility because L'Estrange and Clarendon indicated the type of source from which they derived their accounts. Introducing the section of his book which dealt with the occurrences in Scotland in 1637, Hamon L'Estrange wrote:

> . . . a true account I shall give you, though not an exact one, as to descend to every particular; that is done already as by a Royal hand, so 'Stylo Imperatorio,' in a full body, and Historical systeme: from whence I shall extract such occurrences as are of prime remarque. . . .[12]

L'Estrange was clearly deriving his narrative of the events in Scotland in 1637 from some official documents. How he acquired them, and what they were he left unsaid.

The Earl of Clarendon cast more light onto his sources. At the conclusion of his narration of the riot, he noted:

> . . . it seems the bishops thought it not of moment enough to desire or require any help or protection from the council; but without conferring with them, or applying themselves to them, they dispatched away an express to the king, with a full and particular information of all that had passed . . . .[13]

Clarendon while resident on Jersey, requested and received many

documents from the royal government.[14] It is reasonable to assume, in light of the above statement, that the report of the bishops was among them.

Additional information on the source or sources for the accounts of Clarendon and L'Estrange is derived from a letter written by Robert Baillie, Principal of the University of Glasgow. Baillie arrived in Edinburgh the day after the riot at St. Giles (i.e., on July 24), and he stayed for several days, speaking with many people about the events. On October 4, 1637, he wrote to William Spang concerning the riot. Concluding his account of the riot in the letter to Spang, Baillie identified two, separate, official accounts of the riot sent to King Charles I:

> The Chancellor [Archbishop of St. Andrews] wrote up presently the story to the King, with some wype to the Thesaurer, who that foule day was from the towne. The Thesaurer and Counsellors being highly offended, that the Chancellors should wryte in such a business without their privity, delayed to write or send their post till the Fryday. It was thought the Councill's letter did extenuate the matter so much, as it might be laid on the rascall multitude, with some reflexion on the Bishop's imprudent precipitation.[15]

Are either of these accounts, one by the Archbishop of St. Andrews, the Chancellor, the other by the Privy Council, the accounts referred to by L'Estrange or Clarendon? The Archbishop's account, referred to by Baillie, and the bishops' account, referred to by Clarendon, appear to be the same report. First, both Baillie and Clarendon claim the accounts to be the work of the Scottish clerical hierarchy, either the Archbishop (Baillie) or simply the bishops (Clarendon). Second, both Baillie and Clarendon stated that the report was written without the consultation of the Privy Council. Third, Baillie stated that the report of the Archbishop contained "some wype to the Thesaurer." In this context, "wype" means a harsh or sarcastic remark. The Earl of Clarendon wrote a page-long defense of the Earl of Traquaire, the Treasurer, for his actions with regard to the introduction of the *Book of Common Prayer* into Scotland.[16] Clarendon placed that statement immediately prior to his account of the riot at St. Giles. It is probable that Clarendon was moved to write the defense of Traquaire at that point in his *History* precisely because he had read the Archbishop's report.

Therefore, the Archbishop's account is one source for Clarendon's *History*. But did L'Estrange also use this report? It seems unlikely that he did, both because of what L'Estrange included in his account and because he failed to note so many of the details that Clarendon recorded. It appears that L'Estrange had access solely to the account of the Privy Council and, moreover, that Clarendon had knowledge of the Privy Council's report in addition to the Archbishop's report. To support these suppositions, note that Baillie's description of the Privy Council's report contained two elements, the first being that the blame for the riot was put on the mob and the second that the Bishop of Edinburgh had acted imprudently. Both these elements are contained within the accounts of L'Estrange and Clarendon. One should particularly note Baillie's reference to the Bishop. Only Clarendon and L'Estrange contained a summation of the Bishop's speech. It seems most likely that they obtained it from the Privy Council's report.

If Clarendon had used both accounts, while L'Estrange had access to only the Privy Council's, this may explain some of the discrepancies between their two similar, though not identical,

accounts. L'Estrange may simply have not had as many facts available to him. This shortage of material would then translate as blanks in his column in the Appendix to this paper.

In sum, the similarity of the accounts of the Earl of Clarendon and Hamon L'Estrange and their differences from the other authors' leads one to suspect that Clarendon and L'Estrange have used the same source or sources, which were not available to the other writers. A study of their personal histories during the time when they were composing their accounts of the riot apparently rules out the possibility of their having copied one another. Hamon L'Estrange noted his access to official documents describing the events in Scotland in 1637. The Earl of Clarendon was aware of an account of the riot written by the bishops and had access to royal documents. Robert Baillie's account of two official reports describing the riot supports the assumption that Clarendon had read the Archbishop's report. Further, Baillie's description of the Privy Council's report leads one to believe that L'Estrange and Clarendon read and used this report. Therefore, since the Chancellor and most of the Privy Council were present in St. Giles on July 23, 1637,[17] the accounts of Clarendon and L'Estrange are drawn from eye-witness reports. Clarendon, however, seems to have used both the bishop's and the Privy Council's reports while L'Estrange apparently only had access to the latter.

I undertook the research for this note because the nine accounts of the riot at St. Giles disagreed so markedly. This is not an uncommon problem for historians. When faced with this situation, the historian must choose to believe some sources and disbelieve others. The historian does so because he must decide *what* happened before he is able to decide *why* it happened. Comparative studies of sources, such as presented here, can help the historian in establishing the important factual foundation to historical analysis.

NOTES

The author wishes to thank Clayton Roberts, whose assistance in the composition of this paper was invaluable, and Nancy E. Offutt, who diligently read and criticized the paper.

1. C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's Peace 1637-1641* (London: Collins, 1955), pp. 13, 63-64, 76, 91.

2. The nine accounts are: Robert Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ed. by David Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club Publications, 1841-1842), pp. i, 15-18; Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, ed. by W. Dunn Macray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. i, 143-146; Henry Guthrie, "Memoirs," printed in *Scottish Diaries and Memoirs 1550-1746*, ed. by J.G. Fyfe (Stirling, Scotland: E. MacKay, 1928-1942), pp. 136-138; Samuel Johnson, *Notes upon the Phoenix Edition of the Pastoral Letter* (London: n.p., 1694), part 1, pp. 103-104; Archibald Johnston, *Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston* (Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1896), p. 265; Hamon L'Estrange, *The Reign of King Charles* (London: n.p., 1655), pp. 146-147; Earl of Rothes, "Relation," printed in *The Scottish Convenanters*, ed. by J. Pringle Thomson (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914), pp. 1-3; John Spalding, *Memorials of the Troubles in Scotland and in England* (Edinburgh: Ballantyne and Co., 1850), pp. i, 79-80; Robert Wodrow, *Analecta* (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1842-1843), pp. i, 64. It is true that the account in Sir Richard Baker's *Chronicle of the Kings of England* (London: n.p., 1733), p. 449, is markedly similar to those of Clarendon and L'Estrange. This section of Baker's book, however, was written by Edward Philips, who was frequently accused of plagiarism by his contemporaries. Since Hamon L'Estrange's account of the riot was available to Philips when he wrote in 1660, L'Estrange having published his book in 1655 and again in 1656, one can assume that Philips copied this rendering of the events of July 23, 1637 at St. Giles. Therefore, I have not counted Baker as one of the accounts. See Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography* (London: Clarendon Press, 1921-1922), pp. xv, 1084.

3. Notable among the current works on the subject are: John Bowle, *Charles I* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975), pp. 160-162; William M. Campbell, *The Triumph of Presbyterianism* (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1958), pp. 29-31; Gordon Donaldson, *The Making of the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637* (Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1954), pp. 82-83; Walter Makey, *The Church of the Covenant 1637-1651* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1979), pp. 18-19; David Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution 1637-1644* (Newton Abbot, Eng.: David and Charles, 1973), pp. 60-64.

4. Johnston, *Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston*, p. 265; Spalding, *Memorials of the Troubles in Scotland*, pp. i, 79.

5. Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, pp. i, 18; Guthrie, "Memoirs," p. 137; Rothes, "Relation," pp. 1-3.

6. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 144; Guthrie, "Memoirs," p. 137; Johnston, *Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston*, p. 265; Rothes, "Relation," p. 1; Spalding, *Memorials of the Troubles in Scotland*, pp. i, 79; Wodrow, *Analecta*, pp. i, 64.

7. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 144; L'Estrange, *Reign of King Charles*, p. 147.

8. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 144; L'Estrange, *Reign of King Charles*, p. 147; Rothes, "Relation," p. 1.

9. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 144-145; L'Estrange, *Reign of King Charles*, pp. 146-147.

10. T.H. Lister, *Life and Administration of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1837-1838), pp. i, 295-305.

11. Stephen and Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography*, pp. xi, 994-995.

12. L'Estrange, *Reign of King Charles*, p. 146.

13. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 145.

14. Ibid., pp. v, 476; Clarendon, *Life of Clarendon and Continuation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1827), pp. i, 239; P. Ogle and W.H. Bliss, eds., *Calendar of Clarendon State Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872), pp. i, 326, 341-342, 353, 356, 357, 367, 394, 402-403, 419.

15. Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, pp. i, 18.

16. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars*, pp. i, 143-144.

17. Ibid., p. 144.

APPENDIX

The following accounts of the riot are drawn from Hamon L'Estrange's *The Reign of King Charles* (London: n.p., 1655), 147; and the Earl of Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. i, 144-145. The original spelling and punctuation have been retained.

	L'Estrange		Clarendon
1	July 23, being Sunday	1	On Sunday morning appointed for the work,
2		2	The Chancellor of Scotland and others of the Council being present in the cathedral church,
3	The Dean of Edenburgh began to read the Book in St. Giles Church (the chief of that city)	3	The dean began to read the Liturgy,
4	but he no sooner began,	4	which he had no sooner entered upon
5	then the inferior multitude began in a tumultuous manner to fill the Church with uproar;	5	but a noise and clamour was raised throughout the church that no voice could be heard distinctly,
6		6	and then a shower of stones and sticks and cudgels were thrown at the dean's head,
7	whereupon the Bishop of Edenburgh, stept into the pulpit,	7	The Bishop went up into the pulpit,
8	and hoping to appease them by minding them of the sanctity of the place,	8	and from thence put them in mind of the sacredness of the place, of their duty to God
9	they were the more enraged, throwing at him cudgels,	9	but he found no more reverence, nor was the

	L'Estrange		Clarendon
	stools, and what was in the way of fury, unto the very endangering of his life;		clamour or disorder less than before.
10	upon this the Archbishop of St. Andrews, Lord Chancellor, was enforced to call down from the Gallery the Provost, Bayliffs, and other magistrates of the City (then sitting there) to their assistance,	10	The Chancellor, from his seat, commanded the provost and magistrate of the city to descent from the gallery in which they sat and by their authority to suppress the riot,
11	who with much ado at length thrust that unruly rabble out of the Church, and made fast the doores;	11	which at last with great difficulty they did, by driving out the rudest of those who made the disturbance out of the church and shutting the doors,
12	This done, the Dean proceeded in reading the Book,	12	which gave the dean occasion to proceed in the reading of the Liturgy,
13		13	which was not at all intended or hearkened to by those who remained within the church;
14	the multitude in the mean while rapping at the doores, pelting the windowes with stones,	14	and it had, they who were turned out continued their barbarous noise, brake the windows, and endeavored to break down the doors;
15	and endeavoring what in them lay to disturb that sacred exercise;	15	so that it was not possible for any to follow their devotion.
16	but not withstanding all their clamour, the service was ended.	16	When all was done that at that time could be done there,
17		17	and the Council and magistrates went out of the church to their houses,
18	but not the peoples rage,	18	the rabble followed the bishops with all the opprobrious language they could invent, or bringing in superstitution and Popery into the kingdom, and making the people slaves,
19		19	and were not content to use their tongues, but employed their hands too in throwing dirt and stones at them.
20	who waiting the Bishops retiring to his lodging, so assaulted him,	20	and treated the bishop of Edinburgh, (whom they looked upon as most active that way), so rudely
21		21	that with great difficulty he got into a house after they had torn his habit,
22	as had he not been rescued by a strong hand, he had probably persht by their violence.	22	and was from thence removed to his own with great hazard of his life.
23	Nor was St. Giles Church only thus pester'd, and profan'd, but in other Churches also, (though not in so high a measure) the peoples dissorders were unison and agreeable.	23	As this was the reception it had in the cathedral, so it fared not better in the other churches in the city, but was entertained with the same hollowing and outcries, and threatening the men whose office it was to read it, with the same bitter execrations against bishops and Popery.

Book Reviews

The North African Stones Speak. By PAUL MACKENDRICK. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xxi + 434. Bibliography, maps, illustrations, index. $21.00.

This volume is the seventh in a series in which Paul MacKendrick, Professor of Classics at the University of Wisconsin, surveys life in the Roman provinces. It is the fruit of scholarly research extending over almost forty years and of extensive travels in North Africa since 1944. The text is lucidly written, with an abundance of fascinating detail, and lavishly illustrated. The 124 photographs are carefully chosen to illustrate the richness of North Africa's architectural remains, mosaics, and sculptures. Sixteen maps and eleven well-drawn site plans complement the volume, all of them relevant and useful.

As a detailed survey of Roman North Africa based on a thorough knowledge of the literature, this volume is of absorbing interest. Not the least valuable feature of the work is the remarkable seventy-seven page bibliography, enlivened by the author's occasional notes. This lists not only general works but also a wide variety of sources--some of them very obscure--on aspects of North African history, archaeological sites, coin hoards, and various art forms. It is a valuable research tool.

MacKendrick's objective, as stated in his preface, is "to use archaeology to write cultural history." The focus throughout is on architectural remains, usually of the more spectacular kind--public baths, amphitheatres, temples, altars, aqueducts, royal tombs, rich villas. This reflects the lingering bias of classical archaeology, with its predilection for the monumental. On the other hand, we learn little from this volume about the lives of the majority of the population of Roman North Africa: the peasant farmers, the nomads, the traders, the slaves, the craftsmen, the masons, or the fishermen. What emerges from MacKendrick's survey, therefore, is not a cultural history of the North African peoples as a whole, but an architectural history with a strong urban bias, drawn from a relatively narrow range of archaeological evidence. The emphasis, as with much classical "art history," is on description rather than explanation; we are treated to elaborate descriptions of sculpture, mosaics, and architecture (often with dimensions stated). The text occasionally gives the impression of an encyclopedia or guided tour to the monuments. This is not without value, but the reader is left curiously dissatisfied about the lives of the less privileged classes of North Africans, and virtually uninformed about the social and economic processes which underlay the prosperity of the region. It is evident that while much can be learned from architectural remains, more is needed to construct a well-balanced cultural history of the inhabitants as a whole.

One major source has been missed in the impressive bibliography: *The Theodosian Code and Novels* (1952), which have long been available in an excellent translation. While cultural historians are not generally attracted to obscure legal texts, this fifth-century compendium includes many fascinating details about everyday life in Roman North Africa.

MacKendrick has grappled valiantly with the problem of imposing order on the mass of material at his command. Of the various approaches possible--thematic, geographical, chronological--he has attempted to combine the last two. The book is cast in a regional framework, dealing in turn with Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco. Within each of these sections the material is discussed in part chronologically, in part site by site. The result, useful for quick reference, nevertheless makes for difficult reading, the text sometimes dissolving into a series of disconnected vignettes. Such obstacles might have been overcome, and the impression of a descriptive encyclopedia avoided, by the use of a more thematic approach.

This is a sound and generally well-balanced work of scholarship with few surprises. The reviewer's eyebrows rose, however, in connection with MacKendrick's handling of the supposed voyage of Hanno to West Africa. MacKendrick apparently continues to believe the authenticity of this picturesque fable. He concedes "Hanno's story contains so many puzzles and so many fearsome wonders that some scholars think it was deliberately intended to put Carthage's rivals off the scent" (p. 14). But there is no indication that this tale has been debunked by Germain in a famous article where he describes the *Periplus* of Hanno as "for three quarters at least a mediocre literary exercise whose sources, many of them also literary, are sometimes recognizable" ("Qu'est-ce le périple d'Hannon?" *Hesperis*, 1957). MacKendrick's bibliography ignores this paper, and also fails to notice Mauny's equally well-known article on the impossibility of navigation to West Africa in classical times ("La navigation sur les côtes du Sahara pendant l'antiquité," *Revue des Etudes Anciennes*, 1955).

Despite this small aberration, MacKendrick's work will give pleasure to the reader. It is spiced with wit and shrewd observations. This is a convenient and valuable work of reference, attractively produced and, at the price, something of a bargain in these inflationary days. For scholars and students whose interests lie in classical North Africa, it is to be recommended.

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Islam in Tropical Africa. Edited by I.M. LEWIS. (2nd edition). Bloomington, Indiana, and London, England: International African Institute in association with Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. 310. Introduction, revised bibliography, index, maps. $10.95 (paper).

It is with pleasure that one welcomes the return to print of an important, classic work, first published in 1966. It is certainly the best work in English on the subject and deserves to be on the shelf of any Africanist or Islamicist, even in this new, attenuated form. Fourteen of the original nineteen chapters of the first edition are reprinted here (omitting essays by Froelich, Ceulemans, Stevenson, Baxter, and Hodgkins). Except for the essay by Froelich, those omitted deal with areas marginal to Islam in tropical Africa (e.g. the Congo, Ghana, etc.). Since the papers were all presented to the now-famous 1964 Fifth International African Seminar at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Nigeria, which considered the question of Islam in tropical Africa, there could be no question of printing papers not originally presented in 1964.

Nevertheless, no criteria have been given for dropping some papers while including others.

The first edition contained essays in either French or English, with a summary in the other language for those who read only one of the two languages. In this edition all the French articles have been translated into English. To the reader who cannot read French, the change is a felicitous one. Thus the book is more likely to be adopted as a textbook at American universities, where bilingualism of any sort is uncommon.

Although the introduction is substantially unchanged, the editor has not ignored the many changes in both African and Islamic studies since 1966. On pages 96-98 there is an updating of the original bibliography. Although not intended to be exhaustive, it is a useful and welcome addition to the book. Its only shortcoming is that too little attention has been given to the recent works in both English and French by West Africans themselves. The new preface also identifies several aspects of African Islam which need further investigation by both Islamicists and Africanists. These include the interaction between Islamic and traditional law in Africa, and the influence of Islam on African nationalism.

This book does contain most of the biases for which Islamic studies recently have been criticized by Edward Said (*Orientalism*, 1980). It is not hard to recognize bias in statements like that in one article:

> Among the universalistic religions, Islam is distinguished by its emphasis on war as a means of spreading the Faith. Where likely to succeed, such war is a duty for the Faithful, and it was largely due to the zealous prosecution of this profitable duty by its adherents that Islam spread as far and fast as it did (p. 213).

But there is another bias in Islamic studies, shared even by Said, which this book, by its very nature, cannot share. Most Islamic surveys done in the West ignore the existence of Islam in tropical Africa. For example, the publishers of the famous *Encyclopedia of Islam* have published *A Historical Chart of the Muslim World* (Ibrahim Gomaa, 1972) claiming to illustrate the political control of the Muslim world throughout history. This chart includes Ceylon, the Balkans, trans-Syr-darya, Spain, Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily. Yet the Republic of the Sudan is the only Subsaharan territory shown. Such long-Islamic areas as Somalia, Bornu, the inland Niger delta and even Arab Mauritania are ignored. Even radicals in Islamic studies such as Said carelessly assume that Egypt is not part of Africa (*Orientalism*, p. 35), perpetuating the racist attempt to divide "African" from "Islamic" studies. Said often attacks racism in Western scholarship, but his only target is anti-Arab racism.

Lewis's book is to be praised for its all-too-rare attempt to integrate our understandings of Islam and Africa. The several essays discuss the dynamics of Islamicization and the social effects of spreading Islam within tropical Africa. They contribute to our understanding of both Islam and Africa. Most important of all, they show that Islam is an African religion and that Africa has had profound impacts on Islam.

The habitual racist schizophrenia of Islamic studies has unfortunate side effects other than perpetuating the stereotype that there is no Islam south of the Sahara. Academics often assume that the study of African Islamic societies can contribute nothing to the understanding of other Islamic societies. For example, a 1978

survey of women in Islam, edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (*Women in the Muslim World*), spends considerable space discussing the status of Muslim women in China. Yet Nigeria, with approximately 50 million Muslims, does not even appear in the index! The struggle for women's suffrage in northern Nigeria, as well as the legacy of the teachings of Usuman dan Fodio, have raised major questions about the nature of women's rights under Islam, and have contributed to the stirring of Islamic feminism.

Although not the subject of any specific study, Lewis considers the relation of women to Islam in tropical Africa. He shows how matrilineality in a society may actually help to spread Islam, though Islamic influence often results in a shift from matrilineal to patrilineal inheritance (p. 48). He even shows an instance where women convert to Islam to preserve their economic independence (p. 50). This is not to say that African Islam is not sexist, but if more Islamicists were to read Lewis's book, our understanding of the potentialities of Islam would be increased, and facile generalizations could be avoided.

The criticisms made here of Orientalist scholarship should not be seen as personal attacks, but rather as illustrating a point about the discipline and its traditions. Modern scholars are victims of the prejudice of their predecessors. Without a conscious effort to overcome the white racist bias of the discipline, scholars will continue to make the same mistakes.

This bias was not, of course, part of the heritage of classical Islam itself. The respect given black African intellectuals by their Muslim contemporaries is a matter of English language record since at least the publication of Edward Wilmot Blyden's *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (1888). Even the non-specialist can see, for example in Joel Rogers's *World's Great Men of Color* (1947), that many famous Muslims in all periods have either been from Africa and black themselves, or of black African descent, including some of the greatest classical Arab thinkers and writers. One of the most famous, known in the West as al-Jahiz, wrote a work in the ninth century entitled "On the Superiority of the Black Race over the White."

Although it was not the purpose of the seminar that gave rise to this book to examine the influence of Africa in the wider Islamic community, the editor recognized the importance of tropical Africa as "one of the major Islamic areas of the world" (p. 1). Islamicists can no longer ignore Africa. African Islam is both long-established and rapidly spreading. Islamicists must become familiar with African Islam, and this book is a good place to start.

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Heresy and Authority in Medieval Europe: Documents in Translation. Edited by EDWARD PETERS. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 312. Introduction, commentaries, sources, bibliography. $25.00.

Edward Peters has edited a reader of sixty-four translations which document over a millenia of heresy. This is an immense span of time and Peters condenses a major portion of it, representing the third to ninth centuries with an introductory chapter of eight

documents. Together with a long introduction and copious intermediary commentaries (all with bibliographical references for supplementary reading), these eight translations address the origins of heresy (from the Greek word *hairesein*, "to choose") and reveal the archtypal qualities which Arianism, Manichaeism, and Gnosticism (among others) assumed for medieval churchmen in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The old lines of defense for ecclesiastical unity forged in the final years of the Roman Empire later mingled with new tactics devised by medieval churchmen against opponents and dissenters. This is the subject of the remaining fifty-six documents covering the eleventh through fifteenth centuries.

The book is a valuable pedagogical tool, not just for teaching the history of religion, but also for providing a historical background to modern political studies. The definition of heresy and its elaborate articulation during the Middle Ages sharpen discussion of the often obscure issue of dissent in modern society. Who were these individuals who seem to exist only in the vilification and condemnation of their enemies? What is the connection between these religious deviants and the popular movements of their time? For consideration of such questions, this reader provides a minimum prerequisite.

Peters considers the battle against the residual paganism of the Celtic, Germanic, and Slavic peoples to have been more important for the Western Latin Church than the problem of heresy between the sixth to the eleventh centuries. Schism with the Eastern Church rather than internal heresies occasioned the principal doctrinal challenge to ecclesiastical authority. Peters begins the main body of his documents only with the eleventh century. He asserts that Catharism and Waldensianism represent the first of the new medieval heresies alerting churchmen to the possibilities of dissent and that this spurred them to institutionalize the means of detecting and dealing with heresy.

The gradual and haphazard quality of the response to heresy in the Middle Ages cannot be emphasized enough. We who already know the end of the story are only too eager to get on with the inquisition and the stake. But up to the twelfth century the Church experimented with many non-violent means of ecclesiastical discipline (the way of *caritas*). Violence, especially mob action, was usually the response of the laity. The Albigensian Crusade under the papacy of Innocent III seems to mark a turning point, however, to the way of *potestas*: Roman law was revived to prosecute heretics. And in addition to the episcopal inquisition, the 1231 papal bull was added which led to centralization of the assault on heresies.

The history of heresy has been mainly a history of intellectuals, with only occasional reference to the masses. Peters furthers the intellectual approach with documents on theological positions condemned in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, especially at the University of Paris in the 1270s. For those interested in social history he includes documents on the Spiritual Franciscans and voluntary poverty movements as well as the peasant Cathars. But as the final chapter of documents on the heresies of John Wyclif and Jan Hus attest, Peters intends to show the salience of intellectuals in the history of heresy.

The student is left the main task of establishing medieval heresy's significance and of continuing the story into the modern era. As Peters puts it, by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the literature becomes overwhelming. What Peters's book provides is a compact guide through the "middle period" between ancient arguments over religion and modern mass movements led by the religious. The great disproportion in the quantity of documents, how-

ever, has forced Peters to edit to the point of discontinuity. The book runs the danger of falling between two extremes: either too short for research or too much for teaching. The fact that the book has no index hampers cross-sectional research so important to social history. It is difficult to find women or laborers, for example. Yet despite these limitations, Peters has assembled a good running bibliography, placed in historical context and studded with intriguing tidbits from the sources.

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Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages: Comparative Perspectives on Social and Cultural Formation. By THOMAS F. GLICK. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 376. Illustrations, notes, bibliographic essay, index. $22.50.

In this work Glick applies a comparative method intended "to blur the profile projected by political peaks and valleys, and to stress phenomena which bespeak continuity between periods, and among different societies or cultures to identify and compare their basic components" (p. 194). After introductory remarks and a skelatal chapter devoted largely to the development of Islamic Spain from 711 to 1000, Glick systematically and brilliantly examines the growth of Christian and Islamic cultures, and their points of interaction. Successive sections treat agriculture and the "moving frontier," urbanization and trade and investment patterns, social structure, relations between ethnic groups, and structural stability. A somewhat truncated Part Two devotes itself to diffusion of technological discovery and scientific knowledge, concluding with a more general chapter on cultural change and exchange. Glick is not as concerned with documenting the fact of cultural borrowing as with the manner in which this borrowing qualitatively alters the recipient culture and also the ways in which specific elements are qualitatively altered by the very act of diffusion. The result is a masterful work of scholarship, one which might well justify what many have viewed as the overly optimistic future Marc Bloch projected for the comparative method in history in his well-known 1928 article, "Pour une Histoire Comparée des Societés Européens" (presented at the Sixth International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Oslo in 1928).

Some of Glick's more striking theses include a social model of Islamic Spain comprising the dominant Arabs, Berbers, and a great mass of Neo-Muslims (Hispano-Roman converts) who occupied the lowest echelons of society, as well as a predominantly Islamic model for the establishment of Christian towns and villages. He also argues that medieval people perceived ethnicity largely in terms of religious affiliation, and that the tribal nature of Islamic Spain (described so well by Pierre Guichard) is not necessarily indicative of the political instability so often noted. Glick also draws numerous arguments from Richard W. Bulliet's hypothesis on the conversion process to Islam. Bulliet sees the rate as slow until the tenth century (only one-fourth of the eventual total having been converted), with the explosive period coinciding with the reign of 'Abd al-Rahman III (912-961), and the process being completed (eighty percent converted) by the year 1100. Although I have no basis upon which to quarrel with Bulliet, it seems noteworthy that Glick so readily accepts what was then an unpublished

thesis, and certainly one yet to have stood the test of scholarly criticism.

The one major drawback in the work is that the text spans only three hundred pages, and therefore neglects many topics deserving Glick's characteristically sure-handed scholarship. The Visigoths and the Jews, though frequently mentioned, do not receive the full treatment called for. In his section on the patterns of cultural diffusion, Glick neglects art, architecture, literature, and, more importantly, warfare. The methods and mechanisms of transmission in these areas certainly need to be established for a complete picture. Also missing, as indicated by the title, is any discussion of the high and later Middle Ages. Even if one accepts Glick's thesis that the formative periods in both Islamic and Christian Spain were the early centuries of the Middle Ages, the so-called *convivencia* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries still play a key role. Perhaps Glick's next book will center here.

Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages is a magnificent work. Despite technical language and the imposing quality of frequent analysis of Castilian, Latin, and Arabic terms, it is straightforward and clear enough to be used in an upper-division undergraduate class. The fifty-seven pages of notes and bibliography, as well as suggestions for avenues of future research, suit it ideally for the graduate seminar. The book's legacy will not be pedagogical, however, but rather, the significant role it will most likely play in advancing Spanish historiography beyond the stagnating polemic of Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz and Americo Castro. In this alone, scholars of medieval Spain will remain enormously in debt to Professor Glick.

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In Contempt of All Authority: Rural Artisans and Riot in the West of England, 1586-1660. By BUCHANAN SHARP. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 292. Maps, notes, bibliography, index. $17.50.

This is the first book-length study of rioting in seventeenth-century England. Its findings are of major significance for our understanding of both the history of popular disorder and the social structure of pre-industrial England. The most important characteristic of the rural disorders Sharp studies is that the participants were predominantly skilled artisans employed in the mining, ironmaking, and textile industries. In contrast to historians who assert that industrial labor in this period was commonly a "by-employment" of agrarian laborers or husbandmen farmers, Sharp argues that these artisans were in fact propertyless wage earners who together constituted a large proletariat almost entirely dependent on industrial prosperity for their income.

The book focuses on two types of disturbances, food riots and enclosure riots, which resulted from the marginal existence these workers experienced as an industrial labor force in a primarily agricultural society. Unlike previous work on the subject, Sharp emphasizes the role of industrial unemployment, as opposed to harvest failures and high grain prices, as the cause of the approximately forty food riots which occurred in East Anglia and the West between 1586 and 1631. He attributes the anti-enclosure riots, on

the other hand, to the fact that the artisans relied on the royal forests as a vital source of raw materials for their crafts. As propertyless cottagers, they were legally powerless, despite customary practice, to oppose the attempts made by James I and, more vigorously, Charles I to enclose the forests and exploit them as a source of non-Parliamentary Crown income. Faced with the loss of a substantial source of income, artisans rioted and tore down enclosures almost immediately after their erection. The most serious of these riots comprised the "Western Rising" of 1626-1632, and a smaller set of risings in the 1640s and 1650s.

This research demonstrates the importance of the study of popular disturbances to our understanding of the political and social structure of early modern England. The inability of the Crown to effectively enclose its royal forests exemplifies the limits of Charles I's "personal rule." The considerable success of the rioters as well as their common membership in a large class of artisans provide dramatic evidence of social groups unaffected by traditional bonds of deference, and of serious social tensions directed against men of property. These findings cast doubt on any characterization of early modern England as a "one class society."

Nevertheless, Sharp's analysis of the combination of social and economic grievances which precipitated the riots is incomplete. Although he is successful at demonstrating the importance of the threats to the artisans' livelihood imposed by depressions in the cloth trade and deprivations of rights to the forest common, he leaves the reader with an old-fashioned picture of popular unrest as an automatic "gut" reaction to economic distress. What Sharp omits from his analysis is the role of intervening variables in determining the frequency, timing, location, and nature of artisan protest. Without this information, Sharp is unable to explain why there were so few food riots in the seventeenth century, considering both the extreme economic distress in this period and the much greater frequency of riots in eighteenth-century England.

In particular, Sharp fails to convince the reader that the artisans constituted a single social group of wage laborers. As the case of the miners in Dean Forest suggests (p. 207), some of Sharp's "proletariat" were in fact independent entrepreneurs. A more complete examination of the forest communities' social structure, including possible divisions within the artisan class, must also take into account the fact that non-artisans occasionally, but not consistently, defended artisanal resistance to the Crown's attempts at enclosure.

Furthermore, Sharp ignores the role of specific cultural norms in defining the legitimacy of popular disorder. He dismisses the relevance of E.P. Thompson's model of the "moral economy of the crowd" to the seventeenth-century food riots as an "overly sentimental view of the life and behavior of the poor" (p. 33). Yet several elements of the "moral economy" were present in the riots Sharp studies, such as his assertion that the food riots can be considered as "extreme forms of petitioning" to alleviate distress (p. 42), and the fact that the miners' assertions of traditional rights to the forest common were based on custom and long usage (p. 176). In addition, the wrath of the artisans in the food riots was directed against the purveyors of grain, who were frequent enemies of the "moral economy." Nevertheless, Sharp paradoxically argues that the real cause of the artisans' misery was a collapse of the cloth trade. Further consideration is clearly necessary of the role of the "moral economy" as it affected the behavior of both the authorities and the poor.

In all fairness, many of these questions may be unanswerable

due to the limitations of sources. Few local documents have survived, and Sharp is forced to rely primarily on the records of judicial authorities based in London such as the Courts of the Exchequer and Star Chamber. Nevertheless, Sharp fails to discuss how these limitations affect the reliability of his conclusions regarding the social and cultural precipitants of the riots, and his research in the local records outside the clothmaking areas is not comprehensive. Yet his basic findings regarding the social composition of the riots and their economic and political context are solid. They are an important contribution to our knowledge of the Crown's attempts to exploit the resources of the royal forests as a source of non-Parliamentary income, the role of industrial employment in rural England, and the English tradition of artisan radicalism.

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The Politics of Rural Russia 1905-1914. Edited by LEOPOLD H. HAIMSON. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 309. Notes, tables, index. $19.50.

The Politics of Rural Russia 1905-1914 is a collection of individual papers which examine gentry politics during the period of Russia's so-called "constitutional experiment" between the Revolution of 1905 and World War I. The book grew out of a 1968 graduate seminar at Columbia University. Two issues common to most of the original projects unite the papers in this anthology: the influence of the provincial nobility over Russian society and politics during the constitutional period, and the growing isolation of rural politics from the emerging political culture of commercial, industrial Russia.

The 1905 Revolution resulted not only from worker and peasant dissatisfaction and the loss of the Russo-Japanese War, but also from the development of middle class and gentry liberalism during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Russia's gentry faced great difficulties after the abolition of serfdom and the loss of a large part of their lands in 1861. Many were not able to adapt to the growing commercialization of agriculture and the long-term decline in grain prices on the world market. This, combined with the gradual but steady replacement of nobles in the state machinery by professional bureaucrats, led to economic malaise and political estrangement, contributing heavily to the gentry's adoption of western liberal and constitutionalist ideas. When revolution forced Nicholas II to establish representative institutions, to allow the formation of political parties, and to grant civil rights, many of the politically articulate members of the gentry were already conscious liberals. They supported either the new Constitutional Democrats, who favored a liberal parliamentary monarchy along the lines of England's, or the more conservative Octobrists (named after Nicholas's October Manifesto), favoring a parliamentary system more like Germany's, i.e., with a stronger monarchy than the Constitutional Democrats desired.

With the outbreak of the most widespread peasant disorders since the Pugachev rebellion of the eighteenth century, however, a new Great Fear swept the nobility and resulted in a remarkable political backlash. This reaction led the nobility to reject overwhelmingly its earlier liberalism and to seek new ways to protect

its position in society and politics. It is this reaction and the new political forms to which it gave rise that form the main focus of *The Politics of Rural Russia*.

More specifically, the contributions are concerned with the "third of June system," a reference to the government's abolition of the second Duma (parliament) in 1907 and the alteration of electoral laws calculated to reduce the influence of the peasantry and the urban sector in Russia's new "constitutional" politics. This coup shifted the official political spectrum several degrees to the right, all but eliminating the peasant and worker voice in the Duma, and leaving the moderate Constitutional Democrats--already weakened as a party by the gentry reaction--as the new far-left faction. To their right were the Octobrists (now the center-left), the Nationalist Bloc (later, Party) of traditionalist-aristocratic conservatives, and finally, the radical right, including the proto-fascist Union of Russian People, members of the Orthodox clergy, and an assortment of individuals.

With the new instruments available to the nobility--political parties, the Duma, an active conservative press--it was able not only to crush revolutionary attacks on its power from below, but also to ward off what it perceived as attacks on its privileged position from above by an increasingly professionalized, reforming, state bureaucracy. An example of the latter is the defeat of Prime Minister Stolypin's political reforms intended to give the peasants a greater voice in local government, complementing his abolition of the peasant commune to encourage economic differentiation and the emergence of a class of rising smallholders. Ironically, the nobility became increasingly dependent on the state structure to protect its weakening social position, while at the same time utilizing the new constitutional forms to block government-sponsored reforms which might in the long run have prevented the next revolution.

The most substantial contribution to *The Politics of Rural Russia* is by Roberta Thomas Manning, who wrote or co-authored several of the book's essays. In "Zemstvo and Revolution" (the Zemstvos were elective organs of local self-government), Manning analyzes the strengthening of right-wing sentiment among the rank and file provincial gentry immediately following the 1905 Revolution and leading up to the "third of June" system. In "Political Trends in the Zemstvos 1907-1914," Manning and Ruth D. MacNaughton show how the conservative gentry blocked attempts at securing an effective voice in Russian government for the bourgeoisie, the workers, and the peasants, and thus contributed to the later downfall of the imperial order in 1917. Eugene D. Vinogradoff contributed the only selection on peasant politics during the 1905-1914 period, focusing on how peasants were excluded from power in the Dumas and how they tried to maintain some voice even after June 3, 1907. Other articles focus on specific political parties and associations. The introduction and conclusion by Leopold Haimson provide a theoretical overview which relates the individual articles to the main themes of the collection and to the broader history of Russia in this period.

This anthology is a significant contribution to the history of Russia's constitutional experiment. The articles are minutely detailed and based largely on extensive research in Soviet archives. Each contribution is an exhaustive treatment of a well-defined issue, and as such, difficult to criticize. Perhaps the book's very strength is its one minor flaw: its microscopic detail makes for tedious reading. Specialist in nature, the articles address a limited audience. While individual papers may prove useful to the non-specialist reader, anyone seeking an overview of the subject

would be better advised to consult Geoffrey Hosking's 1973 study, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914*.

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Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and Control. By WILLIAM T. HAGAN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966; reprint ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 194. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $4.95 (paper).

Seeking a solution to the Indian "problem," post-Civil War philanthropists assumed the duty of lifting the aborigine to a level of civilization comparable to that of white men. Convinced of the righteousness of the cause, few of these citizens considered taking Indian aspirations into account before launching their reform crusade. Despite this oversight, native Americans became active participants in their own acculturation process. American Indians, by adapting the methods and institutions of the white man, devised strategies to defend their cultural integrity. A sophisticated use of America's communication, religious, educational, and legal systems helped Indian cultures endure and eventually prosper.

William Hagan attempts to tell one part of this story in an unrevised reprint of his 1966 book, *Indian Police and Judges*. During the 1870s, Indian agents decided that their wards could assume responsibility for reservation law and order. Despite low pay, scant provisions, and taunts from fellow tribesmen, "progressive" Indians joined agency police forces. Lawmen like the daring Cherokee Sam Sixkiller evicted reservation trespassers, arrested bootleggers, broke up fights, and forced children to attend school. Informal courts, presided over by native judges, tried lawbreakers. Early experiments proved so successful that Congress agreed to fund the reservation legal systems. Not until after 1900, when state laws began to prevail on reservations, did the need for Indian police diminish.

Throughout this work, Hagan is sympathetic but patronizing toward Indians, often falling into the trap of ethnocentrism. He refers, for example, to native lawmen as "vanguards of a more highly developed civilization" who helped tame a people "among whom the fighting tradition was still strong" (p. 162). While it is true that native Americans had technologically less complex cultures than whites, Hagan deems Indian society inferior. He speaks of superstitious natives as if to imply that Christian whites held no superstitions, and he laments the fact that Indian police often would not overstep the bounds of tribal belief by questioning the authority of a medicine man.

Indian Police and Judges contains several undue simplifications of complex subjects. The author concludes, for example, that native American difficulty with alcohol resulted from an inability to mass produce intoxicants. As inexperienced drinkers, Indians were prone to crime and a constant source of trouble on the reservations. By explaining away the multi-faceted subject of Indian alcoholism in a few sentences, Hagan ignores factors such as stress produced by white efforts to destroy Indian cultural integrity. Similarly, the author oversimplifies when he aligns native civili-

zations along a spectrum with the Plains Indians and the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma as the two extremes, and the Winnebagos, Sacs, and Foxes as "the slough of despond in the middle" (p. 18). By portraying Indian cultures in a linear progression from a savage to a civilized state, Hagan fails to account for the diversity of native civilizations as well as the dynamic flux of all cultures.

Like a well-intentioned reformer of the nineteenth century, Hagan fails to understand the adaptive nature of native American culture. He focuses on the assimilative results of the reservation law program, but fails to demonstrate how Indians used the law to keep their native cultures intact. While praising progressives for accepting farming, education, and white dress, he denigrates so-called conservatives like Sitting Bull, who preferred a traditional life. Hagan's analysis is ill-served by this strict progressive/conservative dichotomy. As he himself acknowledges, by the 1890s, many tribesmen had a foot in each camp. They accepted the outward trappings of white society but managed to keep a separate cultural identity. Comanche Judge Quanah Parker was one example: Hagan tells us that Parker drew praise from whites as an effective lawman. The judge aided civilization efforts by helping agents enact the land allotment program. At the same time he was a pioneer in the dynamic peyote cult. What the author does not reveal is that in 1908, Parker used his law experience successfully to defend this native religion against white efforts to ban it. Other tribesmen used their legal experience to fight infringements on native dances and ceremonies, to prevent white encroachment on their lands, and to ensure government conformity to treaty agreements. Hagan, however, does not discuss those efforts that served to strengthen Indian cultural integrity.

Indian Police and Judges is one of few works that address the subject of reservation legal systems. With the revision demanded by fifteen years of subsequent scholarship, it could have been a valuable book. As it stands now, this interesting subject still awaits adequate treatment.

Joseph B. Herring
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The Los Angeles Barrio, 1850-1890: A Social History. By RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Pp. xiv + 217. Tables, maps, illustrations, appendices, glossary, bibliography, index. $16.50.

Griswold del Castillo's history of the Mexican community during the first decades of the "American era" has as its focus the active participation of the Mexican population in the shaping of its own culture and society. The author's intent is to draw attention away from the concepts of "barrioization" and "proletarianization" as explanations of Chicano history. Recent Chicano historians have argued that the very nature of imperial colonization of non-white peoples by the Anglo-Americans determined the course of the Mexican community's history and culture. Griswold del Castillo's social history of the Los Angeles barrio concentrates on the mechanisms which the community adopted as it was confronted by changes in the economic structure of the region, the in-migration of Anglo-Americans as well as Mexicans, and by the effects of racial segregation on the community.

Following the methodology of New Urban historians Stephen Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, Griswold del Castillo analyzes statistical data found in manuscript census schedules, tax lists, city directories, church documents, and birth and death records. From these he derives occupational structures, population growth charts, and patterns of social and occupational mobility. He deals with problems of statistical accuracy and margins of error in appendices to the work.

During the Spanish and the Mexican eras of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Mexican society in California consisted of a number of small, tightly-knit communities. Traditional pueblo values served to unite communities and to reinforce the heirarchical social structure as the communities evolved from subsistence farming economies to commercial ranching. Political and social leadership was concentrated in the hands of the wealthy Californio landowners by the end of the Mexican era. Yet even as the political structure became more authoritarian, it retained its populist base.

Griswold del Castillo argues that the economic decline of the Mexican community began before the middle of the century, before the "American era." By measuring the rates of persistence among property owners, he shows that although certain occupational changes occurred as the community adapted to the commercialization of the agrarian economy, the occupational structure did not alter sufficiently to include the Mexican community in the region's economic expansion. Instead, the occupational structure was generally stagnant, the population transient, and the community isolated from the developing Los Angeles economy.

In the third and perhaps strongest chapter of the book, the author focuses on the family as that institution which "absorbed the brunt of economic and cultural shocks that marked the transition from national to ethnic status" (p. 62). He observes changes in the size and structure of the family between 1850 and 1890. The female-centered family became a significant institution at a time when changes in the traditional property laws weakened the woman's economic and social status. By 1880 families had become smaller, and, whereas prior to the American era extended families accounted for seventy-one percent of families, the proportion of extended families to nuclear ones fell during the period of 1850 to 1890, despite the superior performance of the extended family in economic and social mobility (pp. 98-102).

In view of its changing relationship to traditional sources of cultural leadership--the institutional Church and the wealthy Californios, both of which tended to ally with Anglo-American interests--the main body of the Mexican-American community developed new sources of cultural expression. This "emerging ethnic consciousness," based in a Mexican nationalism, was reflected in incidences of racial violence within the barrio, judicial and political discrimination within the Anglo-American community, and repatriation to Mexico, on the one hand; and by the growth of Spanish-language newspapers, community schools, and the *mutualistas* (agencies which provided the barrio with social and economic services formerly provided by the Church and the social elites), on the other. Griswold del Castillo sees the emergence of these institutions as a response to the social and political realities of racial, occupational, educational, and political discrimination. The development of an ethnic consciousness provided psychological advantages to the community, which in turn gave meaning to an otherwise bleak existence within the barrio. Griswold del Castillo has interpreted that element of ethnic consciousness as an expression of vitality, a vitality the community needed in order to survive the cultural and social changes brought about not so much by the "Americanization" of

the region, but by the forces of rapid economic growth.

Griswold del Castillo's study of the Los Angeles barrio contrasts sharply with those works which focus on the proletarianization and the barrioization of the Chicano community. He does not deny the community was a working class one, nor that the barrio imposed certain limits upon it. Rather, he has attempted to show what mechanisms the Mexican community adopted in the face of economic and social changes. His study does not deal specifically with the inherent structural limitations of the new capitalist socio-economic system in which the community had hopes of participating. The limitations are revealed, however, in his evidence of the community's economic isolation. This study of the Los Angeles barrio provides a balance to Chicano historical literature. Its aim is to reveal the history of a community undergoing rapid social and economic change, not to write the history of one society's domination of another.

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A Generation of Women: Education in the Lives of Progressive Reformers. By ELLEN CONDLIFFE LAGEMANN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. vii + 207. Illustrations, notes, note on method and sources, index. $12.50.

Lagemann's educational biography offers historians of social and women's history an important interpretation of the process whereby female social reformers gained access to public power and influence during the Progressive Era. By broadly defining education as "a continuous, cumulative, essentially lifelong process of growth," Lagemann has provided a framework to evaluate the life experiences of American women who were self-educated at a time when women were restricted from access to formal professional training.

Biographical essays illuminate the lives of five individuals: Grace Hoardly Dodge, Maud Nathan, Lillian D. Wald, Leonora O'Reilly, and Rose Schneiderman. Lagemann suggests the life cycles of the five historical actors she has evaluated were influenced by two factors: strong parental pedagogy and the influence of important mentor/protegé relationships. Utilizing the methodology of comparative biography, Lagemann makes a persuasive argument for the importance of continuous self-education in the lives of the activists she has examined.

Lagemann describes the extraordinary accomplishments of public leaders which were uncharacteristic of the life experiences of the majority of American women. The five biographies depict women who held public positions and influenced the course of social change both individually and collectively through cross-class associations. The historical contributions of these women in a variety of reform programs, from trade unionism and suffrage to peace organizations and consumerism, reflect the broad reform activism of the period. The question remains, however, whether Lagemann has given enough attention to the larger social changes influencing the lives of the women she has described.

Emphasizing the influence of parents, mentors, and colleagues in the education of the five reformers, Lagemann maximizes her evidence regarding the individual experiences of the women. At the

same time she deemphasizes manuscript material which indicates the effects of such influences as immigration, class, and ethnic factors in the life cycles she has depicted. At times arguing at odds with remembrances described in correspondence, autobiographies, and diaries, Lagemann disputes her historical actors. Often assumptions are not strongly tied to manuscript evidence, which is curious considering the voluminous written legacy left behind in books, manuscripts, and articles by this generation.

Ultimately, the book must be judged by the extent to which the five biographies are indicative of the generation of cohorts addressed by this research. With no explanation by the author of why she chose these particular reformers, or why their lives are indicative of the experiences of their cohorts, one is left with unanswered questions. In a period marked for the dominance and influence of Yankee Protestants, why were three-fifths of Lagemann's sample Jewish, and why is religion an ancillary factor in her analysis? During a period characterized by the increasingly political participation of female activists, why did Lagemann downplay the significance of the political appointments earned by her sample?

The form of biography offers historians the opportunity to weave personal and political aspects of singular human experience against the warp of collective social experience. Lagemann has succeeded in describing the lives of five female leaders while failing to examine the context of their opportunities and limitations in the wider social arena. Her study of education and pedagogy nevertheless fills a historiographical gap in women's and social history. She has drawn a portrait of struggle by social reformers implementing differential personal strategies to address important social issues of their times. If the picture she has drawn is sometimes static and limited, it is a picture with which we need to become more familiar.

Elizabeth Weisz-Buck
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The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 1535-1585: Precedent, Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony. By PAUL E. HOFFMAN. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 312. Maps, tables, appendices, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. $30.00.

Until recently the history of the colonial Spanish Caribbean had received little innovative attention from scholars. When the area was studied at all, interest centered on either the early years of discovery, conquest, and settlement, or on defense, piracy, contraband trade, and non-Spanish attempts to found colonies in the area during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The present study is significant because, while firmly in the latter genre, it looks at the seldom-studied period of the mid-sixteenth century. Hoffman disagrees with the time-honored belief that the Spanish Crown was incapable of dealing with the challenge to its sovereignty in the Indies. Instead, his book graphically demonstrates that Spain began to formulate the policies and procedures to deal with a foreign presence in the Indies during the middle of the sixteenth century. In fact, Spanish arms enjoyed some success in meeting the physical threat to their colonies even at this early time, though the techniques employed would only reach maturity in following centuries. No less significant is the author's use of

previously ignored source materials--especially records of royal expenditures for defense in the Indies--to which he applies a sophisticated methodology.

Breaking new ground, Hoffman bases his study heavily on treasury records of the *Casa de Contratación* in Spain and seventeen treasuries in the New World. All of them can be found today in the *Archivo General de las Indias* of Seville and the *Archivo General* of Simancas. These records not only contain lists of expenses, but also copies of royal *cédulas*, authorizations, and dispositions of the actual transactions which appear to be about seventy percent complete for the years under study. Hoffman discusses his methodology in a general way in the introduction and in much greater detail in a highly useful appendix. He uses a sophisticated computer technique to help analyze his rich, extensive sources, and to construct the work's many excellent tables. This method allows him to formulate a time series revealing important patterns of development during the period under study.

In the course of four chapters, dividing the period 1535-1585 into what Hoffman believes were unique stages in the formation of a viable defense for the Indies, several types of expenditures are considered. These include money spent for fleets and convoy escorts, patrol squadrons, land fortifications, munitions, militias, and garrisons. At the same time, the author applies his statistical method to the size and frequency of contraband trade and corsair attacks in the Indies. Hoffman painstakingly correlates data obtained in this manner with several factors he considers crucial in shaping the Spanish effort, the most important of which are: the historical experience available for the Crown to build upon (precedents); recognition by all parties involved of the King's obligation to deal with the problem (patrimonialism); and royal willingness or ability to pay for defense (parsimony). All of this is summarized and conclusions drawn in the concise final chapter of the book. By using this method and organization, Hoffman is able to arrive at the clearest, and perhaps the most significant, picture to date of the patterns of defense in the Indies.

Since this is a study of royal defense expenditures, it might at first seem that the Crown plays a more important role in the discussion than current opinions of royal effectiveness will allow. But the author goes beyond an unthinking listing of the actions of an omniscient Crown by critically relating what the ruler and his councils thought or decreed to what actually took place, both as revealed by actual expenditures and by local reception of, or indifference to, royal moves. Hoffman presents a picture of a Crown which, especially in the early colonial period, was hard-pressed to make its wishes felt over local, political, or commercial interests, a Crown whose plans were often ignored or circumvented, whose monies were continually usurped by officials on the scene for other purposes, and whose sometimes inadequate or belated responses were often augmented by ad hoc local initiative.

At first glance, Hoffman's findings appear to support the old view of Spanish ineptitude in meeting the threat to the colonies. Certainly the continuous references to delay, seemingly ill-timed royal parsimony, monopolistic mercantile policies which served to encourage contraband trade, and continual failure of diplomacy seem to point to that traditional view. But Hoffman sees in this early period the beginnings of formulating a defense policy based on the precedents of experience and the growing realization that the empire could no longer be maintained through the efforts of the private sector alone. The Crown, the commercial interests, and the citizens of the Indies themselves moved in fits and starts toward the acknowledgement that royal monies and energy--royal patrimony--

would have to be vigorously employed if sovereignty was to be preserved. Though the results were certainly uneven, the effort was successful in meeting the threat given the technology of the time and so long as certain assumptions (such as the typical size of corsair fleets) were not challenged.

On the whole, Hoffman's treatment of his subject is comprehensive, but in some cases the discussion might have been deepened. Though the author gives a clear picture of the growth and organization of militias, a similar treatment of royal garrisons is not as complete. He indicates that garrisons, usually temporary in nature, were recruited from both the Indies and Spain. It would be enlightening to know the proportion of individuals provided by each area and perhaps the social type involved. Certainly the extent to which the Indies were expected or able to provide hired garrisons for their own defense is a significant factor, and a discussion of it would have strengthened the work.

The only real technical drawback is in some sections of narrative prose, notably those dealing with fleet movements. With their many references to commanders, fleets, and an occasionally choppy chronology, they can become confusing and tedious. Surely these sections could have been streamlined to retain the details without leading the reader through a morass of names and dates. It must be emphasized, however, that these structural flaws are relatively minor, and most of the writing is clear and informative. Hoffman always summarizes his discussion, minimizing any confusion which might arise from parts of the text. He has demonstrated that the sixteenth-century Caribbean saw the establishment of important precedents for defense which would lead to the more successful systems of the following centuries. Both his innovative use of sources and groundbreaking conclusions bring fresh insights to an old problem.

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São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937. By JOSEPH LOVE. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980. Pp. xx + 398. Illustrations, tables, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. $25.00.

Recently some American Brazilianists have begun to question their approach to Brazilian history. This developing school of thought has decided that the use of the term "Brazil," when applied to the period from 1889 to about 1940, is inaccurate and misleading. During this period, it is argued, Brazil was not one unified entity but rather an extremely loose association of diverse and geographically separate regions which can only be truly understood in their separateness. Joseph Love is one of the three main founders of this new view and his book forms the third part of a trilogy of Brazilian regional studies by the founders of the school. (The previous two works in this trilogy are *Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937* by John Wirth and *Pernambuco in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937* by Robert Levine.) All three are concerned with the period in Brazilian history known as the "First Republic."

The basis of this regionalist history, according to Love, is an almost complete erosion of a centralization which had characterized colonial and pre-republican Brazil. From 1822, the year of

Brazil's independence from Portugal, political and economic power began to devolve from a strong central government based in Rio de Janeiro to the various state capitals. By 1889 regional politics had far outstripped national politics in importance. The various individual states, not "Brazil" as a nation, became the basic focus of political loyalty and organization. Love points out, for example, that the concept of a national political party was completely alien in Brazil until 1922, when the first national political party was founded: the Brazilian Communist Party.

While the focus of this study is on São Paulo's internal developments, it is impossible to discuss São Paulo in this period without discussing its role in Brazilian national politics. In no other Brazilian state during the First Republic was state politics so nearly synonymous with national politics. Love points out that from 1894 to 1930 Paulistas held the vast majority of important national posts, including the Presidency for eighteen years. From the lofty heights of national office, Paulistas were able to facilitate the dominance of São Paulo's economic interest over the other states. São Paulo's emergence during the First Republic as *the* most influential factor in Brazil's political economy is in fact one of the major themes of this book. As Love points out in great detail, the importance of São Paulo's coffee industry was the basis of this Paulista dominance. While the coffee growers waxed fat on the international demand for coffee (supported in lean times by large federal subsidies), the rest of Brazil waned terribly.

The Brazilian specialist will find this book of extreme interest because of Love's treatment of the "dependency" issue. Most scholarship on Brazil now routinely incorporates the arguments of the dependency school of analysis, which has come to dominate the field. This school of thought, founded and made popular by Andre Gunder Frank, holds that Brazil's underdevelopment came about as a result of its economic domination by the capitalist world. Love, however, argues that São Paulo's development, at least, was not retarded by western-based capital. Love believes Paulistas held enough political and economic advantages to "offset an importers monopoly" and increase their share of coffee profits sufficiently to control their own destiny. With enormous capital accumulation based on coffee, São Paulo was free of the stymying effects of foreign "dependence."

Love buttresses his argument concerning São Paulo's development with a plethora of charts, graphs, and statistical tables, the results of feeding his raw research data into a computer. Practitioners of the cliometric school think computer results provide their conclusions with irrefutable scientific objectivity. Yet São Paulo, despite Love's protestations to the contrary, was indeed a classical mono-crop dependency of the capitalist world, its destiny controlled not locally but by western capitalists. What Love unwittingly relates is a classical case of growth without development.

Love's use of the cliometric methodology can best be understood as another attempt by a conservative western scholar to offer a "scientific" alternative to the dependency school of analysis, with its clear foundation on the Marxist critique of capitalism. In his ideological zeal to present a quantified version of São Paulo's development from 1889 to 1937, Love completely overlooks important social factors. An excellent example of this point is Love's myopic focus on São Paulo's elites; they are the only social group he deems worthy of his consistent concern. Except for a scant few pages on the workers' union movement in São Paulo, the common man is all but ignored. For Love, political and economic history is reduced to a mere recounting, albeit in encyclopedic

detail, of the political and economic vicissitudes of the "elite" members of São Paulo's ruling class. His focus was obviously dictated by the availability of written sources, yet more progressive-minded social scientists are transcending such strictures by using oral sources and by borrowing some research methodology from social anthropologists.

In the introduction to this book Love writes that he hopes to see many more regionalist works produced in the near future, even suggesting the regions most in need of attention. While this call for further research is worthwhile, it is hoped that the sophistry of cliometric methodology will be abandoned. It is also hoped that further regionally-based research will fully integrate all the social classes of the region into its discussion.

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Paraguay Under Stroessner. By PAUL H. LEWIS. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 256. Notes, bibliography, index. $22.00.

Alfredo Stroessner, the last of Latin America's "traditional" dictators, has ruled Paraguay for the past twenty-seven years, surpassing even Fidel Castro in tenure. Unlike the Cuban revolutionary, however, Stroessner has rarely been the subject of scholarly analysis. Now, Paul H. Lewis has written a finely-crafted study that treats the reading public to a non-polemical look at the political structure of contemporary Paraguay.

Lewis discredits the "man on horseback" image often associated with the Paraguayan chief of state. Instead, the Stroessner portrayed here is a consummate politician whose durability in office can be traced to his use of a very modern set of strategies. By transforming the Colorado Party into a highly centralized and disciplined apparatus, Stroessner has enhanced his regime's ability to mobilize considerable support among the peasantry. At the same time, his manipulation of traditional hatreds and development of an "ideology" of *Coloradismo* have extended the Party's network into other social classes. Finally, Stroessner has co-opted the military and fused Party and state bureaucracies into a coherent unit, thus creating in Paraguay an insulated and self-sustaining regime.

The examination of Stroessner's political prowess is provocative and unusually well-balanced. Lewis relies extensively on secondary sources and material garnered from interviews with political exiles. With most primary materials under lock and key, the extent of Lewis's analysis is all the more remarkable. All opposition groups are described with reference to program and internal organization, including the Roman Catholic Church, which remains the most formidable opponent of the regime. Lewis, it should be noted, is no stranger to the world of Paraguayan opposition politics; his account of the Febrerista Party, *The Politics of Exile* (1968), provides the English-reading public with a rare look at underground activities in a South American context.

Some of the background information, however, is misleading. It is perhaps premature to draw too many conclusions from Colorado-Liberal rivalry in the late nineteenth century. One could debate, for example, whether Bernardino Caballero really represented an

"authoritarian socialist tradition" (p. 20). In fact, the Caballero government, along with other post-Triple Alliance war regimes, was responsible for the wholesale liquidation of public lands and state-owned industries, many of which passed directly into foreign hands. Such were hardly the actions of a socialist-oriented administration.

For the Stroessner period itself, several interesting lacunae might be noted. First, biographical details are sparse. We are told little of Stroessner's early life in the army or of his participation in the Chaco conflict. His pre-1947 party affiliations are also left shrouded in mystery. Second, Lewis does not discuss Stroessner's alleged support of expatriate Nazis, including the notorious Josef Mengele. Third, although he deals at length with the role of Epifanio Mendez Fleitas, leader of the leftist Movimiento Popular Colorado, Lewis fails to address the charge, made in 1975 by Philip Agee in *Inside The Company* (p. 342), that Mendez Fleitas was, in fact, an agent of the CIA. Such an analysis might place Stroessner's political opposition in a very different light.

None of these criticisms seriously impairs Lewis's achievement. He has taken a virtually unknown and, it might be added, somewhat dangerous subject and has rendered it understandable to both scholar and layman. His examination of political authoritarianism will doubtless prove useful in analyzing other situations in the Third World. Moreover, by blazing a frontier in Paraguayan studies, Lewis has made Stroessner less of an "untouchable" for researchers.

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

JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Special Features

"Special Features" aims to provide a cumulative and updated directory of existing academic resources and professional services as well as general information of interest to graduate history students. Organizations and/or individuals wishing to submit material for publication in Volume 3 are encouraged to do so. The deadline for all submissions is April 15 of each year.

This installment of "Special Features" includes an essay by Marilyn Turner on how to prepare a college-level course proposal and how to turn a dissertation into a book, and briefer notes by Roger Long on bibliographic guides, directories, academic newsletters, professional associations, grants and fellowships, travel and accommodations, getting published, and jobs and career opportunities.

HOW TO PREPARE A COURSE PROPOSAL AND HOW TO TURN A DISSERTATION INTO A BOOK: There are two critical decisions everyone must face before selecting a career. First, you should decide what vocation will be the most personally rewarding. Second, you should be aware of supply and demand in that profession. Regarding the first factor, there is little question that graduate historians expect career satisfaction. But the second item--today's job market for historians--is not promising. Given the declining classroom enrollments and the subsequent drop in the demand for history professionals, departments nationwide are encouraging graduate students to reevaluate their goals and to use their research and writing skills in business and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the majority of graduate students do not want an MBA or a law degree--they want to be academic historians.

Is this refusal to accept reality foolish? Perhaps. But Professor Elizabeth Perry at the University of California, Los Angeles, offers practical tips for graduates who wish to pursue a career in academia even in the face of a tight job market. Her advice centers on two topics: how to prepare a course proposal and how to turn a dissertation into a book. Both can help in obtaining employment or securing advancement.

Perry counsels that to prepare a course proposal, begin by collecting ideas *now*. Start files of general categories such as "women," "medicine," or "the American West," or any other topic, and include any and all random, creative thoughts and select bibliographies. According to Perry, the key to a solid course proposal is source material, and this can be found in a variety of places. Advertisements for book sellers, scholarly journals, and favorite undergraduate and graduate courses are only a few locations. There is no fixed method to gather material, so you should expect to change and remain open to all kinds of ideas. Do not be too discriminating. Refining can be done later. As your individual files become full, place these on the back burner for a while and begin new ones. Time will eventually reveal superficiality and will help in weeding out the foolish or the irrelevant material when later additions are made.

An important point to keep in mind while establishing such files is that most history departments are concerned with enrollment figures since these help determine departmental funding. De-

partments need to attract non-majors, and, as a result, historians must "sell" history to a broad range of people. Perry suggests that interdisciplinary approaches, such as those which combine law or psychology with history, are among the ways you can broaden history's appeal and boost enrollments.

The second phase in preparing a proposal is organization. By sorting through files, you can eliminate potential topics until a particularly intriguing and well-documented one remains. With the topic chosen, Perry advises that you should review the major points of the ideas and sources in the file and determine what main concepts students should learn from the course. Furthermore, the development of these concepts must have a logical progression. Organizing demands discipline--the course must make sense and, as far as possible, fit the limits of your intended students' backgrounds.

After arranging your ideas in a logical manner, the course can be formalized in typewritten form. The proposal should include a title, a brief description, prerequisites and restrictions (if any), and a week-by-week syllabus. It also should outline assigned work (such as papers, etc.), goals, staffing requirements, and a budget. Legitimize the course with a three-to-four page bibliography and an explanation of the course's academic merit. End with an example of a projected mid-term exam. While writing the proposal, remember that active verbs are direct and convey confidence and vitality. Your wording could determine the reception of your work, placing it at the front of a department's files rather than at the back.

When the final draft is ready to submit, there are a number of institutional variables which come into play when deciding where to send your proposal. Junior colleges, for example, may be receptive to innovative programs such as teaching history through extensive use of the media. On the other hand, history departments at larger universities, while they may also be open to fresh ideas, frequently are more traditional than their junior partners. Perry states that you should take the time to investigate the school where you plan to submit your proposal and find out what types of courses are offered currently. In addition, it is useful to learn the various specializations of the faculty members at a school and avoid "trespassing" on their turf. Try to appear as an enthused addition, not an overbearing upstart.

University extensions can be promising spots for new course proposals. Extension services often look for courses to attract students from outside traditional student fields. Although extensions pay about one-third as much as mainstream colleges, they can be invaluable in adding to teaching experience. You must, however, watch for deadlines. Unlike mainstream history departments, university extensions have rigid cut-off dates for accepting course proposals and these are usually early in the academic year.

After teaching your course for the first time, you will find that interaction with students may cause you to want to change your approach, to clarify or expand. Do not resist this urge. When a course is new and not a time-tested success, you should expect to add readings, alter emphases, and make other appropriate changes. Above all, be flexible.

In addition to advice on course proposals, Perry offers some worthwhile thoughts on the eventual appearance of your dissertation as a book. This may not necessarily happen, and you instead may publish scholarly papers or articles which are, of course, valuable. But Perry advises that planning to turn your dissertation

into a book can be psychologically therapeutic, and professionally rewarding. Moreover, such planning can improve the style and development of your thesis.

There are a number of distinctions between dissertations and books which are important to recognize when converting from the former to the latter. A dissertation is often overly-long. Since publishers rarely market a book exceeding 350 pages, Perry recommends that you cut "fat." Gear your writing as much as possible toward the "educated reader," and not to your committee chair or peers. It *is* possible to maintain academic excellence while appealing to a wider audience, and you should strive to do both. Form, however, is another matter. It may be difficult to alter the form due to your faculty's preference for the traditional or the unusual, but attention to differences in form are nonetheless instructive and may help you avoid common problems. For example, dissertations tend to wallow in their scholarliness whereas most educated readers are not nearly so concerned about references to other scholars. A dissertation wants to sound knowledgeable, but a book is more intent on being clear. A dissertation seeks to make *the* definitive statement. A book, on the other hand, frequently raises questions it does not assume to answer.

As a result of the above distinctions, dissertations usually are not saleable. This can be overcome, however, with some effort. Perry suggests that after you finish your dissertation, ask a friend to read it. When they subsequently offer criticisms, take them in good spirit. You may not ultimately take all their advice but objectivity is worth a great deal. Bear in mind that when you are converting your dissertation, it is no longer a finished product; it is a working copy and criticism will help refine it into a book.

You may have to reorder the chapters, clarify and/or "beef-up" areas, but again, be flexible. Pare the length no matter how much it hurts. In addition to major restructuring, also perfect maps, illustrations, and tables. (Incidentally, a professional cartographer is always a good investment.) Furthermore, drop as much academic jargon as possible without sacrificing the work. You should aim for the broadest appeal.

After reshaping as much as you can, write a two-page abstract--a book proposal describing how your book is unique. Perry advises that this should be in a relaxed fashion to convey your particular style and to pique a publisher's curiosity. Send this abstract with your manuscript to the publisher and enclose a return envelope with postage. It is a customary courtesy to send your manuscript to only one publisher at a time. You will not need an agent if you send your thesis to an academic press. University presses compete for good dissertations, so you can count on a prompt and thorough review of yours. An agent will be necessary, however, when submitting to a non-academic press because these rarely accept dissertations.

When a publisher receives your manuscript, at least one and sometimes two editors are assigned to read it. The manuscript will then go to an outside "expert" in the field, after which an editorial conclave will determine if your work is acceptable. If your material is not what that publisher is interested in, they will send you the outside reader's comments along with suggestions for another press, often including the name of a specific person to contact. On the other hand, if your manuscript is accepted, you are far from finished. There will be trivia to dicker over, contracts to negotiate, and galley proofs to read. The press itself gets the copywrite in your name for a set number of years so do not

expect instant wealth from the venture. But you will be in print, and that, Perry adds, will help your career. For further information on converting your doctoral dissertation into a published work, Perry recommends: Eleanor Harman and Ian Montagnes, eds., *The Thesis and the Book* (1976).

Teaching and publishing, the mainstays of the history profession, may appear distant to the struggling graduate student. You nonetheless can begin to help your career by ordering ideas for a course proposal and working toward the eventual publication of your dissertation.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDES: Listing all extant bibliographic guides is beyond the scope of this section, but the following publications will assist in making a basic search and keeping up-to-date with new books and articles.

Any bibliographic search should begin with *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*, both produced by ABC-Clio Press. For a free "List of Publications" surveyed by ABC-Clio for their guides, contact them at Riviera Campus, 2040 A.P.S., P.O. Box 4397, Santa Barbara, California 93103.

For new books, *The Times Literary Supplement* is the best single source available. See also the history section of "New Scholarly Books" in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. The subject volumes for *Books in Print* are also indispensible.

Other valuable sources are the *Bibliographical Guide to North American History*, G.K. Hall and Company, Boston, Massachusetts; *Historical Periodicals*, ABC-Clio; *Ulrich's International Periodical Directory*, Bowker, New York; and *Irregular Serials and Annuals*, also by Bowker. Forthcoming from ABC-Clio is *Historical Periodicals Directory*, Volume 1: *U.S.A. and Canada*.

Recently Published Articles is issued by the American Historical Association, 400 A Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003, while Gale Research Company produces *Book Review Index, 1981 Periodical Issues*, *Book Review Index - Annual Clothbound Cumulations*, and *Book Review Index 1969-1979: A Master Cumulation*. The *Index to Book Reviews in Historical Periodicals 1972-1975* is compiled by John W. Brewster and Joseph A. McLead, with annual author/title indexes also issued. Only English language periodicals are indexed although foreign publications are included if reviewed in English. *Current Contents/Arts and Humanities* issued weekly by ISI, enables you "to read the titles of items listed on the contents pages of nearly 1,100 journals."

To obtain a free copy of one or more of the 121 bibliographies of doctoral dissertations and masters theses write to University Microfilms International, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 or call toll free 800-268-6090 (Michigan, Alaska, Hawaii, and Canada excepted). You can buy copies at $9.00 for microform and $18.00 for xerographic. These prices are for academics (libraries, departments, faculty, staff, and students) in the United States and Canada only.

Finally, the Association for the Bibliography of History in conjunction with Lauinger Library and the Department of History at Georgetown University has organized the National Registry for the Bibliography of History which will "collect, record and disseminate information about bibliographic projects in all fields of history." For information contact Thomas T. Helds, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057

DIRECTORIES: At present there are over five thousand directories of all kinds listed in the *Directory of Directories*. It is arranged in fifteen broad subject categories and published by Gale Research Company. Some directories of particular use to history students include the following:

Gale Research Company produces two very useful directories of libraries, the *Directory of Special Libraries and Information Centers*, Volume 1, *Special Libraries and Information Centers in the United States and Canada*, Volume 2, *Geographic and Personnel Indexes*, and Volume 3, *New Special Libraries*. The second directory is the *Subject Directory of Special Libraries and Information Centers*, the fourth volume of which covers social sciences and humanities libraries.

A Directory of Asian and African Libraries in North America is currently being compiled by the Asian and African Section of the American Library Association. For further information, contact Janet Krompart, Secretary, Asian and African Section, ACRL, AAS, Library, Oakland University, Rochester, Minnesota 48063.

The standard guide to "who's where" in the academic world is the *National Faculty Guide, 1981*, a two-volume work published by Gale.

The American Historical Association's *Directory of Historical Consultants* lists "thirty firms and seventy-three individual consultants," giving a good idea of the kinds of opportunities open to historians to practice history outside of academia.

For the Third World, the *International Directory of Third World Scholars and Specialists* is the most up-to-date work (1981).

ACADEMIC NEWSLETTERS: The University of Maryland is compiling a comprehensive list of newsletters in Asian Studies. For further information, contact Frank Joseph Shulman, East Asia Collection, McKeddie Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.

ASSOCIATIONS: Joining a professional association which issues a newsletter (and most do) is the best way to keep abreast of developments in the history profession, and with various deadlines for items such as paper proposals, scholarships, and travel arrangements. The three-volume *Encyclopedia of Associations* is a basic guide in the field. Volume 1 is subtitled "National Organizations of the U.S."; volume 2, "Geographic and Executive Index," lists all the executives mentioned in volume 1. Volume 3 supplements the first volume by giving information on "New Associations and Projects."

Among those associations listed in the *Encyclopedia* is the American Historical Association whose *Newsletter* is useful to learn of other organizations' activities and deadlines. More information on the AHA can be obtained by writing to them at 400 A Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS: A basic listing is found in *Foundation Grants to Individuals* available for $15.00 from the Foundation Center, 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York 10019 or by dialing toll-free 800-424-9336. Also valuable is *The Instant Foundation Telephone Index*, which costs $7.50 and can be received by writing to Research Grant Guides, P.O. Box 357, Oceanside, New York 11572. Other useful guides include *Grantsmanship* ($6.00, Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212), and *Your Own Financial Factory* ($4.95, Octameron Associates, P.O.

Box 3437, Alexandria, Virginia 22302). See also the American Historical Association's *Grants and Fellowships of Interest to Historians*.

To do the searching for you, there is The Scholarship Bank located at 10100 Santa Monica #750, Los Angeles, California 90067. They will sell you fifty computer-searched sources for $45.00 or twenty for $35.00. When writing to them, enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

For additional sources consult *A Guide to Scholarships, Fellowships and Grants: A Selected Bibliography*, available free from the Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017.

TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATION: For traveling by air to attend conferences or other activities of an educational nature, the National Center for Educational Travel, Inc. offers a group flight program. Write to George Marucci, Travel Systems Inc., 1990 M Street N.W., Suite 480, Washington, D.C. 20036.

GETTING PUBLISHED: The American Historical Association in cooperation with the Association of American University Presses has a program aimed at securing publication for first works by historians. Contact the AHA at 400 A Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 for further information.

Deserving special mention is the recently-published *Historical Journals: A Handbook for Writers and Reviewers*, by Dale R. Steiner (hardcover, $28.50; paper, $13.85). Published by ABC-Clio Press, this useful reference work provides detailed information on a multitude of scholarly historical periodicals particularly aimed at getting book reviews and articles published. This information includes journals' focuses, addresses, length and style requirements for manuscripts, how many copies are required, the proportions of manuscripts usually accepted, frequencies of issue, average journal page lengths, and circulation figures. In addition, the *Handbook* offers general advice on submitting articles, as well as how to become a book reviewer. This is by far the single most useful source on getting published in journals.

JOB AND CAREER OPPORTUNITIES: *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, published weekly, and the quarterly *Employment Information Bulletin*, an AHA publication, are the premier sources for information concerning openings in teaching and other areas of education.

Careers in Business for Historians, edited by Lawrence Bruser, is available for $3.00 from the Public History Research Office, Department of History, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106.

Other career-related information can be obtained from organizations listed in the booklet "So You've Chosen To Be a History Professional," available from the American Association for State and Local History, 1400 8th Avenue South, Nashville, Tennessee 37203.

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

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